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Abstract
Wireless communications is widely employed in modern society and plays an in-
creasingly important role in people’s daily life. The broadcast nature of radio propa-
gation, however, causes wireless communications particularly vulnerable to malicious
attacks, and leads to critical challenges in securing the wireless transmission. Moti-
vated by the insufficiency of traditional approaches to secure wireless communications,
physical layer security that is emerging as a complement to the traditional upper-layer
security mechanisms is investigated in this dissertation. Five novel techniques toward
the physical layer security of wireless communications are proposed. The first two
techniques focus on the security risk assessment in wireless networks to enable a
situation-awareness based transmission protection. The third and fourth techniques
utilize wireless medium characteristics to enhance the built-in security of wireless
communication systems, so as to prevent passive eavesdropping. The last technique
provides an embedded confidential signaling link for secure transmitter-receiver in-
teraction in OFDM systems.
In order to effectively and efficiently defend against malicious attacks in a wire-
less network, the transmission nodes need to understand the communication risk in
the operating environment. A security level awareness scheme is proposed in this
dissertation, where the number of active users in a multipath fading environment is
estimated. A time domain pilot correlation (TDPC) algorithm for detecting OFDM
signals with frequency domain inserted pilots is proposed to recognize the presence
of active users, based on the cyclic correlation between the complex conjugate multi-
plication of received signal segments and a local time domain pilot reference. Taking
ii
advantage of a typical device fingerprint—I/Q imbalance, the number of active users
is estimated through counting all the identified distinct transmitter I/Q imbalances.
With regard to enhancing the built-in security of wireless communication systems
against passive eavesdropping, two novel anti-eavesdropping OFDM systems are pro-
posed by exploiting the reciprocal, location-dependent and time-varying nature of
wireless channels. Based on the instantaneous channel state information (CSI) be-
tween the transmitter and legitimate receiver, dynamic coordinate interleaving and
subcarrier interleaving are employed in the two proposed secure OFDM systems, re-
spectively. In the coordinate interleaving scheme, a transmitter performs coordinate
interleaving at partial subcarriers of each OFDM signal, where the symbol coordi-
nate of an OFDM subcarrier is interleaved in an opportunistic manner depending on
the associated subcarrier channel gain or phase. The subcarrier interleaving strategy
is realized by interleaving subcarriers of each OFDM signal according to the sorted
order of their sub-channel gains. Since wireless channels associated with each pair
of users at separate locations exhibit independent multipath fading, the frequently
renewed security design can only be shared between legitimate users based on channel
reciprocity. Consequently, eavesdropping is prevented due to mismatched information
recovery at the eavesdropper.
In the final part of the dissertation, the proposed anti-eavesdropping OFDM sys-
tems are upgraded by enabling an efficient and confidential side information transmis-
sion mechanism between the legitimate users, without interrupting the data transmis-
sion and requiring additional time and frequency resources. In the design, the cyclic
prefix of an OFDM signal is replaced by a specially tailored orthogonal sequence. The
side information is conveyed by the confidential orthogonal sequence that maintains
the same time and frequency characteristics as the data-carrying OFDM symbol.
Key words: Wireless communications, physical layer security, OFDM, security level
awareness, eavesdropping prevention, embedded confidential signaling.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Research Motivation
Wireless communications, which removes the constraint of cable connections for
information exchange, is becoming ubiquitous nowadays. Over the last few decades,
wireless technologies have been widely employed in military, civilian and commercial
services. However, due to the inherent broadcast nature of radio signal propaga-
tion, wireless communications is vulnerable to masses of malicious attacks, including
eavesdropping, jamming, spoofing and so on [1]. Hence, securing wireless commu-
nication systems has become a critical issue along with the proliferation of wireless
applications [1].
Traditionally, security strategies for wired communication systems, such as au-
thentication and encryption at the link and upper layers, are extended to the wireless
counterparts. However, the traditional approaches are not sufficient for securing
wireless communications, due to the lack of a robust physical-layer protection [2]. As
wired communication systems rely on a wire-based physical connection, adversaries
inserting into the original link can be easily detected and illegal access to the network
can be prevented. A secure physical layer is inherently provided by the channel access
mechanism of wired communication systems, so that no special physical-layer protec-
1
tion is addressed in the traditional security strategies. Conversely, the physical layer
of wireless communications is the most vulnerable and easy to compromise part of the
system due to the unconstrained propagation of the electromagnetic wave. A secure
physical layer would thus be a determinant in protecting the wireless transmission.
Recently, physical layer security has emerged as an effective and valuable paradigm to
improve the security of wireless communications, as a complement to the traditional
security techniques.
Inherent physical-layer properties of wireless communications can be exploited to
enhance the transmission security, including the situation- and user-dependent ran-
domness from the wireless medium [2] and the unique radio frequency distinct native
attribute (RF-DNA) of wireless devices [3]. These physical-layer properties can be
employed for the transmission confidentiality enhancement, the user authentication,
as well as the intrusion and spoofing detection in wireless networks. Several physical
layer security schemes have been reported in the literature [4–12]. With a compre-
hensive study of the existing physical layer security techniques, we can find that
the present schemes usually require significant modifications to off-the-shelf systems
and have high computational complexity. Intelligent, effective, simple and efficient
physical-layer approaches for securing wireless communication systems have yet to be
investigated.
Orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) has been widely employed in
modern high-speed wireless communication networks, such as Long-Term Evolution
(LTE), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 and IEEE
802.16, because of its spectrum efficiency and robustness to multipath distortion.
However, the conventional OFDM signal is vulnerable to malicious eavesdropping
and intervention, due to its distinct time and frequency characteristics [13]. The
traditional security strategies at upper layers of the protocol stack cannot completely
address the security threats in wireless OFDM systems of a physical layer transparent
to adversaries. It is therefore of great importance to enhance the security of OFDM
at the physical layer.
2
1.1.1 Security Risk Assessment in Wireless Networks
In order to provide confidential, authenticated, integral and reliable communica-
tion between legitimate users, a wireless communication system needs to take some
proper actions to defend against the malicious attacks. One fact to be addressed is
that the transmission risk of an operating environment is time-varying due to vari-
ations of the channel conditions, the surrounding devices as well as the roles played
by coexistent users [14]. As a result, the security scheme and implementation need
to be evaluated regularly and updated corresponding to the security risk changes in
the communication environment. Otherwise, insufficient defending would fail to pro-
tect the transmission security, and over-performed countermeasures would reduce the
efficiency of the system since any security solution is resource-consuming.
In order to effectively and efficiently defend against malicious attacks in a wireless
network, a wireless device should assess the security risk in the operating environment
in the first place. Intuitively, a wireless device could identify all malicious attacks and
then take corresponding actions to combat the identified attacks, which, however, is
not enough since the detection of the types of attacks cannot indicate the severity of
the security threat. Furthermore, the detection of all malicious attacks is unrealistic
in the practical implementation. First of all, there are a mass of potential attacks
and each typical security attack may have numerous derived varieties [14]. Hence, it
is difficult for legitimate users to identify all malicious attacks in the detection phase.
Second, the attack detection process is time- and power-consuming. Large numbers
of tests have to be carried out in order to cover adequate potential attacks. Putting
aside the latency caused by the attack detection phase to the data transmission, the
detection results may be out-of-date, and legitimate users may suffer power-crisis.
In addition, some attacks are hard to be identified in time, such as eavesdropping,
spoofing, and attacks from adversaries with anti-reconnaissance capabilities. There-
fore, security risk assessment in wireless networks cannot rely on the attack detection
strategy.
3
To that end, security risk assessment schemes for wireless communications, which
can effectively and efficiently evaluate the transmission risk in an operating environ-
ment, need to be investigated. In principle, any node in a network, even a present
legitimate user, may intentionally or unintentionally perform hostile attacks such as
eavesdropping and jamming, and becomes a potential threat [15]. It is near impossible
to prevent some amount of data loss or disclosure from devices that can physically
access the network [16]. The communication risk arises along with the increase of
coexistent users. Hence, the number of active users in a network can generally in-
dicate the security level of a wireless environment, and be used to guide developing
the defending strategies. Compared with the risk assessment scheme that attempts
to detect all potential attacks, the estimation of the number of active users is much
simpler and easier to be implemented. Although the number of active users in a net-
work cannot identify the attacks, it would imply the possible existence of attackers
and the defending intensity needed in the operating environment.
Considering that device identities at upper layers of the protocol stack such as
media access control (MAC) and Internet protocol (IP) addresses can be duplicated
with little effort, mature estimation schemes for the number of active uses, which
exploit the device-specific physical-layer characteristics of wireless devices, would be
preferred. Moreover, in order to further improve the overall efficiency of a wireless
communication system, we would like to avoid unnecessary estimation operation for
the number of active users. A triggering mechanism can thus be employed, where the
estimation procedure would only be performed after the confirmation of the existence
of active users.
1.1.2 Eavesdropping-Resilient OFDM Systems
With the security risk assessment in a wireless communication environment, ap-
propriate defending strategies can be designed and implemented. Malicious attacks
in wireless communications can be classified into two categories: passive and ac-
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tive [17]. Legitimate terminals can often perceive active attacks based on the sense
of transmission anomalies, and then carry out corresponding protective measures. In
contrast, even with specific detection procedures, passive attacks are hard to be de-
tected since they usually do not leave any evidence about their illegal behaviors and
crimes. Private information can be intercepted by adversaries without the awareness
of the communicating pair. Accompanied with the fact that information collected by
passive attacks is usually used to further the damage of other forms of attacks by
adversaries, the threat of passive attacks is fatal. Therefore, wireless communication
systems should strengthen their built-in security against passive attacks. Eavesdrop-
ping is a most common form of the passive attacks. This dissertation will concentrate
on the eavesdropping relevant issues for simplicity.
The physical layer is responsible for the physical connection between end stations.
It is the foundation of the information transmission. The security of wireless commu-
nications is thus conditioned on a secure physical layer. Unfortunately, the physical
layer is the most vulnerable part of wireless communication systems since it does
not depend on any human-made logical organization, but rather obeys uncontrollable
laws of electromagnetic wave propagation [12]. As a result, the physical-layer built-in
security of wireless communication systems against passive attacks must be enhanced.
Considering the general acceptance of OFDM technology in modern wireless networks
as well as the security weaknesses of OFDM systems, the built-in security enhance-
ment at the physical layer of wireless OFDM systems needs to be addressed.
The physical-layer built-in information confidentiality can be realized by disrupt-
ing the information recovery in eavesdropping. Technically, plentiful randomness can
be introduced into the signal structure in the legitimate communication, leading to
dynamic signal structure that can only be recognized by legitimate users. In wire-
less communications, legitimate parties can harvest continual influx of randomness
from the time-varying wireless channels. This user- and location-dependent random-
ness can be exploited for the communication security design. Because of channel
reciprocity, the transmitter and receiver would experience and observe an identical
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wireless channel. Consequently, the channel based randomness can be shared between
the two ends of the channel. In contrast, wireless channels associated with different
endpoints at separate locations generally exhibit uncorrelated propagation charac-
teristics. It is thus impossible for an eavesdropper at a third location to track the
randomness involved in the legitimate transmission and perform correct information
recovery. As a result, the physical-layer built-in security of wireless communications
against eavesdropping can be achieved. With regard to a specific design, its effec-
tiveness and efficiency can be improved by consulting the security risk assessment
result.
1.1.3 Secure OFDM Systems with Embedded Confidential
Signaling Link
Secure communication systems should not only defend against malicious attacks
but also maintain reliable legitimate transmission. Under some hostile channel condi-
tions, transmitter-receiver interaction for certain security design relevant parameters
may be needed in secure wireless communication systems, in order to guarantee the
reliability of legitimate transmission while not degrading the transmission security.
One example is the channel-based secure access where channel reciprocity is exploited
by legitimate users to share the security design. Typically, the end stations of a wire-
less link can only have noisy observations of the channel due to the existence of noise
and interference at the two ends. Hence, the channel estimates at the communicat-
ing pair are just correlated though the channel is inherently reciprocal. Under the
situation of strong noise and interference, the transmission of certain security design
relevant parameters between legitimate terminals may be required, so as to mitigate
the impairment from imperfect reciprocity of the channel estimates and improve the
reliability of legitimate transmission.
Generally, the security design relevant parameters do not have much content, but
may be renewed frequently along with the update of the design. The transmitter-
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receiver interaction should thus be always available. Moreover, the side information
interaction with lower priority cannot interrupt or interfere the original data transmis-
sion, but should provide a reliable and confidential information exchange. In addition,
such interaction should not ask for additional time and spectrum resources that are
typically unavailable to the transmission of side information.
A candidate solution to solve the aforementioned problems is to transmit data and
security design relevant parameters concurrently, through a confidential signaling link
embedded into the secure communication system. As an advance of the secure OFDM
systems with physical-layer built-in security enhancement, embedded confidential sig-
naling strategies are worthy of research efforts. OFDM with precoded cyclic prefix
(PCP-OFDM), which was originally proposed for the adaptive transmission in cogni-
tive radio [18], can be extended and specially tailored for the transmission of security
design relevant side information between legitimate users.
1.2 Dissertation Contributions
The main contributions of this dissertation are summarized as follows.
• In order to respond appropriately to malicious attacks in a wireless network,
a security level awareness scheme for effectively and efficiently evaluating the
security risk in wireless communication environments is proposed. Instead of
attempting to detect all potential attacks, the proposed scheme simply estimates
the number of active users in a transmission environment after recognizing their
existence. Robust active user detection is achieved by a proposed time domain
pilot correlation algorithm and its affiliated interference mitigation techniques.
The number of active users is evaluated by a novel estimation method that
exploits a typical device RF-DNA—I/Q imbalance.
• Two novel anti-eavesdropping OFDM systems are proposed by taking advan-
tage of the channel reciprocity and the uncorrelation feature exhibited among
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spatially separate wireless channels in rich multipath environments. Based on
the instantaneous channel state information (CSI) between the transmitter and
legitimate receiver, dynamic coordinate interleaving and subcarrier interleaving
are employed in the two proposed secure OFDM systems, respectively. The
“coordinate interleaving” strategy is carried out by interleaving the symbol co-
ordinates at partial subcarriers of each OFDM signal, where subcarriers that
perform coordinate interleaving are determined by the subcarrier channel gains
or phases. The “subcarrier interleaving” scheme is realized by selectively inter-
leaving subcarriers of each OFDM signal according to the sorted order of the
subcarrier channel gains. In addition, techniques to mitigate the impairment
from imperfect channel reciprocity are also investigated.
• This dissertation extends the previous study on PCP-OFDM in [18], and pro-
vides an embedded confidential signaling link for the transmitter-receiver inter-
action in secure OFDM systems. Specially tailored PCP sequences that have
the same time and frequency characteristics as the data-carrying OFDM sym-
bols are used to reliably and confidentially transmit the security design relevant
system parameters between legitimate terminals.
1.3 Dissertation Organization
The following details the organization of remaining chapters of this dissertation.
It would be beneficial to first provide fundamentals related to the wireless commu-
nication security, including the typical malicious attacks, general security objectives
and countermeasures, as well as principles of the security design. All of these are
explained in Chapter 2. The security vulnerabilities of OFDM physical layer are also
addressed in this chapter, after a review of the general aspects of OFDM technology.
Security risk awareness for wireless communications is investigated in Chapter
3 and Chapter 4. The proposed security level awareness scheme consists of two
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procedures: 1) recognizing the existence of active users; 2) estimating the number of
active users in the operating environment. Chapter 3 focuses on the proposed time-
domain pilot correlation based user detection algorithm, followed by the number of
active users estimation technique using transmitter I/Q imbalance in Chapter 4.
Following the discussions on the proposed security risk awareness techniques,
this dissertation moves on to the proposed novel anti-eavesdropping OFDM sys-
tems. Chapter 5 provides insight into the proposed anti-eavesdropping OFDM system
through CSI-based coordinate interleaving. In Chapter 6, the eavesdropping-resilient
OFDM system using dynamic subcarrier interleaving is analyzed.
In addressing the issue of imperfect channel reciprocity, an embedded confidential
signaling scheme is proposed and investigated in Chapter 7. It enables a reliable
and confidential transmission of security design relevant system parameters between
legitimate users, and thus upgrades the proposed anti-eavesdropping OFDM systems.
Finally, in Chapter 8, conclusions are drawn from the studies and future research
directions are pointed out.
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Chapter 2
Security Issues in Wireless
Communications
This chapter summaries security risks and threats in wireless communication sys-
tems, accompanied with an insight survey of existing solutions to these security issues.
OFDM technology, which has been adopted in lots of modern wireless communication
networks, is also reviewed in this chapter. In addition, the security vulnerabilities of
OFDM due to its distinct physical-layer time and frequency characteristics are ad-
dressed.
2.1 Risks and Threats in Wireless Communica-
tions
Wireless communications is ubiquitous nowadays and continues to flourish world-
wide further. Various wireless communication systems, such as WiFi, WiMax and
LTE, have widely permeated people’s daily life from home to public venues. The
main reason behind its proliferation is plentiful advantages offered by the wireless
technology, such as the freedom of mobility, flexible options of connectivity, and low
cost of network configuration. However, compared with the traditional wired com-
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munications, much more security vulnerabilities are induced by the wireless transmis-
sion mechanism. First and foremost, the wireless medium is inherently an open-air
medium. Adversaries can easily access a wireless network as long as they are within
its coverage range, due to the broadcast nature of radio propagation. Furthermore,
most wireless communication systems are highly standardized. Apart from security
weaknesses in the communication standards, the standardization increases security
risks of wireless transmission. Some system parameters, such as the composition of
data packets and the protocol of network configuration, are public and available to
adversaries. The information of such parameters would lower the technical difficulties
in malicious attacking. In addition, the mobility and portability of wireless devices
further facilitate adversaries to attack wireless communications.
Wireless communications is subject to a number of security risks and threats.
Generally, malicious attacks in wireless communication networks can be classified
into two categories: passive and active [17]. Passive attacks intercept legitimate mes-
sage from wireless channels without interfering with the operation of legal networks.
Conversely, active attacks attempt to disrupt the normal network operation instead
of intercepting the legitimate traffic. The most common forms of passive and active
attacks in wireless communications are listed as follows:
• Eavesdropping : Eavesdropping is the act that an attacker, named eavesdropper,
passively listens to a network and intercepts the ongoing traffic [2]. Due to the
openness of wireless medium, an eavesdropper is possible to access the data
stream as long as it lies in the coverage of the transmitter. In the case that
communication protocols are known by the eavesdropper, it can simply follow
those protocols like normal participants and then intercept the sensitive and
private information.
• Traffic Analysis : Traffic analysis is the process of intercepting and examining
the collected data streams in order to deduce information from patterns of com-
munication. Similar to eavesdropping, traffic analysis is also based on what the
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attacker hears in the network. However, this sort of attack does not have to
demodulate and understand the actual data in transmission [19]. It is often
used to determine the locations, identities and behavior patterns of the commu-
nicating parties. Adversaries can then use the collected information from traffic
analysis to support other forms of attacks [2].
• Jamming : Jamming occurs when intentional or unintentional interferences flood
a communication link [20]. A hostile jammer can broadcast interference signals
over a broad spectral band to degrade the channel condition and disrupt the
legal information transmission. In the situation that the attacker has infinite
power supply, it can even exhaust the resource for legitimate users and then
destroy the legal communication.
• Spoofing : In spoofing, an attacker pretends to be an authorized client, device
or user to gain access to a network protected by some forms of authentication
mechanisms, so as to seize the system resource and intercept the confidential
information [1]. Moreover, an attacker can also impersonate a network resource
by positioning itself between the client and intended resource. When a victim
initiates a connection, the attacker can intercept the connection, and then com-
plete the connection to the intended resource. As a result, all communication
between the client and intended resource is controlled by the adversary [1].
• Injection and Data Modification: Injection happens when an attacker adds com-
mands and data to the existing connection to hijack the ongoing communication,
or maliciously send commands and data to manipulate the available resource [2].
Moreover, adversaries can flood the network access point with connection mes-
sages, thereby tricking the network access point into exceeding a maximum limit
and then denying authorized user access to the network [20]. Data modifica-
tion refers to an attack in which an aggressor adds, deletes or even changes the
network communication contents [2].
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Table 2.1: Classification of security attacks in wireless networks
Security Attacks
Passive Attacks Active Attacks
Eavesdropping Jamming
Traffic Analysis Spoofing
Injection and Data Modification
The classification of these security attacks is shown in Table 2.1. Under active
attacks, communication anomalies can normally provide demonstrable evidence of
malicious attacks, so that legitimate terminals can easily detect the attackers and
then launch corresponding defending operations. In contrast, passive attacks without
leaving much evidence about their illegal behaviors are difficult to be detected. Sensi-
tive and private information may be intercepted by adversaries without the awareness
of the communicating pair. The threats from eavesdropping and traffic analysis would
be inherent risks in wireless networks that cannot be avoided [1]. Please note that
malicious attacks typically do not stand alone. Adversaries usually coordinate sev-
eral attacks to further the damage, where passive attacks such as eavesdropping and
traffic analysis are essentially used to gather information for other forms of attacks.
Therefore, as the foundation of malicious attacking and with the counter-detection
feature, passive attacks can cause fatal damage to a wireless communication system.
It is also noteworthy that the risks and threats in wireless communications are
time- and location-varying, due to the variations of channel conditions, surrounding
devices as well as roles played by coexistent users.
2.2 Solutions to Secure Wireless Communications
Securing communication systems has been a problem of interest since the time of
conception of network based communications [17]. The concept of secure communi-
cation is linked to two main desired objectives: effective defending against malicious
attacks and reliable transmission between legitimate users. The first objective indi-
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cates that a communication system should protect the confidentiality, authentic-
ity, integrity, and availability of data transmission, by defending against various
attacks [14,21], where
• Confidentiality denotes the property that the transmitted information is pre-
vented from unauthorized individuals, entities or processes;
• Authenticity is to provide the assurance of the identities of communicating
nodes, which ensures that a received message comes from a desired transmitter
and vice versa;
• Integrity indicates the capability to protect transmitted messages from being
modified and destroyed by adversaries during the propagation;
• Availability means that a communication system is able to provide services
whenever it is demanded by a legitimate entity.
With regard to the second objective, a message for an intended receiver should be
reliably received by that user. In other words, the demodulation error rate at the
legitimate receiver needs to satisfy an acceptable requirement.
In addition, since the risks and threats in wireless networks are time- and location-
varying, the solutions to secure wireless communication systems need to be evaluated
and updated regularly. In order to effectively and efficiently defend against the ma-
licious attacks, a wireless device should intelligently perform proper security schemes
corresponding to the real-time communication risk in an operating environment.
2.2.1 Traditional Security Approaches and Limitations
Traditional strategies to secure wireless communications mainly rely on a layered
protocol architecture, by exploiting authentication and encryption at the link and
upper layers.
The layered protocol architecture that dominates modern data communications
is illustrated in Fig. 2.1. The physical layer is responsible for the establishment
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Figure 2.1: Layered protocol architecture in communication systems.
and termination of a connection to the communication medium. It is intended for
defining the relationship between a device and the transmission medium. The link
layer transfers data between two directly connected stations, and detects and possibly
corrects errors that may occur at the physical layer. The network layer determines the
route that a packet would need to take from the source to the destination. In addition,
the transport layer provides transparent transfer of data between end users, and the
application layer acts as a user interface in the network [22]. Traditionally, every layer
in the protocol stack is secured with a certain algorithm, except the physical layer.
2.2.1.1 Traditional Authentication and its Limitations
Authentication, a process that a station recognizes the identity of its communica-
tion partner, is typically performed at the link layer, network layer, transport layer
15
and application layer. Link-layer authentication is executed by checking the MAC
addresses of stations that attempt to be connected. Unfortunately, this authenti-
cation strategy is vulnerable since that the MAC address of a device is changeable.
Adversaries can spoof a legitimate user by duplicating its MAC address, and then get
the access to the network. Network-layer authentication relies on the IP addresses
to identify nodes in a network, but it becomes vulnerable under route spoofing. An
attacker can pick up any IP address desired. The transport layer utilizes the message
authentication code to provide integrity and authenticity assurances of the data trans-
mission. However, the message authentication code may be disclosed and duplicated
as well. At the application layer, user authentication mechanisms like the login and
password based authentication are employed, which are restricted by the safety of the
password-like information. In addition to the user authentication mechanisms, the
application layer can also make use of secure facilities available from the lower layers,
such as checking the incoming and outgoing data and requiring the use of strong
authentication. In this case, the application layer would inherit all the weaknesses
belonging to lower layers of the protocol stack.
2.2.1.2 Traditional Encryption and its Limitations
Encryption, which is often carried out at all the upper four layers, is controlled
by a private key either shared between legitimate users or only available to the in-
tended receiver. In this approach, the transmitted data is encrypted using an en-
cryption key (a shared private key in the symmetric-key scheme or a public key in
the asymmetric-key scheme), and can only be decrypted by a terminal with a cor-
responding private decryption key. Adversaries without such private decryption key
cannot read the encrypted message. The vulnerabilities of the traditional encryption
are obvious, particularly in its key distribution and protection. In the symmetric-key
scheme, since each possible communicating pair must agree on a secret key before the
communication, the private key may be disclosed during the interaction between the
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communication parties, even during their initial key exchange. In the asymmetric-
key scheme, adversaries can exploit the public key to either conduct active attacks
like injection or pretend to be the legitimate transmitter and then wangle the private
decryption key. Furthermore, certain participants in a network may not have satis-
factory security strength. They are easy to be defeated. As a result, the safety of
the private key cannot be ensured. In addition, adversaries with tremendous power,
memory and computational capability can attempt to crack the private key from the
received signals, especially when the key has been used for a long time.
2.2.1.3 Other Weaknesses of Traditional Security Approaches
Traditional security strategies, such as the traditional authentication and encryp-
tion, merely rely on the inherent computational complexity to protect the transmit-
ted information. They are more and more vulnerable with the significant evolution
of hardware manufacturing technologies and the development of efficient software al-
gorithms. Wireless devices nowadays are much more powerful and possess improved
computational capability. Equipped with these devices, adversaries have high possi-
bilities to crack the traditional authentication and encryption, let alone the inherent
weaknesses of these security strategies.
In addition to the insufficiency of traditional security approaches in securing wire-
less communications, it has been demonstrated that the upper layer security schemes
have low efficiency [23]. All the layers in the protocol stack are secured indepen-
dently under the assumption that the traffic from the lower or upper layers is well
behaved. Without a systematic view, individual security processes developed for dif-
ferent protocol layers may provide redundant security services, and hence consume
more resource than necessary. Also, the layered security schemes are time-consuming
since the operation of a certain layer has to wait for the process at lower or upper
layers. They would induce excessive communication latency. Meanwhile, the layered
security schemes are power inefficient due to the overhead produced by the authenti-
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cation and encryption at each layer. It is noteworthy that most of the wireless mobile
devices are battery-powered so that they are power-limited.
Furthermore, from a business point of view, the main universally available wire-
less systems such as the cellular system do not want to handle a complex security
mechanism like traditional security approaches, because they are intended for mass
use. Implementation of the layer-by-layer measures would make these systems very
expensive and non-profitable to the service providers [12].
In summary, traditional security approaches have some inherent weaknesses that
make them vulnerable to adversaries. Meanwhile, the effectiveness of these schemes,
which depends on the computational complexities introduced into malicious attacks,
is not guaranteed in the event of hardware manufacture and software algorithm break-
throughs. It becomes easier for adversaries to break these schemes as attack devices
become more powerful and less costly and attack algorithms become more efficient.
Moreover, such layered security schemes often lead to system capacity degradation,
excessive communication latency and high power consumption [24].
2.2.2 Physical Layer Security
In wireless communications, the effectiveness and efficiency of traditional upper-
layer security approaches are restricted by their weaknesses. Reviewing the informa-
tion flow through the layered protocol stack, we can see that all upper layers depend
upon the physical layer to deliver the data. The physical layer is the entry point
of malicious attacks. A secure physical layer would therefore be a determinant in
protecting the information transmission. Unfortunately, the physical layer of wireless
communication systems is vulnerable due to the open-air nature of wireless medium.
Hence, physical-layer security enhancement is critical in securing wireless communi-
cations.
In recent years, physical layer security, which improves communication security at
the physical layer, has emerged as an efficient and valuable paradigm to complement
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traditional wireless security techniques [13]. The innovative concept behind wire-
less physical layer security is to exploit the continual randomness from the wireless
medium and the device-dependent RF attributes of wireless devices to secure wire-
less communications. As the new paradigm is independent of the traditional security
techniques, it can be integrated with the upper-layer security solutions to enhance
the total strength of security in wireless communications.
2.2.2.1 Wireless Channel based Physical Layer Security
Wireless channel based physical layer security takes advantage of the continual
randomness inherent in wireless channels to improve the system security. Fundamen-
tal properties of wireless channels, including the reciprocity, spatial and temporal
variations, are exploited in the security designs.
In wireless communications, the propagation through a radio link can be char-
acterized by three categories of losses: multipath, shadowing, and distance loss [25].
Multipath refers to the many different propagation paths between the transmitter and
receiver, where each path is characterized by its own phase, delay, and attenuation. It
results into channel variations over distances in the order of a wavelength. Shadowing
refers to local variations in the received signal strength caused by structures, hills,
canyons, vehicles, and so on. Distance loss refers to the phenomenon that the received
signal power decreases as the distance between the transmitter and receiver increases.
Taking all of these factors together, the impulse response of a wireless channel can
be mathematically modeled by [25]
h(t, τ) =
L−1∑
i=0
αi(t)e
θi(t)δ(t− τi), (2.1)
where L denotes the number of channel paths, and the ith path has amplitude αi(t),
phase θi(t), and propagation delay τi at time t.
With plenty of theoretical analysis and experimental verification, it is widely rec-
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ognized that wireless channels have the following properties:
• Reciprocity: A channel behaves in an identical manner irrespective of in which
direction it is observed, so that the two ends of a communication link should
ideally observe the same channel impulse response.
• Spatial decorrelation: Channel responses decorrelate rapidly in space, partic-
ularly in a rich multipath environment. Generally, a third party who lies more
than half a wavelength away from a pair of communicating nodes experiences a
fading channel uncorrelated to that between the communicating terminals [26].
• Time variation: Wireless channels are time-varying. The channel fading is
random over time due to the multipath propagation.
The above properties, which do not exist for wired or optical channels, have been
proved to be true in most terrestrial wireless communication systems [10].
The fading and noise inherently present over wireless channels, accompanied with
the reciprocity, spatial and temporal variation properties of multipath channels can be
exploited to enhance wireless communication security at the physical layer, including
data protection, user authentication, secret key generation and so on.
2.2.2.2 RF-DNA based Physical Layer Security
RF-DNA based physical layer security relies on the device-dependent hardware
imperfections that are caused by the manufacturing variability. The term RF-DNA
is used to indicate the unique physical attributes of a wireless device induced by
embedded processors and other analog circuits, in a manner analogous to biometric
human fingerprint. Hardware imperfections, such as I/Q imbalance, frequency and
magnitude errors, cannot be avoided in the manufacture. Even in the integrated
circuit (IC) fabrication processes that are necessarily precise, structural variations
are still introduced in the final device structure on a very small scale [3]. Meanwhile,
hardware impairments are generally accepted in practical implementations as long as
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process-induced variations are within acceptable tolerances. Therefore, no two devices
can be exactly the same in practice. It has been validated that even wireless devices
are fabricated using the same manufacturing and packaging processes, individual
device exhibits unique RF characteristics that are significant enough for distinguishing
one from another [27,28].
RF-DNA based physical layer security can defend against malicious attacks such
as spoofing and injection at the device level. The device-specific RF-DNAs that can
be exploited to protect wireless communications include I/Q imbalance, transient
phase, frequency error, phase error, and magnitude error [28].
2.2.2.3 State of the Art in Physical Layer Security
Extensive research efforts have been dedicated to physical layer security from both
academia and industry. In the last decade, there has been considerable progress in this
realm. Various methods have been proposed to take advantage of the randomness of
wireless channels and RF-DNAs of wireless devices to enhance the security of wireless
communications at the physical layer.
Theoretical Secrecy Capacity from Wireless Channels Information theoretic
security examines the fundamental ability of the physical layer to secure communi-
cations [11]. Historically, the notion of information theoretic security was first intro-
duced into communication systems by Shannon in [29], and then extended by Wyner’s
work in [30]. The so-called secrecy capacity was defined as the maximum rate achiev-
able between the legitimate transmitter-receiver pair while being able to keep the
message secret from unintended receivers. It was proved that confidential commu-
nication is possible if the desired receiver enjoys better channel conditions than the
eavesdropper under the Gaussian wiretap channel model [31]. More recently, the se-
crecy capacity over fading channels was investigated [32–34]. It was shown that in the
presence of multipath fading, information theoretic security is achievable even when
the eavesdropper has a higher average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) than the legitimate
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receiver [32]. In addition, space-time diversity in wireless communication systems
using multiple antennas was also exploited to enhance the information security and
information-hiding capabilities [35].
Channel-based Data Protection The reciprocity and spatial decorrelation of
wireless channels have been exploited to protect the confidentiality of data transmis-
sion at the physical layer. A key distribution method using the theory of reciprocity
for antennas and electromagnetic propagation was proposed in [36]. A crosslayer
secure coding scheme based on the statistical knowledge of wireless channels was pre-
sented in [37]. In addition, resource allocation [38, 39], transmit beamforming [40],
artificial noise [41] and cooperation transmission [42] have been investigated to max-
imize the secrecy capacity, so as to realize the transmission confidentiality.
Channel-based Authentication Channel-based authentication algorithms can be
generally divided into two categories: CSI and received signal strength (RSS) assisted
authentication. Physical layer authentication algorithms that exploited the spatial
variability of wireless channels were investigated [43, 44]. RSS, which is determined
by the transmit power and CSI, is also used for authentication at the physical layer
of wireless communication systems. Both RSS similarity and temporal RSS variation
have been utilized to authenticate wireless users [45].
Channel-based Secret Key Generation The randomness inherent in wireless
channels can benefit the secret key generation. [46] introduced a level crossing algo-
rithm for key generation in fading wireless channels. A joint source-channel approach
that combined existing source and channel models for key agreement over wireless
fading channels was developed in [47]. Moreover, key extraction methods based on
both the entire CSI and single channel parameter such as RSS were compared in [48].
RF-DNA based Device Identification and Authentication RF-DNA is gen-
erally employed for the device identification and authentication. A RF fingerprinting
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technique that exploited the transient amplitude and phase responses was introduced
to identify wireless devices in [49]. In [50], the authors used the frequency difference
and phase shift difference between the ideal signal and the one transmitted to pre-
vent spoofing, through a proposed nonparametric Bayesian method. Moreover, more
than one device-specific features are combined to improve the reliability of the RF
fingerprinting for wireless devices in [51]. Physical layer authentication based on the
RF-DNAs of integrated circuits was investigated and validated in [3, 52].
2.3 OFDM and its Security Vulnerabilities
OFDM has been widely adopted in modern high-speed wireless communication
networks such as LTE, IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.16, mainly due to its high spectral
efficiency and robustness against multipath fading. Unfortunately, the distinct time
and frequency characteristics of OFDM signals make OFDM communication systems
extremely susceptible to malicious attacks from the adversaries.
2.3.1 Basic Concept of OFDM
OFDM was first introduced by S. Weinstein and P. Ebert in 1971 [53]. Compared
with high data rate single-carrier communication systems, OFDM splits the serial
data stream in parallel and divides the entire channel into many narrowband flat
fading subchannels that are orthogonal to each other. These parallel data streams are
modulated to transmit simultaneously over the orthogonal subcarriers/subchannels
with a one-to-one correspondence and summed up to generate an OFDM symbol. A
time domain OFDM symbol with N subcarriers can be given by
x(t) =
N−1∑
k=0
X(k)ej2pifkt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (2.2)
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of an OFDM symbol with 5 subcarriers.
where X(k) is the data stream transmitted on the kth subcarrier, and T is the symbol
duration of one OFDM symbol. fk = k∆f is the frequency of the kth subcarrier,
where ∆f is the subcarrier spacing and T∆f = 1. Assuming that the time domain
OFDM symbol x(t) is sampled at an interval of Ts =
T
N
, the corresponding samples
of x(t) can be expressed as
x(n) =
N−1∑
k=0
X(k)ej2pifk
nT
N , n = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1. (2.3)
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Figure 2.3: The structure of OFDM signal with cyclic prefix.
Substituting fk =
k
T
into (2.3), the above equation can be rewritten as
x(n) =
N−1∑
k=0
X(k)ej2pi
k
T
nT
N
=
N−1∑
k=0
X(k)ej2pi
kn
N , n = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1. (2.4)
Clearly, equation (2.4) is exactly the expression of inverse discrete Fourier transform
(IDFT) of X(k), which indicates that OFDM modulation process can be effectively
implemented by using IDFT. In order to reduce the computational burden and provide
a more efficient OFDM system, inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT) can be employed
instead of the IDFT. Figure 2.2 provides an illustration of an OFDM symbol with 5
subcarriers, where Fig. 2.2(a) represents the construction of the time domain OFDM
symbol and Fig. 2.2(b) depicts how the OFDM symbol looks like in the frequency
domain.
To deal with the time dispersion of wireless channels, a cyclic extension of the
OFDM symbol is generally employed in OFDM systems, named cyclic prefix (CP).
The basic idea of CP is to repeat the end part of the time domain OFDM symbol
in the beginning to create a guard period between adjacent OFDM symbols. The
cyclicly extended OFDM symbol is illustrated in Fig. 2.3. As long as the duration of
CP is longer than the maximum excess delay of the wireless channel, the intersymbol
interference (ISI) corrupted part of an OFDM signal stays within the guard period,
and can be removed later at the receiver. Therefore, the impact of multipath dis-
tortion on the orthogonality among subcarriers of an OFDM signal can be removed.
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Figure 2.4: ISI elimination in OFDM using cyclic prefix.
Figure 2.4 demonstrates the principle of ISI elimination in OFDM using CP.
2.3.2 Applications of OFDM Technology
As an exciting technology for the modern wireless communications, OFDM has
been employed by various existing and evolving standards. A brief introduction of
some existing applications of OFDM is provided, including LTE, IEEE 802.11, IEEE
802.16 and Digital Video Broadcasting-Terrestrial (DVB-T).
LTE Long-Term Evolution is a standard for cellular services with high-speed data
transmission [54]. Started in 2008, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)
standard LTE provides an uplink speed of up to 50 megabits per second (Mbps) and a
downlink speed of up to 100 Mbps. OFDM is the modulation scheme for the downlink
of LTE, while its downlink multiplexing is accomplished via orthogonal frequency-
division multiple access (OFDMA). The basic subcarrier spacing of an OFDM signal
in LTE is 15 kHz, with a reduced subcarrier spacing of 7.5 kHz available for some
special scenarios.
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IEEE 802.11 IEEE 802.11, with a marketing name of WiFi, is a set of popular
standards for the broadband wireless local area network (WLAN). OFDM technology
is employed in the IEEE 802.11 family such as 802.11a, 802.11g and 802.11n [55,56].
IEEE 802.11a is an amendment to the original IEEE 802.11 standard, which uses a
52-subcarrier OFDM with a throughput of up to 54 Mbps in the 5 GHz band. Later,
the system is extended to the 2.4 GHz band by the amendment IEEE 802.11g. In
2009, IEEE 802.11n was released, which can increase the network throughput to 600
Mbps by supporting multiple-input multiple-output and frame aggregation [56].
IEEE 802.16 IEEE 802.16, under a marketing name of WiMAX, is another series
of wireless broadband standards developed for the global deployment of broadband
wireless metropolitan area networks (WMAN) [57]. IEEE 802.16 specifies the air
interface of fixed broadband wireless access systems that support multimedia services
during the spectrum band from 10 to 60 GHz. License-exempt frequencies below 11
GHz are also considered in IEEE 802.16, where improved PHY and MAC mecha-
nisms such as dynamic frequency selection are introduced [57]. OFDM technology is
introduced into IEEE 802.16 to improve the overall system performance, including
WMAN-OFDM and WMAN-OFDMA.
DVB-T Digital Video Broadcasting-Terrestrial is the DVB European-based con-
sortium standard for the broadcast transmission of digital terrestrial television in
very-high frequency (VHF) and ultra-high frequency (UHF). DVB-T makes efficient
utilization of spectrum and can transmit Internet pages, compressed digital audio and
video data, and so on. To address the transmission of information with high data rate,
OFDM technology is adopted in DVB-T standard [58]. As one popular digital TV
broadcast standard, DVB-T has been further developed into new standards, such as
Digital Video Broadcasting-Second Generation Terrestrial (DVB-T2) [59] and Digital
Video Broadcasting-Handheld (DVB-H) [60].
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2.3.3 Security Vulnerabilities in OFDM
Due to the distinct time and frequency characteristics, the physical layer of OFDM
systems is transparent to adversaries. Transmission parameters in an OFDM system,
such as the symbol duration, CP length, sampling frequency and number of subcarri-
ers, can be blindly estimated by any user within the listening range of the transmitter.
Consequently, malicious attacks to OFDM systems can be launched by adversaries
without any prior information.
Blind estimation techniques for OFDM system parameters have been extensively
investigated. A blind OFDM receiver that exploited both time- and frequency-domain
correlations of the received signal was designed in [61]. In [62], OFDM symbol du-
ration was estimated using a cyclic correlation of the received signals, and the CP
length was derived by performing a correlation test for the redundancy induced by
the cyclic extension. For the sampling frequency used in an OFDM system, it can be
estimated through a cyclic spectrum analysis method, as reported in [63]. Meanwhile,
the number of subcarriers of an OFDM signal can be figured out through a Gaus-
sianity test [62]. In case that not all subcarriers of an OFDM signal are employed for
the transmission, active subcarriers can also be identified by analyzing the subcarrier
power level at the output of fast Fourier transform (FFT) [64]. Moreover, based on
the second-order cyclostationarity of OFDM signals, the parameter estimation for
OFDM signals impaired by a time-dispersive channel was studied in [65]. Similarly,
a blind OFDM signal recognition algorithm, which could achieve a reasonably good
performance at low SNRs for various channel conditions, was also proposed [66].
To sum up, adversaries can locally derive all necessary physical-layer parameters
of an OFDM system without any prior information, which makes OFDM fragile to
both passive and active attacks from the adversaries. Transmission-level techniques
for enhancing the built-in security of OFDM signals have yet to be investigated.
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2.4 Summary
Wireless communications is susceptible to malicious attacks due to the open-air
nature of wireless medium. Traditional security approaches that exploit authen-
tication and encryption at the link and upper layers of the protocol stack cannot
completely handle the security issues in modern wireless communication systems, be-
cause of their inherent weaknesses. Thus, physical layer security, which exploits the
physical-layer features such as the continual randomness from wireless medium and
the RF-DNAs of wireless devices to defend against malicious attacks, has emerged
as an effective and valuable paradigm to complement the traditional wireless security
techniques. In a study related to modern wireless communications, OFDM, which
has been widely employed in modern wireless networks due to its high spectral effi-
ciency and robustness against multipath fading, needs to be addressed. Unfortunately,
OFDM is vulnerable to malicious attacks due to its distinct time and frequency char-
acteristics at the physical layer. Therefore, it would be appropriate to consider OFDM
in the investigation of physical layer security due to its wide popularity and inherent
security vulnerabilities. In addition, it is noteworthy that solutions to secure wireless
communications need to be updated regularly based on the situation awareness, since
risks and threats in wireless networks are time- and location-varying.
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Chapter 3
Active User Recognition through
Low Complexity Time Domain
OFDM Signal Detection
Effective and efficient security solutions can be performed by wireless communi-
cation systems based on the security risk assessment of the operating environment.
As any user in a wireless network could be a potential security threat, the number of
active users can be employed to indicate the security level of a wireless environment.
In this chapter, a robust and simple OFDM signal detection algorithm is developed
to recognize the presence of active users. The solution to estimate the number of
active users will be provided later in Chapter 4.
The existence of active users can be recognized by verifying the presence of signals
they radiated. In light of the widespread deployment of OFDM in wireless communi-
cations, a time domain pilot correlation (TDPC) algorithm to detect OFDM signals
with frequency domain inserted pilots is proposed in this chapter. The proposed
method is based on cyclic correlation between the complex conjugate multiplication
of adjacent received signal segments and a local time domain pilot reference derived
from the inserted pilots. The maximum correlation magnitude is compared with a
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properly selected threshold to determine the existence of active users. Interference
mitigation techniques, including periodic signal segmentation and complex conjugate
multiplication based phase rotation locking, are developed in the algorithm to im-
prove the detection reliability. It has been validated by simulation results that the
TDPC algorithm can achieve reliable detection of OFDM signals even at low SNRs
and is robust to both timing and frequency offsets.
3.1 Introduction
Effective and efficient security provisioning can be achieved in wireless communi-
cations relying on the risk awareness of the wireless environment. Since any user in
a network, even a present legitimate user, can be a potential threat to the security
of wireless transmissions [15], a communication system can determine the communi-
cation risk from the number of active users in an operating environment, and then
launch appropriate defending strategies. In order to avoid unnecessary estimation
process for the number of active users and improve the system efficiency, the presence
of active users needs to be first confirmed. Generally, the existence of active users can
be recognized through the detection of signals they radiated. As OFDM is one of the
most widely-used technologies in modern wireless communication systems, reliable
and efficient signal detection techniques for OFDM signals are worthy of research
efforts.
Several technical challenges need to be addressed in the detection of OFDM sig-
nals in wireless networks. First, reliable signal detection should be accomplished
within limited time duration, where the processing time is typically proportional to
the complexity of a detection algorithm. Due to the mobility and flexibility of wire-
less communications, the operating environment is time-varying, leading to temporal
validity of the detection results. Second, the SNR of signals received at the detection
node may be very low since signals of active users may be severely attenuated by
fading and shadowing. The low SNR condition normally results into an incorrect
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detection decision. In addition, timing and frequency synchronization is unavailable
at detection devices, particularly when the received signal strength is low. Since the
existence of signals to be detected is unknown, it is impossible to perform timing
and frequency offset estimation before the signal detection process. This challenge
becomes more pronounced in detecting OFDM signals that are extremely sensitive to
synchronization errors.
The detection of OFDM signals has received substantial attention from both
academia and industry, particularly in the realm of spectrum sensing for cognitive ra-
dio communications. Detection techniques for OFDM can be generally classified into
two categories: blind methods and feature based methods [67]. Energy detection is a
typical blind method which makes a decision by estimating the energy of the received
signals [68]. Non-blind methods rely on certain special features of OFDM signals
that are usually introduced by the cyclic prefix and in-band pilots. The insertion of
CP introduces cyclostationarity into OFDM signals, which can be employed to detect
the presence of OFDM signals [69–72]. However, the performance of these CP-based
signal detection methods highly depend on the length of CP. When the duration of
CP is short, a long detection time is required to achieve satisfactory detection confi-
dence. In-band pilot based frequency domain detection algorithms for OFDM signals
were proposed in [73–76], but their implementations are limited by the computational
complexity of FFT operation in the detection process though they usually have high
detection reliability. Recently, a time domain symbol autocorrelation method for pi-
lot inserted OFDM signals was reported [77]. Unfortunately, it failed to exploit the
pilot patterns to differentiate different communication systems.
In this chapter, a time domain pilot correlation (TDPC) algorithm for detecting
OFDM signals with frequency domain inserted pilots is developed. To be specific,
the complex conjugate multiplication (CCM) of adjacent received signal segments is
cyclicly correlated with a local time domain reference derived from the inserted pilots.
The existence of active users is determined by comparing the maximum correlation
magnitude with a properly selected threshold. In the proposed algorithm, timing
32
offset (TO) in the received signals is approximately compensated by the cyclic corre-
lation due to the periodicity of the OFDM pilot sequence in the time domain. The
impact of noise on the detection reliability is mitigated by a time domain segment
averaging following the complex conjugate multiplication enabled phase rotation lock-
ing. The detection robustness to frequency offset (FO) is improved by only taking
into consideration the magnitude of the correlation function, because frequency offset
just leads to a phase rotation of the time domain OFDM signals. It is also noteworthy
that this pilot based detection scheme can achieve a user identification purpose, since
different OFDM systems often have different pilot patterns.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. The system model considered in
this chapter is introduced in Section 3.2. The proposed TDPC detection algorithm
and affiliated interference mitigation techniques are presented in Section 3.3. The
simulation results are provided to validate the analysis and evaluate the performance
of the proposed technique in Section 3.4. At last, this chapter is summarized in
Section 3.5.
3.2 System Model
In this study, an OFDM based wireless network is considered, where OFDM sig-
nals would be present if any active user exists. The same as most of the OFDM based
wireless communication systems, pilots are inserted into OFDM signals for channel
estimation and synchronization [78], and are considered as public information in the
network. In order to simplify the analysis, it is assumed that the same pilots are
inserted at fixed subcarriers of each OFDM signal in the frequency domain. In addi-
tion, a slow time-varying Rayleigh fading channel is considered in the model, in which
the channel impulse response is invariant over at least two adjacent OFDM signals.
With the insertion of the in-band pilots, N subcarriers of each OFDM signal can
be divided into two sets: pilot subcarriers P (k) and data subcarriers D(k). The time
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domain OFDM symbol after N -point IFFT can therefore be expressed as
x(n) = p(n) + d(n), (3.1)
where
p(n) =
1√
N
∑
k∈P
P (k)W knN , (3.2)
d(n) =
1√
N
∑
k∈D
D(k)W knN , (3.3)
and
WN = exp(j2pi/N). (3.4)
P denotes the set of pilot subcarriers, while D denotes the set of data subcarriers.
Before the signals are sent out by the transmitter, a cyclic prefix is inserted at the
beginning of each OFDM symbol to deal with the delay spread of wireless channels
[79]. Suppose the length of the CP is NCP , which is longer than the channel delay
spread, the total symbol duration of each transmitted OFDM signal becomes Ns =
N +NCP . It can be concluded from (3.1), a time domain OFDM signal can be taken
as a summation of two components: time domain data-carrying sequence and time
domain pilot sequence.
Propagated through a wireless channel with a length of L, the OFDM signal
received at the detection device, including the impact of timing and frequency offsets
between the transmitter and detection device1, can be written as
r(n) = W
(n−τ0)ε
N
L−1∑
l=0
h(l)x(n− τ0 − l) + w(n) (3.5)
= W
(n−τ0)ε
N
L−1∑
l=0
h(l)p(n− τ0 − l) +W (n−τ0)εN
L−1∑
l=0
h(l)d(n− τ0 − l) + w(n),
n = 0, 1, · · · , Ns − 1,
1Please refer to Appendix A for a brief introduction of the timing and frequency offsets in OFDM.
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where τ0 represents the timing offset in terms of the sampling interval, ε is the fre-
quency offset normalized by the subcarrier spacing, h(l) denotes the complex fading
gain of the lth path of the multipath channel, and w(n) denotes the additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) with a mean of 0 and a variance of σ2w.
In OFDM, the data subcarriers D(k), k ∈ D can generally be modeled as indepen-
dent random variables. When the size of D is large, the time domain data sequence
d(n) can be considered as a zero-mean Gaussian distributed variable with a vari-
ance of σ2d, by invoking the central limit theorem (CLT). Under the assumption that∑L−1
l=0 |h(l)|2 = 1, the received data-carrying signal also follows a zero-mean Gaussian
distribution with variance σ2d. As the pilots and transmitted data are independent
of each other, the time domain data-carrying signal can then be treated as Gaussian
noise to the time domain pilot sequence. Therefore, the received signal r(n) can be
rewritten as
r(n) = W
(n−τ0)ε
N
L−1∑
l=0
h(l)p(n− τ0 − l) + wˆ(n), (3.6)
where wˆ(n) denotes a combined noise consisting of the data-carrying sequence and
AWGN. Since W
(n−τ0)ε
N
∑L−1
l=0 h(l)d(n−τ0−l) and w(n) are independent of each other,
wˆ(n) follows a zero-mean Gaussian distribution with a variance of σ2d+σ
2
w. Obviously,
the time domain pilot sequence provides a distinctive pattern for the detection of
OFDM signals with frequency domain inserted pilots.
Without loss of generality, there are two hypotheses for the OFDM signal detection
in the time domain:
H0 : r(n) = w(n), k = 0, 1, · · · , Ns − 1; (3.7)
H1 : r(n) = W (n−τ0)εN
L−1∑
l=0
h(l)p(n− τ0 − l) + wˆ(n), k = 0, 1, · · · , Ns − 1.
Here, hypothesis H0 means the absence of active users while H1 denotes the presence
of active users.
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3.3 Proposed TDPC Detection Algorithm
3.3.1 Interference Mitigation Techniques
Under the hypothesis that active users are present, the SNR of OFDM signals
received at the detection device may be very low, due to the severe signal attenuation
caused by fading and shadowing. Meanwhile, since the existence of active users is
unknown prior to the detection process, timing and frequency synchronization cannot
be achieved before the detection operation. Therefore, special interference mitigation
techniques are developed to improve the detection reliability of the proposed TDPC
algorithm.
One important fact is that all transmitted OFDM signals have an identical time
domain pilot sequence with a period of Ns. As a result, even with an unknown
timing offset, segmentation with a period of Ns would still provide a complete time
domain pilot sequence in each signal segment but in a circularly rotated order. Cyclic
correlation can thus be adopted to combat against the unknown timing offset. Time
domain averaging can be employed to mitigate the interference from the data-carrying
sequence and AWGN. However, it is noteworthy that frequency offset would cause a
time domain phase rotation of the OFDM signals, so that direct time domain segment
averaging may eliminate the pilot component when segments have inverse phases, and
then degrade the detection performance. Considering that the phase rotation between
each two adjacent OFDM segments is a constant, complex conjugate multiplication
between every two adjacent received signal segments can be performed before the
average operation to mitigate the effect of frequency offset.
The block diagram of the proposed TDPC detection algorithm is presented in Fig.
3.1. The first step of this algorithm is to segment the received signals with an equal
length of Ns. When OFDM signals present, any two adjacent segments m and m+ 1
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Figure 3.1: Block diagram of the proposed TDPC detection algorithm.
can be expressed as
rm(n) = W
(n+(m−1)Ns−τ0)ε
N
L−1∑
l=0
h(l)p(n− τ0 − l) + wˆm(n), (3.8)
n = 0, 1, · · · , Ns − 1,
and
rm+1(n) = W
(n+mNs−τ0)ε
N
L−1∑
l=0
h(l)p(n− τ0 − l) + wˆm+1(n), (3.9)
n = 0, 1, · · · , Ns − 1.
Comparing rm(n) and rm+1(n), we can find that the phase rotation between two
neighboring segments, which is induced by the frequency offset, is a constant WNsεN .
Complex conjugate multiplication between two adjacent signal segments is thus em-
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ployed in this algorithm to mitigate the damage of frequency offset, that is
Zm(n) = r
∗
m(n)× rm+1(n) (3.10)
= WNsεN
∣∣∣∣∣
L−1∑
l=0
h(l)p(n− τ0 − l)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
+wˆm+1(n)W
−(n+(m−1)Ns−τ0)ε
N
[
L−1∑
l=0
h(l)p(n− τ0 − l)
]∗
+wˆ∗m(n)W
(n+mNs−τ0)ε
N
[
L−1∑
l=0
h(l)p(n− τ0 − l)
]
+ wˆ∗m(n)wˆm+1(n) .
It can be found from (3.10) that the variances of the second and third terms
of Zm(n) are proportional to the noise power σ
2
d + σ
2
w, while the fourth term has
a variance proportional to (σ2d + σ
2
w)
2
. As a result, when the SNR is very low, the
variances of the second and third terms are relatively very small compared to that of
the fourth term while they all have a mean of 0. It is thus reasonable to ignore the
second and third terms. Zm(n) can then be approximated as
Zm(n) ≈ WNsεN
∣∣∣∣∣
L−1∑
l=0
h(l)p(n− τ0 − l)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ wˆ∗m(n)wˆm+1(n)
= WNsεN
∣∣∣∣∣
L−1∑
l=0
h(l)p(n− τ0 − l)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ w′m(n). (3.11)
Further expansion of (3.11) gives us
Zm(n) = W
Nsε
N
L−1∑
l=0
|h(l)|2 |p(n− τ0 − l)|2
+WNsεN
L−1∑
l1=0
L−1∑
l2=0,l2 6=l1
h(l1)h
∗(l2)p(n− τ0 − l1)p∗(n− τ0 − l2)
+w′m(n). (3.12)
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Under the assumption of Rayleigh fading channel, h(l) for l = 0, 1, · · · , L − 1 can
be modelled as L independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) complex Gaussian
variables with zero-mean and variance σ2h. Therefore, |h(l)|2 follows an exponential
distribution with a parameter 1/σ2h. In the second term of (3.12), h(l1) and h
∗(l2) are
two independent zero-mean complex Gaussian variables, while WNsεN , p(n − τ0 − l1)
and p∗(n − τ0 − l2) can all be taken as constants for a specific communicating pair.
Consequently, the second term of (3.12) would have a mean of 0. The averaging of
Zm(n) over G pairs of successive OFDM segments can then be obtained as
Z¯(n) =
1
G
G−1∑
m=0
Z2m(n)
≈ σ2hWNsεN
L−1∑
l=0
|p(n− τ0 − l)|2 + w¯′m(n)
= σ2hW
Nsε
N Λ(n− τ0) + w¯′m(n), (3.13)
where
Λ(n− τ0) =
L−1∑
l=0
|p(n− τ0 − l)|2 . (3.14)
Note that the total number of segments employed in this calculation is M = 2G. It
can be seen from (3.13) that the distortions from the multipath channel, data-carrying
sequence and AWGN can be mitigated through the average operation. The reliability
of signal detection can then be enhanced, particularly in low SNR environments.
3.3.2 Proposed Detection Metric
In the proposed OFDM signal detection algorithm, a local time domain pilot
reference Lp(n) is generated from the frequency domain inserted pilots that are public
information in the network. Under a multipath channel with a length of L, the local
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reference Lp(n) can be derived as
Lp(n) = Λ(n) =
L−1∑
l=0
|p(n− l)|2, n = 0, 1, · · · , Ns − 1. (3.15)
In practice, any arbitrary point may be used as the initial sample time instance
at the detection device, so that timing offset usually occurs. Considering that timing
offset just cyclicly rotates the averaged CCM result Z¯(n) which includes a complete
time domain pilot sequence when OFDM signals present, it can be compensated
by cyclicly correlating Z¯(n) with the local reference Lp(n). The cyclic correlation
between Z¯(n) and Lp(n), denoted by T (ν), can be calculated as
T (ν) =
1
Ns
Ns−1∑
n=0
Lp(n)Z¯
(
mod
{
n+ ν
Ns
})
,
ν = 0, 1, · · · , Ns − 1, (3.16)
where mod {·} denotes the modulo operation. Under hypothesis H1, T (ν) can be
rewritten as
T (ν) =
σ2h
Ns
Ns−1∑
n=0
Lp(n)Λ
(
mod
{
n− τ0 + ν
Ns
})
WNsεN
+
1
Ns
Ns−1∑
n=0
Lp(n)w¯
′
m
(
mod
{
n+ ν
Ns
})
,
ν = 0, 1, · · · , Ns − 1. (3.17)
Theoretically, when ν = τ0, a correlation peak should be observed, that is
T (τ0) =
σ2h
Ns
Ns−1∑
n=0
[Λ(n)]2WNsεN +
1
Ns
Ns−1∑
n=0
Λ(n)w¯′m(n+ τ0). (3.18)
Since frequency offset would distort the correlation result by introducing a phase
rotation WNsεN , the magnitude of T (ν) is calculated in this algorithm to further miti-
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gate the effect of FO. As a result, when ν = τ0, we can have
|T (τ0)| =
√√√√{ σ2h
Ns
Ns−1∑
n=0
[Λ(n)]2
}2
+ V , (3.19)
where V denotes the combining noise as
V =
σ2h
N2s
Ns−1∑
n1=0
[Λ(n1)]
2WNsεN
Ns−1∑
n2=0
Λ(n2)w¯
′∗
m(n2 + τ0) (3.20)
+
σ2h
N2s
Ns−1∑
n1=0
[Λ(n1)]
2W−NsεN
Ns−1∑
n2=0
Λ(n2)w¯
′
m(n2 + τ0)
+
1
N2s
Ns−1∑
n1=0
Λ(n1)w¯
′∗
m(n1 + τ0)
Ns−1∑
n2=0
Λ(n2)w¯
′
m(n2 + τ0).
As shown in (3.19), the phase rotation WNsεN now only acts on the noise term V .
Based on the previous average operation, the power of the noise w¯′m(n) is significantly
reduced. Consequently, the effect of the combining noise V on the magnitude of the
correlation T (τ0) is limited. A significant correlation peak should still be observed
from |T (ν)| when ν = τ0 under hypothesis H1. Therefore, the impact of frequency
offset on the OFDM signal detection can be remarkably mitigated. The detection
metric γ can then be obtained as
γ = max {|T (ν)|} . (3.21)
On the other hand, under hypothesisH0, no OFDM signal is present. The received
signal segments m and m+ 1 will be
r′m(n) = wm(n), n = 0, 1, · · · , Ns − 1, (3.22)
r′m+1(n) = wm+1(n), n = 0, 1, · · · , Ns − 1. (3.23)
After the complex conjugate multiplication, the averaged multiplication result over
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G pairs of successive signal segments can be given by
Z¯ ′(n) =
1
G
G−1∑
m=0
w∗2m(n)w2m+1(n). (3.24)
Following the cyclic correlation between Z¯ ′(n) and the local reference Lp(n), the
magnitude of the correlation, |T ′(ν ′)|, can be mathematically written as
|T ′(ν ′)| =
∣∣∣∣∣ 1Ns
Ns−1∑
n=0
Lp(n)Z¯
′
(
mod
{
n+ ν ′
Ns
})∣∣∣∣∣ ,
ν ′ = 0, 1, · · · , Ns − 1. (3.25)
Then, the detection metric when active users are absent can be formulated as
γ′ = max {|T ′(ν ′)|} , (3.26)
where ν ′ = τ ′ gives the maximum correlation magnitude.
Comparing γ with γ′, we can find that when active users are present, the local
reference is correlated with correlative OFDM signals, a correlation peak can thus
be observed after the cyclic correlation. In contrast, when active users are absent,
the local reference is just correlated with independent noise, the correlation would
always be low. The proposed detection metric γ can therefore be used to identify the
existence of active users in the OFDM network.
3.3.3 Detection Threshold Selection
The presence of OFDM signals is determined by comparing the detection metric
γ against a properly selected threshold λ. If γ > λ, active users are deemed to be
present. Otherwise, the detected spectrum channel is considered as vacant. Without
loss of generality, the detection threshold in the proposed algorithm is selected with
respect to a requirement of the false alarm probability (FAP) Pfa, i.e. the probability
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that a false decision is made when active users are absent.
For the segment complex conjugate multiplication result Z¯ ′(n) in (3.24), since
w∗2m(n) and w2m+1(n) are independent and identically distributed random variables,
Z¯ ′(n) can be approximated as a Gaussian variable with a mean of 0 and a variance
of 1
G
σ4w according to the central limit theorem. Due to the property of Gaussian
distribution, T ′(τ ′) in (3.25) is also Gaussian distributed with a mean of 0 and a
variance of
∑Ns−1
n=0 L
2
p(n)
GN2s
σ4w. As the magnitude of a complex Gaussian variable follows
a Rayleigh distribution, it can be asserted
|T ′(τ ′)| ∼ Rayleigh
√∑Ns−1n=0 L2p(n)
2GN2s
σ2w
 . (3.27)
Then the false alarm probability Pfa with respect to γ
′ can be represented as
Pfa = Prob(γ
′ > λ)
= 1− Fray
λ;
√∑Ns−1
n=0 L
2
p(n)
2GN2s
σ2w
Ns , (3.28)
where Fray(x;σ) denotes the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of Rayleigh dis-
tribution,
Fray(x;σ) =
∫ x
−∞
u
σ2
exp
(−u2
2σ2
)
du. (3.29)
Given a required false alarm probability Pfa, the threshold λ can then be selected as
λ = raylinv
(1− Pfa)1/Ns ,
√∑Ns−1
n=0 L
2
p(n)
2GN2s
σ2w
 , (3.30)
where raylinv(y, σ) is the inverse of the Rayleigh cumulative distribution function.
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3.4 Simulation Results
Simulations are carried out to evaluate the performance of the proposed OFDM
signal detection algorithm using time domain pilot correlation. The robustness of the
proposed TDPC detection algorithm to low SNR, timing offset and frequency offset
are estimated. An OFDM system with 256 subcarriers is employed in the simulations.
Without further specification, 16 pilots are inserted into each OFDM signal in the
frequency domain; the false alarm probability requirement in the threshold selection
is set to 0.1; frequency offset is assumed to be 0.1 and timing offset is randomly
generated by MATLAB. Sixty received signal segments are averaged to mitigate the
interference and noise in the detection operation. In addition, a Rayleigh fading
channel with a length of 12 is taken into account in the simulations.
Figure 3.2 evaluates the miss detection probability (MDP) Pmd (the probability
of making an incorrect decision when active users are present) of the proposed TDPC
algorithm under different false alarm probability requirements when different numbers
of signal segments are averaged. As shown in the figure, a miss detection probability
less than 0.001 can always be achieved when SNR is larger than -1 dB in this simulated
channel condition. Additionally, with a looser false alarm probability requirement, a
better detection performance, in terms of miss detection probability, can be observed.
In the meantime, when more segments are averaged in the detection process, the
interference and noise can be further mitigated, which leads to an enhanced detection
reliability. In order to limit the time cost in the detection process when a large amount
of segments need to be averaged in the low SNR environment, a buffer can be utilized
to store the previous complex conjugate multiplication result Z¯t−1(n). The averaging
process can be reformulated as
Z¯t(n) =
G− 1
G
Z¯t−1(n) +
1
G
Zm(n). (3.31)
As a result, once a new multiplication result is obtained, the averaging operation can
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Figure 3.2: Probability of miss detection under different Pfa requirements when dif-
ferent numbers of signal segments are averaged. FO = 0.1 and TO is randomly
generated.
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Figure 3.3: Robustness of the proposed TDPC algorithm to timing offset when Pfa =
0.1 and FO = 0.1.
be executed and a timely detection decision can be made by the proposed TDPC
algorithm.
The robustness of the proposed detection algorithm to timing and frequency off-
sets is simulated and presented in Fig. 3.3 and Fig. 3.4, respectively. In Fig. 3.3,
we evaluate the Pmd of the detection algorithm with and without random timing off-
set between the transmitter and detection device when different numbers of received
segments are averaged. It can be concluded from the simulation results that the de-
tection performance only experiences little degradation when there is random timing
offset, especially when more segments are averaged in the detection process to further
mitigate the effect of the interference and noise. In the study of the robustness to
frequency offset, carrier frequency offsets between the transmitted and received sig-
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Figure 3.4: Robustness of the proposed TDPC algorithm to frequency offset when
Pfa = 0.1 and TO is randomly generated.
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Figure 3.5: Effect of the number of pilots in each OFDM signal on the detection
performance. Pfa = 0.1, FO = 0.1, and TO is randomly generated.
nals are set to 0, 0.01, 0.1 and 0.5, respectively, in the simulation. Undistinguishable
detection performance in terms of miss detection probability is observed in Fig. 3.4.
Therefore, the proposed OFDM signal detection algorithm is robust to both timing
and frequency offsets.
The effect of the number of pilot subcarriers in an OFDM signal is also studied in
the simulation. While the number of total subcarriers in each OFDM signal is fixed
at 256, the number of pilots changes among 8, 16 and 32. It can be observed from
Fig. 3.5 that a larger number of pilots in the OFDM signals would result into a better
detection performance. This is easy to be explained by (3.5). When more subcarriers
are used to transmit the pilots, a stronger time domain pilot pattern is included in
each received OFDM signal, leading to a lower miss detection probability.
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Figure 3.6: Performance of the proposed TDPC algorithm in multipath channels with
different delay spreads. Pfa = 0.1, FO = 0.1, and TO is randomly generated.
The performance of the proposed TDPC algorithm in Rayleigh fading channels
with different delay spreads is provided in Fig. 3.6. In the simulation, the lengths of
the Rayleigh channels are set to 4, 8, 12, and 16, respectively. Frequency offset with a
value of 0.1 and random timing offset are added. As shown in the figure, our proposed
TDPC algorithm can have higher detection reliability in the Rayleigh fading channel
with a shorter delay spread.
3.5 Summary
In order to enable a robust and simple active user detection in wireless networks,
a time domain pilot correlation algorithm for detecting OFDM signals with frequency
49
domain inserted pilots is proposed in this chapter. The time domain cyclic correlation
between the complex conjugate multiplication of adjacent received signal segments
and a local pilot-based reference is utilized to detect the presence of OFDM signals.
The noise effect on the detection reliability is mitigated by a time domain signal seg-
ment average following the phase rotation locking processing. The robustness of the
proposed detection algorithm to timing offset is improved by the time domain OFDM
symbol length based segmentation and the cyclic correlation. The robustness to fre-
quency offset is enhanced by the segment complex conjugate multiplication and the
use of the correlation magnitude. Simulation results show that the performance of the
proposed detection technique is satisfactory in hostile multipath channel conditions
with the presence of both timing and frequency offsets.
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Chapter 4
Exploiting Transmitter I/Q
Imbalance for Estimating the
Number of Active Users
After recognizing the existence of active users in a wireless environment, we would
like to estimate the total number of those active users for further security risk analysis.
The number of active users in a network is crucial for understanding the security
level of wireless operating environments. Since any node in a network could perform
malicious attacks and be a potential threat, the transmission risk arises with the
increase of active users. This chapter proposes a novel estimation technique for the
number of active users by exploiting a typical device RF-DNA—I/Q imbalance, which
has been identified as a device-specific hardware impairment and can be utilized to
distinguish different wireless devices. In the proposed approach, I/Q imbalance of
a transmitter is first estimated from its transmitting signals. The estimate is then
compared with the observed I/Q imbalances of previously identified users through
a hypothesis testing, where the Euclidean distances between the new estimate and
previous observations are adopted as the test metric. If all the Euclidean distances
are larger than a properly selected threshold, a new active user is claimed. Finally,
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the number of active users is determined by counting all the distinct I/Q imbalances.
Simulation results are provided to validate the proposed estimation scheme.
4.1 Introduction
Due to the inherent broadcast nature of radio propagation, wireless communi-
cations is vulnerable to a variety of malicious attacks. In principle, any node in a
network, even a present legitimate user, may perform hostile attacks such as eaves-
dropping and jamming. It is almost impossible to prevent data loss or disclosure from
one device that can physically access the network [16]. The communication security
risk arises along with the increase of coexistent users. Hence, the number of active
users in a network can generally indicate the security level of an operating environ-
ment, and be used to guide the developing of defending strategies [15]. Ideally, the
association mechanism of communication protocols would provide the information of
active users. However, the number of clients associated to an access point (AP) is
usually not the same as the number of active users in a wireless network. Spoofing
attacks can be launched with little effort in wireless communications. Meanwhile,
some adversaries may not need to associate with or even strive to hide themselves
from APs. Thus, sophisticated strategies to estimate the number of active users need
to be developed.
Various techniques for estimating the number of active users have emerged in the
last decade. Most of the existing work exploited the statistics of packet retransmis-
sions to estimate the number of active users, which arises from the fact that the
network throughput is sensitive to the number of stations competing for channel
access [80]. An extended Kalman filter approach, coupled with a change detection
mechanism to capture variations in the number of competing terminals in a network,
was investigated in [81]. Vercauteren et al. proposed two Bayesian estimators, in
which the number of competing terminals was modeled as a Markov chain with un-
known transition matrix [82]. However, although the aforementioned solutions do
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not rely on association mechanisms of network protocols, they are still highly related
to certain protocol specifications such as the contention window size. In addition to
the packet retransmission statistics, station location information was also adopted to
determine the number of active users [83]. Nevertheless, such a scheme only works in
a static network, and its performance exceedingly depends on the relative positions
among active terminals and the locating precision.
Recently, RF-DNAs of wireless devices have drawn much attention from both
academia and industry due to their potential security applications. Hardware im-
pairments, such as I/Q imbalance, frequency and magnitude errors, are acceptable as
long as process-caused variations are within a tolerated range. It has been verified
that even devices are fabricated using the same manufacturing and packaging pro-
cesses, the impairments induced by the analog circuits cannot be identical and are
normally significant enough for distinguishing one device from all others [3, 27, 52].
In the literature, device RF-DNAs were mainly employed for user identification and
authentication using experimental methodologies [27,52]. In [50], Nguyen et al. men-
tioned that device RF-DNAs could be used to determine the number of attackers in
a network. However, they did not pay enough attention on such application. Sys-
tematic analysis and design of estimating the number of active users based on device
RF-DNAs still remain open.
To that end, this chapter investigates a device RF-DNA based estimation scheme
for the number of active users, by exploiting the I/Q imbalance that is recognized as a
typical feature of device-specific front-end imperfection. Specifically, I/Q imbalance
of a transmitter is first estimated from its transmitting signals. A mathematical
model of the I/Q imbalance observation at a receiver, biased by estimation errors,
is derived. Then, a hypothesis testing is adopted to determine whether the estimate
belongs to any of previously identified users, by comparing the Euclidean distance
between the new estimate and previous I/Q imbalance estimate of each identified
user with a properly selected threshold. A different-device decision is made when
the distance is larger than the threshold, and a new active user is claimed if all the
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comparisons give a different-device decision. At the end, the number of active users
is obtained by counting all the findings. The proposed scheme is independent of the
network protocol and the transmission standard, and it can be easily extended to
other device RF-DNAs.
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the
system model and transmitter I/Q imbalance. The proposed estimation algorithm for
the number of active users is described in Section 4.3, followed by simulation results
in Section 4.4. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 4.5.
4.2 System Model and Preliminaries
4.2.1 System Model
In this chapter, a wireless network that consists of multiple active stations is
considered. Each terminal in the network is surrounded by several wireless devices
which can all be regarded as potential security threats in principle. In order to
evaluate the security level of the operating environment and then perform effective
defending strategies, a station that is going to transmit data would like to estimate
the number of active users in the network.
The wireless network is assumed to be operated in a time-division duplexing
(TDD) scheme, where all the stations alternately transmit their signals. This as-
sumption corresponds to numerous practical wireless communication systems, such
as WiFi and WiMax. Moreover, it is assumed that the network is in a workable
status. Signals transmitted by any node in the network are physically available to all
the other terminals.
4.2.2 I/Q Imbalance Induced by the Transmitter
I/Q imbalance characterizes both the amplitude mismatch and phase mismatch
between the in-phase (I) and quadrature (Q) branches of a signal constellation, as
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illustrated in Fig. 4.1. Generally, I/Q imbalance is caused by two parts of an im-
perfect radio frequency (RF) front-end circuit in a wideband system: imperfect local
oscillator (LO) and imperfect low-pass filter (LPF). Imperfect LO induces frequency-
independent amplitude and phase mismatches, while mismatches caused by the im-
perfection of LPF are frequency-dependent. Since the I/Q imbalance induced by
imperfect LO is typically more significant than that caused by LPF imperfection in
RF circuits [84], this study only targets on the LO-induced I/Q imbalance. The I/Q
imbalance is thus modeled as frequency-independent and constant over the signal
bandwidth.
Letting x(t) = xI(t) + jxQ(t) represent the baseband signal at a transmitter, the
corresponding RF signal s(t), which is distorted by the I/Q imbalance induced by
hardware imperfections of the transmitter RF circuit, can be modeled as
s(t) = xI(t) cos (2pifct)− (1 + ε)xQ(t) sin (2pifct+ φ) , (4.1)
where fc denotes the carrier frequency, ε and φ indicate the amplitude imbalance and
phase orthogonality mismatch between the I and Q branches, respectively. With a
perfect receiver that does not induce any I/Q imbalance, the down-converted signal
after the LPF at the receiver can be written as
yI(t) =
1
2
[xI(t)− (1 + ε)xQ(t) sin (φ)]⊗ h(t) + w′I(t), (4.2)
and
yQ(t) =
1
2
[(1 + ε)xQ(t) cos (φ)]⊗ h(t) + w′Q(t), (4.3)
where yI(t) and yQ(t) represent the in-phase and quadrature components of the re-
ceived signal, respectively. ⊗ indicates the convolution operation. h(t) is the time
domain baseband equivalent channel impulse response with a length of L. Under the
assumption of a slow time-varying wireless channel, the channel impulse response is
taken as invariant during each signal block. w′(t) = w′I(t) + jw
′
Q(t) is the noise after
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the translation from RF to baseband, which can be approximated as additive white
Gaussian noise by ignoring the impact of LPF on its whiteness. Additionally, the sig-
nal x(t), channel h(t) and AWGN w′(t) are considered as statistically independent.
After the digital signal processing, the baseband received signal can finally be given
by
y(t) = 2 [yI(t) + jyQ(t)]
=
[
xI(t) + j (1 + ε) e
jφxQ(t)
]⊗ h(t) + w(t)
= [µx(t) + (1− µ)x∗(t)]⊗ h(t) + w(t), (4.4)
where µ is a defined I/Q imbalance parameter that characterizes both the amplitude
mismatch ε and phase mismatch φ. Mathematically, µ can be described as
µ =
[1 + (1 + ε)ejφ]
2
. (4.5)
w(t) denotes the AWGN acting on the baseband received signal y(t), which follows
a complex Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance of σ2, i.e. w(t) ∼
CN (0, σ2).
4.3 Proposed Estimation Technique for the Num-
ber of Active Users
4.3.1 Estimation of the Transmitter I/Q Imbalance
The goal of the proposed technique is to utilize estimates of transmitter I/Q
imbalances to differentiate different transmitters and then determine the number
of active users in a network. Hence, I do not focus on the development of I/Q
imbalance estimation techniques. Various I/Q imbalance estimation algorithms have
been reported in the past decade [84–87]. In this chapter, a training signal based
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Without I/Q imbalance
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of signal constellation distorted by I/Q imbalance.
estimation scheme is taken as an example to extract the transmitter I/Q imbalance.
Since we are merely interested in how many different I/Q imbalances exist but not
the actual values of their amplitude and phase mismatches, only the I/Q imbalance
parameter µ that is highly competent for the differentiation purpose is estimated.
Training signals, which are usually public information in wireless communication
systems for channel estimation and signal synchronization purposes, can be exploited
to estimate the transmitter I/Q imbalance. Under the assumption of perfect syn-
chronization, the I/Q imbalance parameter µ can be extracted from the correlation
between the received and the conjugate of transmitted training signals at baseband.
Given a sampled training signal x(n), n = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, the correlation between
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x∗(n) and the kth received training signal yk(n) can be expressed as
Γk =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
[yk(n)x
∗(n)]
= µk
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
{[hk(n)⊗ x(n)]x∗(n)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
ck
+(1− µk) 1
N
N−1∑
n=0
{[hk(n)⊗ x∗(n)]x∗(n)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
γk
+
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
[wk(n)x
∗(n)] , (4.6)
where the subscript k indicates variables associated with the kth received training
signal. With perfect channel estimation for hk(n), the receiver can easily calculate
ck and γk. As a result, the estimate of the transmitter I/Q imbalance parameter, µˆk,
can be obtained as
µˆk =
Γk − γk
ck − γk
= µk +
1
(ck − γk)N
N−1∑
n=0
[wk(n)x
∗(n)]
= µk + ∆µk , (4.7)
where ∆µk is the estimation error of µk, which can be modeled as a zero-mean complex
Gaussian variable as
∆µk ∼ CN
(
0, σ2µk =
E¯xσ
2
k
N |ck − γk|2
)
, (4.8)
in which E¯x denotes the power of the training signal, i.e. E¯x =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
|x(n)|2. It
can be concluded from (4.8) that the estimation error ∆µk is independent of the true
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value of the I/Q imbalance parameter µk.
4.3.2 Differentiation of Different Transmitters based on Ob-
served I/Q Imbalances
In order to determine the number of active users in a network, the estimation node
has to differentiate different transmitters by judging whether any two I/Q imbalance
estimates are from an identical device or not. Given two I/Q imbalance observations
µˆl = µl + ∆µl and µˆk = µk + ∆µk , the differentiating procedure can be modeled as a
binary hypothesis testing as  H0 : µl = µkH1 : µl 6= µk . (4.9)
∆µl and ∆µk are estimation errors of µl and µk, respectively, which are independent
zero-mean Gaussian variables referring to (4.8). In the proposed differentiation algo-
rithm, the Euclidean distance between vectors µˆl and µˆk is defined as the test metric,
that is
Λ(l, k) =
∣∣µˆl − µˆk∣∣, (4.10)
where |·| denotes the norm operation. Compared with a properly selected decision
threshold T , if Λ(l, k) is larger than T , it is claimed that these two observations
are from different transmitters; otherwise, µˆl and µˆk are taken as two I/Q imbalance
estimates of an identical transmitter, which are deviated by distortions from the noise
and multipath channel.
The same as a common binary detection problem, two types of errors may occur
during the testing: false alarm and miss detection. Under hypothesis H0, the test
statistic Λ(l, k) can be rewritten as
Λ(l, k)
∣∣H0 = ∣∣∆µl −∆µk∣∣. (4.11)
The term ∆µl − ∆µk is zero-mean complex Gaussian distributed with a variance of
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σ2µl + σ
2
µk
. As a result, Λ(l, k)|H0 follows a Rayleigh distribution with parameter
δ =
√
σ2µl
+σ2µk
2
. The false alarm probability, Pfa, can therefore be derived as
Pfa = P
{
Λ(l, k) > T
∣∣∣H0}
= P
{
|∆µl −∆µk | > T
}
= e
−T2
σ2µl
+σ2µk . (4.12)
Similarly, under hypothesis H1, the test statistic turns to be
Λ(l, k)
∣∣H1 = ∣∣µl − µk + ∆µl −∆µk∣∣, (4.13)
where the term µl − µk + ∆µl − ∆µk follows a complex Gaussian distribution with
mean µl−µk and variance σ2µl + σ2µk . Hence, Λ(l, k)|H1 follows a Rice distribution as
Λ(l, k)|H1 ∼ Rice
(∣∣µl − µk∣∣,√σ2µl + σ2µk
2
)
. (4.14)
Consequently, the miss detection probability, Pmd, can be calculated as
Pmd = P
{
Λ(l, k) ≤ T
∣∣∣H1}
= P
{∣∣µl − µk + ∆µl −∆µk∣∣ ≤ T}
= 1−Q1
 |µl − µk|√
σ2µl
+σ2µk
2
,
T√
σ2µl
+σ2µk
2
 , (4.15)
where Q1(·, ·) is the first-order Marcum Q-function,
Q1 (a, b) =
∫ ∞
b
xe−
x2+a2
2
∞∑
i=0
(ax/2)2i
i!Γ (i+ 1)
dx. (4.16)
As shown in (4.12) and (4.15), FAP is just a function of estimation errors, and is
60
independent of the true value of the I/Q imbalance; in contrast, MDP is a function
of the I/Q imbalance distance |µl − µk|. In practical implementation, an estimation
node has no prior information about I/Q imbalances of the transmitters, so that the
theoretical MDP cannot be obtained in the differentiating procedure. Therefore, the
decision threshold T in the binary hypothesis test should be chosen based on a given
requirement of FAP. Mathematically, a suitable decision threshold can be selected as
T =
√
−ln
(
Pfa
)(
σ2µl + σ
2
µk
)
(4.17)
=
√
−ln
(
Pfa
)(
E¯xσ2l
N |cl−γl|2 +
E¯xσ2k
N |ck−γk|2
)
.
Please note that a new I/Q imbalance observation needs to be compared with I/Q
imbalance estimates of all the identified active users. The discovery of a new station
is claimed if and only if all the testings give a different-device decision.
4.3.3 Estimation of the Number of Active Users
Exploiting the proposed transmitter differentiation algorithm, different terminals
can be identified based on their distinct I/Q imbalances. Thereafter, the number of
active users in the network is determined by counting all the findings.
During an observation time window, the estimation node can obtain multiple
transmitter I/Q imbalance estimates from the received training signals. Let Ξ denote
the set of all the I/Q imbalance observations, and Ω indicate the set of I/Q imbalance
estimates belonging to the identified active users. The procedure for determining the
number of active users can be summarized as follows:
1. Estimate Ξ(1) and put it into Ω as the I/Q imbalance estimate of the first
identified active user, and then make a new estimate Ξ(m),m = 2;
2. Choose a suitable decision threshold T (m) for the identification of Ξ(m),m ≥ 2,
according to the used training signal and corresponding channel condition;
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3. Compare the Euclidean distances between Ξ(m) and all the elements in the set
Ω. If all the distances are larger than the selected threshold T (m), put Ξ(m)
into set Ω;
4. If the time window does not expire, make a new estimate Ξ(m),m = m+ 1 and
then go to Step 2; otherwise, go to Step 5;
5. Count the number of elements in the set Ω.
4.4 Simulation Results
Matlab simulations are carried out to validate the proposed estimation technique
for the number of active users. An OFDM signal with 64 subcarriers and 4-QAM
symbol modulation is adopted as the training signal in the simulations. The sampling
frequency is set to 20 MHz. Without further specification, a Rayleigh fading channel
with an exponential power delay profile (PDP) of a root-mean-square (RMS) delay of
50 ns is considered, which leads to a 12-tap time-domain channel impulse response. As
a result, the cyclic prefix length of the OFDM signal, which is 16 in the simulations, is
larger than the delay induced by the multipath channel. In addition, perfect channel
estimation and synchronization are assumed to be achieved in the simulations.
4.4.1 FAP and MDP of the I/Q Imbalance based Transmitter
Differentiation
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 present the simulated false alarm and miss detection prob-
abilities of the proposed transmitter differentiation algorithm in differentiating two
I/Q imbalance estimates, respectively. A transmitter with I/Q imbalance ε = 0.25
and φ = 5◦ is employed in the simulation for FAP. The decision threshold is selected
based on a FAP requirement varying from 0.1 to 0.001. It can be found from Fig. 4.2
that the simulated FAPs are very close to their theoretical values in the considered
62
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
SNR(dB)
P f
a
 
 
Pfa = 0.1
Pfa = 0.01
Pfa = 0.001
Figure 4.2: FAP in differentiating two I/Q imbalance estimates of an identical trans-
mitter with I/Q imbalance ε = 0.25 and φ = 5◦.
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Rayleigh fading channel during a signal-to-noise ratio range from 0 dB to 30 dB.
In the simulation for MDP, the two I/Q imbalance estimates are observed from
two distinct transmitters. One transmitter has I/Q imbalance ε = 0.25 and φ = 5◦,
the other suffers I/Q imbalance ε = 0.05 and φ = 15◦. The FAPs used in selecting the
decision threshold are 0.1, 0.01 and 0.001, respectively. As shown in Fig. 4.3, when
SNR is around 20 dB, MDPs in differentiating the two transmitters can be as low as
0.01. Moreover, a lower MDP can be observed under the same SNR condition when
a larger FAP is acceptable in the differentiating process. It is noteworthy that the
MDP also depends on the difference between I/Q imbalances of different transmitters,
as addressed in the theoretical analysis in (4.15). A larger I/Q imbalance distance
would reduce the probability of miss detection in the transmitter differentiation.
4.4.2 Accuracy of the Estimation for the Number of Active
Users
In the evaluation of the proposed estimation algorithm for the number of active
users, six transmitters are assumed to be present in the network. The amplitude and
phase mismatches between I and Q branches of their signal constellations, i.e. (ε, φ),
are (−0.3,−15◦), (−0.3, 15◦), (−0.1,−5◦), (0.1, 5◦), (0.3, 15◦), (0.3,−15◦), respectively.
Two estimates are obtained for each transmitter in the observation time window.
Furthermore, a Rayleigh fading channel with an exponential PDP of 100 ns RMS
delay, which would cause inter-symbol interference to the training signals, is also
considered. Taking the event that the estimated number of active users is not equal
to six as an estimation error in the simulation, error probabilities of the proposed
estimation algorithm under different channel conditions are evaluated, as shown in
Fig. 4.4. Acceptable performance can be observed from the simulation results. In
addition, the estimation accuracy degrades when inter-symbol interference is caused
by the multipath channel.
In order to study the statistics of estimation errors, the frequency of occurrence
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Figure 4.3: MDP in differentiating two I/Q imbalance estimates of distinct transmit-
ters. One transmitter has I/Q imbalance ε = 0.25 and φ = 5◦, the other has ε = 0.05
and φ = 15◦.
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Figure 4.4: Error probability in estimating the number of active users when there are
six transmitters in the network. Their I/Q imbalances are (−0.3,−15◦), (−0.3, 15◦),
(−0.1,−5◦), (0.1, 5◦), (0.3, 15◦) and (0.3,−15◦), respectively.
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Figure 4.5: Statistical analysis for the estimation results when six active transmitters
exist in the network.
for all the estimated numbers of active users is analyzed. Figure 4.5 demonstrates
the frequency of occurrence when SNR = 16 dB and SNR = 20 dB in the Rayleigh
fading channel of 50 ns RMS delay. In most of incorrect estimations, the estimated
number of active users is just one away from the true value, caused by either false
alarm or miss detection. Generally, this small deviation will not significantly affect
perceiving the security level of the operating environment.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, a novel device RF-DNA based estimation technique for the number
of active users in a wireless network is proposed. As a typical device RF-DNA that
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has device-specific nature, transmitter I/Q imbalance is exploited in the design. I/Q
imbalance of a transmitter is first estimated from its transmitting signals, and then
compared with the I/Q imbalance estimate of each previously identified active user
through a hypothesis testing, where the Euclidean distance between the new and
previous estimates is adopted as the test metric. If the distance is larger than a
selected threshold, the two estimates are considered to be from different wireless
devices. A new active user is claimed if and only if all the comparisons give a different-
device decision. At the end of an estimation time window, the number of active users
is obtained by counting all the identified transmitters. Simulation results have been
provided to validate the proposed estimation technique.
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Chapter 5
Anti-Eavesdropping OFDM
System with CSI-based Coordinate
Interleaving
In light of the security weaknesses of OFDM technology and its general acceptance
in modern wireless communications, the security of OFDM communication systems
needs to enhanced. This dissertation concentrates on the built-in security enhance-
ment of wireless OFDM systems against eavesdropping. Two novel physical-layer
eavesdropping prevention strategies for OFDM are proposed. This chapter provides
insight into the proposed dynamic coordinate interleaving method, which can be em-
ployed in most existing wireless OFDM systems. For situations that the modulated
data symbols transmitted at OFDM subcarriers are not in a complex-number struc-
ture, another dynamic subcarrier interleaving technique is investigated and presented
in Chapter 6.
A novel anti-eavesdropping OFDM system through dynamic subcarrier coordi-
nate interleaving is proposed in this chapter, by exploiting the reciprocal, location-
dependent and time-varying nature of wireless channels. In the proposed OFDM
system, the transmitter performs coordinate interleaving at partial OFDM subcarri-
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ers, where the symbol coordinate of an OFDM subcarrier is interleaved in an oppor-
tunistic manner depending on the instantaneous channel state information between
the transmitter and intended receiver. More specifically, a subcarrier symbol asso-
ciated with a CSI (i.e., channel gain or phase) larger than a predefined threshold
is coordinate interleaved. Since wireless channels associated with each pair of users
at separate locations exhibit independent multipath fading, the frequently updated
coordinate interleaving pattern can only be shared between legitimate users based
on channel reciprocity. Consequently, eavesdropping is prevented due to mismatched
de-interleaving at the eavesdropper. Two coordinate interleaving schemes are inves-
tigated by employing the subcarrier channel gain and phase in determining the inter-
leaving pattern, respectively. In order to simultaneously evaluate the eavesdropping
resilience and transmission reliability of anti-eavesdropping communication systems,
a novel evaluation criterion, named probability of confidential transmission, is also
proposed. Theoretical analysis and simulation results are provided to validate the
effectiveness of the proposed anti-eavesdropping OFDM system. As confirmed by
simulation results, the proposed system significantly outperforms the conventional
OFDM system in terms of the probability of confidential transmission.
5.1 Introduction
Securing wireless communications is a critical challenge due to the inherent broad-
cast nature of radio signal propagation. Adversaries can possibly intercept legitimate
transmissions as long as they lie within the radio transmission coverage. Tradi-
tional communication securing mechanisms largely rely on cryptographic techniques
at upper layers of the protocol stacks, where the security is generally guaranteed
by using either pre-distributed or public cryptography keys between communication
nodes [88]. However, with limited randomness and potential secrecy leakage in such
highly standardized practices, key distribution and protection face severe threats of
being cracked. In recent years, physical layer security, exploiting the continual influx
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of the situation- and user-dependent randomness from wireless multipath channels,
is emerging as an effective means to complement conventional wireless security tech-
niques [13]. The new physical layer security paradigms benefit from fundamental
properties of wireless channels, such as reciprocity, as well as temporal and spatial
variations.
5.1.1 State of the Art in Eavesdropping Prevention
Eavesdropping, particularly passive eavesdropping, is one of the primary security
problems in a wireless network. A passive eavesdropper can overhear wireless signals
and infer the transmitted information without being detected by legitimate users.
Several studies for preventing eavesdropping at the physical layer in wireless com-
munications have been developed. Information theoretic aspects of secrecy [89, 90],
which originated from Shannon’s notion of perfect secrecy [29], demonstrated that
as long as the eavesdropper’s channel is worse than the legitimate receiver’s channel,
perfect secrecy can be achieved without any cryptographic key.
Differing from the theoretical security techniques, several practical approaches
dealing with eavesdropping have also been investigated:
• Transmitter beamforming and friendly jamming. Transmitter beamforming was
proposed to facilitate the transmission confidentiality in [40], where the maxi-
mum secrecy sum rate was achieved when eavesdropper’s channel state infor-
mation was known. Artificial noise [41] was generated using multiple antennas
or cooperative nodes, and was injected into the null-subspace of the intended
receiver’s channel to prevent eavesdropping.
• Network cooperation. The authors of [91] proposed an anti-eavesdropping space-
time network coding scheme to prevent eavesdropping under the collaboration
of the user nodes in a cluster. Similarly, relay technique was utilized to defend
against eavesdroppers in [92,93] at the cost of collaborative nodes.
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• Coded transmission. Security can also be enhanced through spread-spectrum
techniques at the physical layer such as direct-sequence spread-spectrum (DSSS)
and frequency-hopping spread-spectrum (FHSS) [94], in which a signal is typi-
cally spread over a frequency band with frequency bandwidth much wider than
that of the original information. In [95], messages were transmitted over punc-
tured bits to hide data from eavesdroppers by using low-density parity-check
codes.
• Resource allocation. Power and subcarrier allocation techniques have also been
introduced to improve the security against eavesdropping [96,97]. The optimal
resource allocation was studied with respect to instantaneous channel conditions
under a total transmit power constraint and security constraints.
It can be concluded that the aforementioned security approaches require addi-
tional resource, significant changes of the network protocol and device hardware, or
high computational complexity. Effective practical alternatives with minimum ad-
ditional resource requirement, modification to off-the-shelf systems and operational
complexity have yet to be investigated.
5.1.2 Physical Layer Security of OFDM Systems
OFDM has been widely adopted in many high-speed wireless communication
networks, such as Long-Term Evolution Advanced, IEEE 802.16 and IEEE 802.11,
mainly because of its high spectral efficiency and robustness against multipath fad-
ing. Unfortunately, the distinct physical-layer time and frequency characteristics of
conventional OFDM signals can be exploited for interception purposes by adversaries,
resulting in the OFDM system being vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks. Thus, it
is of practical interest to investigate the physical layer security in OFDM due to its
wide popularity and its inherent security weaknesses.
Extensive research efforts have been devoted to improve the physical layer security
of OFDM systems against eavesdropping. Waveform feature suppression strategies,
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including frequency hopping [98], cyclic prefix and pilot tone elimination [99], as
well as CP size variation and random signal insertion [100], have been employed to
enhance OFDM security. Besides significant modifications to off-the-shelf systems,
these approaches have a critical requirement that the feature suppression processing
needs to be kept unknown to adversaries. It cannot be easily fulfilled in practical
implementations. Encryption methods have also been investigated to prevent OFDM
signals from eavesdropping [101, 102]. Nevertheless, aside from their computational
complexity induced by the involved encryption key generation, key distribution and
management in these techniques face severe threats of being cracked.
Recently, the randomness of wireless channels was exploited to strengthen the
security of OFDM transmission as well. The physical layer security of OFDM sys-
tems over wireless channels was investigated from an information-theoretic perspec-
tive in [13]. A secure OFDM system was investigated by degrading the eavesdrop-
per’s channel condition, where distributed transmitters independently send out pre-
equalized OFDM signals [103]. In addition, an optimal power allocation scheme under
power and security constraints for the wire-tap OFDM system was presented in [104].
However, these security techniques require the knowledge of the eavesdropping chan-
nel, which is conditioned on a successful detection of eavesdroppers. Therefore, it
is expected to develop simple proactive eavesdropping prevention for OFDM at the
physical layer, without the requirements of eavesdropping channel information, sig-
nificant modifications to off-the-shelf systems as well as additional resource.
5.1.3 Contributions of the Proposed Secure OFDM System
The concept of coordinate interleaving was originally introduced into communica-
tion systems to improve the reliability of modulated signals in fading channels by in-
creasing the modulation diversity [105,106]. It was later extended to space-time code
designs for multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wireless transmission [107, 108].
In [109, 110], coordinate interleaving method was utilized to improve the error rate
73
performance in cooperative relay networks. Furthermore, it has been verified that
the peak-to-average power ratio (PAPR) of OFDM signals could be reduced with a
properly designed coordinate interleaving [111]. However, none of these works take
into account the security issues.
In this chapter, a simple and effective anti-eavesdropping OFDM system is pro-
posed by exploiting coordinate interleaving at partial subcarriers of each OFDM sig-
nal. Subcarriers that perform coordinate interleaving are chosen according to the
real-time channel state information between the transmitter and intended receiver.
Both subcarrier channel gain and phase are investigated for determining whether
a subcarrier is to be interleaved, leading to two different coordinate interleaving
schemes. More specifically, the transmitter interleaves the real and imaginary com-
ponents of a subcarrier symbol when its associated channel gain (or channel phase)
is larger than a predefined threshold. Based on channel reciprocity, the legitimate
receiver can locally deduce subcarriers that undergo coordinate interleaving without
any additional signaling. In contrast, due to the independence of spatially separate
wireless channels in a rich multipath environment, the subcarrier coordinate inter-
leaving pattern is unavailable to eavesdroppers at a third location. Consequently,
de-interleaving at eavesdroppers is disrupted and eavesdropping is then prevented.
In order to simultaneously evaluate the eavesdropping resilience and transmission
reliability of anti-eavesdropping communication systems, a novel performance evalua-
tion criterion, named probability of confidential transmission, is also proposed in this
study. Compared to existing security approaches, the proposed anti-eavesdropping
OFDM system does not require eavesdropping channel information or additional in-
formation exchange, only needs minor modifications to off-the-shelf systems, and has
low computational complexity.
Organization The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2
introduces the system model and preliminaries. The proposed OFDM security tech-
nique exploiting the channel gain based coordinate interleaving is analyzed in Section
5.3, followed by the channel phase based coordinate interleaving scheme in Section
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5.4. System optimization with a trade-off between eavesdropping resilience and trans-
mission reliability, as well as the proposed performance evaluation criterion for anti-
eavesdropping systems, is discussed in Section 5.5. Simulation results are provided in
Section 5.6, and conclusions are finally drawn in Section 5.7.
Notations Boldface letter A identifies a random variable vector A and A(k) de-
notes its kth element. [·]T indicates the complex nonconjugate transposition. Bold
upper case letter with superscript N represents an N×N matrix. Complex Gaussian
random variable X with mean m and variance σ2, and with independent and identi-
cally distributed real and imaginary components, is denoted as X ∼ CN (m,σ2).
5.2 System Model and Preliminaries
5.2.1 System Model
In this study, an OFDM wireless network that consists of three nodes is consid-
ered, where a transmitter communicates with a legitimate receiver in the presence
of a passive eavesdropper, as shown in Fig. 5.1. The forward and reverse channels
between legitimate users are assumed to occupy the same frequency band and re-
main constant over several time slots. Hence, the transmitter and legitimate receiver
would experience and observe an identical common channel (channel between the
transmitter and the legitimate receiver), based on the reciprocity property of wireless
channels.
Generally, a third party that is more than half a wavelength away from the in-
tended receiver experiences a fading process independent of that between legitimate
terminals [26]. For instance, at 2.4 GHz, two receivers that are roughly separated by
6.25 cm would suffer independent channel impairments. In most practical scenarios,
the eavesdropper is spatially separated from the legitimate users with a much farther
distance, in order to avoid being detected. As a result, the common channel and
eavesdropping channel (channel between the transmitter and the eavesdropper) are
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Figure 5.1: Wireless communications in the presence of a passive eavesdropper.
modelled as independent of each other in the analysis.
5.2.2 Multipath Channels in OFDM System
Assume that OFDM signals withN subcarriers are transmitted by the transmitter.
At the legitimate receiver, the frequency domain received signals after removing the
cyclic prefix, R = [R(0), R(1), · · · , R(N − 1)]T , can be written as
R = diag
{
H
}N
S + W, (5.1)
where diag
{
H
}N
, which is an N×N diagonal matrix with all its main diagonal entries
H = [H(0), H(1), · · · , H(N − 1)]T , identifies the complex frequency domain channel
responses of the common channel; N × 1 vector S denotes the modulated symbols
transmitted by the N subcarriers, which are mapped into a two-dimensional constella-
tion; and vector W of size N×1 indicates the white Gaussian noise following the dis-
tribution CN(0, σ2w). For the frequency domain channel vector H, it is characterized
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by the associated time domain channel coefficients h = [h(0), h(1), · · · , h(L− 1)]T as
H = FNh, (5.2)
where FN is the N -point FFT matrix with its (n, k)th entry (exp{−j2pink/N}/√N).
Under the assumption of a Rayleigh fading channel, h can be modelled as L indepen-
dent and identically distributed zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables, so
that H is also complex Gaussian distributed due to central limit theorem. Through-
out this chapter, {H(0), H(1), · · · , H(N − 1)} are approximated as i.i.d. random
variables following the distribution CN(0, σ2H).
The same modelling and approximation can be applied to the analysis of the
eavesdropping channel HE. Similarly, {HE(0), HE(1), · · · , HE(N − 1)} are modelled
as i.i.d. complex Gaussian variables following the distribution CN(0, σ2HE) in the
discussion.
5.2.3 Channel Estimates in the Network
Estimation errors generally occur at the channel estimators, due to the presence
of noise, interference and hardware limitations in wireless communication systems.
As a result, only a noisy channel estimate can be obtained by all the nodes in the
network. The observations of the common channel at the transmitter and legitimate
receiver, HˆT and HˆR, respectively, can be given by
HˆT/R = H + ∆HT/R, (5.3)
where subscripts T and R indicate vectors associated with the transmitter and le-
gitimate receiver, respectively. ∆HT/R of size N × 1 is the estimation error of the
common channel H at the transmitter/legitimate receiver, which can be modelled as a
zero-mean complex Gaussian variable vector with all its elements being independently
distributed. With a further assumption that estimation errors at all subcarriers of an
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OFDM signal are identically distributed, ∆HT (k) and ∆HR(k) can be modelled as
∆HT (k) ∼ CN(0, σ2T ), k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, (5.4)
and
∆HR(k) ∼ CN(0, σ2R), k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, (5.5)
respectively. Please note that the noise, interference as well as hardware limitations
at the transmitter are usually independent of that at the legitimate receiver, even
when they follow the same statistical distributions at the two ends. The estimation
errors ∆HT and ∆HR would thus be independent of each other as well.
Similarly, the noisy estimate of the eavesdropper’s CSI can be written as
HˆE = HE + ∆HE, (5.6)
where HˆE is the estimate of the eavesdropping channel HE with estimation error
∆HE. ∆HE(k) for k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1 can also be modeled as i.i.d. zero-mean
complex Gaussian variables with variance σ2E. It is noteworthy that HE is independent
of H, and ∆HE is independent of both ∆HT and ∆HR. Therefore, HˆE should be
independent of both HˆT and HˆR.
5.3 Proposed Secure OFDM System Using Chan-
nel Gain based Coordinate Interleaving
In the proposed anti-eavesdropping OFDM system, the real and imaginary com-
ponents of modulated symbols at partial OFDM subcarriers are interleaved in an
opportunistic manner. Subcarriers of each OFDM signal that perform coordinate
interleaving are dynamically determined by the CSI of the common channel. Two co-
ordinate interleaving schemes are investigated, which exploit the subcarrier channel
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gain and phase in determining the coordinate interleaving pattern, respectively. The
channel gain based scheme is introduced in this section, and the channel phase based
scheme is discussed later in Section 5.4.
In order to provide a deep insight into the gain and phase of the noisy channel
estimates, we rewrite the observed channel frequency responses in a geometrical form.
Referring to (5.3), the noisy channel observations at the transmitter and legitimate
receiver can be geometrically expressed as
∣∣∣HˆT/R (k) ∣∣∣ejθˆT/R(k) = ∣∣∣H (k) ∣∣∣ejθ(k) + ∣∣∣∆HT/R (k) ∣∣∣ej∆θT/R(k),
k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, (5.7)
where |·| indicates the norm operation, θˆT/R(k) denotes the estimated channel phase at
the kth subcarrier of the common channel while θ(k) is its exact value, and ∆θT/R(k)
represents the phase of the estimation error ∆HT/R (k). Similarly, the estimate of the
eavesdropping channel can be rewritten in a geometrical form as
∣∣∣HˆE (k) ∣∣∣ejθˆE(k) = ∣∣∣HE (k) ∣∣∣ejθ(k) + ∣∣∣∆HE (k) ∣∣∣ej∆θE(k),
k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, (5.8)
where θˆE(k), θ(k) and ∆θE(k) denote the phases of the estimated channel response
HˆE (k), the eavesdropper channel HE (k), and the estimation error ∆HE (k), respec-
tively.
Please note that in the proposed anti-eavesdropping OFDM system, we may not
need to involve all N subcarriers of each OFDM signal in the opportunistic coordinate
interleaving. Instead, a subcarrier set M, with M out of the N subcarriers, can be
utilized in the security design, where M ≤ N .
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5.3.1 Subcarrier Channel Gain based Coordinate Interleav-
ing
In the security scheme using channel gain based coordinate interleaving, the in-
stantaneous channel gain of each subcarrier belonging to the set M in an OFDM
signal is compared with a properly selected threshold. If the channel gain of a sub-
carrier is larger than the threshold, the transmitter performs coordinate interleaving
at that subcarrier; otherwise, the modulated symbol at that subcarrier is transmitted
in the original format.
The subcarrier channel gain obtained at the transmitter, which is employed to
initiate the coordinate interleaving pattern, can be given by
λT (k) =
∣∣∣HˆT (k)∣∣∣2 , k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1. (5.9)
Since HˆT (k) follows a complex Gaussian distribution CN
(
0, σ2
HˆT
)
, where σ2
HˆT
=
σ2H+σ
2
T , the channel gain λT (k) is exponentially distributed with a probability density
function (PDF) fT (λT (k)) =
1
σ2
HˆT
e
−λT (k)/σ2HˆT and a CDF FT (λT (k)) = 1−e−λT (k)/σ
2
HˆT .
Given a predefined threshold ΛT , the pattern of the channel gain based coordinated
interleaving at the kth subcarrier can be expressed as λT (k) > ΛT , interleavingλT (k) ≤ ΛT , un-interleaving , k ∈M. (5.10)
The threshold ΛT needs to be selected to maximize the difficulty of eavesdropping. In
our case, an equal probability of both decisions in (5.10) would achieve this purpose,
that is
P (λT (k) > ΛT ) = P (λT (k) ≤ ΛT ) = 1
2
. (5.11)
Since λT (k) follows an exponential distribution with parameter 1/σ
2
HˆT
, the threshold
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ΛT can be chosen as
ΛT = −σ2HˆT ln
1
2
. (5.12)
5.3.2 Performance of Eavesdropping Prevention
No information about the coordinate interleaving pattern will be sent out by the
transmitter of the proposed anti-eavesdropping OFDM system. Any node in the
network that wants to de-interleave and demodulate the transmitted data has to
locally derive the coordinate interleaving pattern of each OFDM signal.
Since the eavesdropping channel HE and common channel H, as well as the chan-
nel estimates HˆE and HˆT, are statistically independent, the channel gains λE and λT
should be independent of each other. Consequently, the eavesdropper has no more
information than a random guess about whether the symbol at any OFDM subcarrier
in the setM is coordinate interleaved. Due to the independence between λE and λT,
the derivation of the interleaving pattern from λE can also be taken as a random
guess. With an equal probability of interleaving and un-interleaving at an OFDM
subcarrier in M, the probability that the eavesdropper makes a correct guess of the
coordinate interleaving pattern at one subcarrier would be
pE(k) =
1
2
, k ∈M. (5.13)
Under the assumption that M subcarriers are involved in the opportunistic coordinate
interleaving for the security purpose, the probability that the eavesdropper makes an
incorrect decision for the interleaving pattern of an OFDM signal, PE, can be given
by
PE = 1− 1
2M
. (5.14)
Let PS denote the symbol error rate (SER) of the conventional OFDM system
using a certain modulation scheme in a Rayleigh fading channel. The SER of eaves-
dropping under the same channel condition when legitimate users adopt the proposed
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channel gain based coordinate interleaving, PS,E, can be calculated as
PS,E = 1− (1− PE) (1− PS) . (5.15)
5.3.3 Performance of Legitimate Transmission
In the proposed anti-eavesdropping OFDM system, the legitimate receiver locally
derives the coordinate interleaving pattern from its own estimate of the common chan-
nel, and then performs de-interleaving and data demodulation. Ideally, the transmit-
ter and intended receiver could have the same channel observations due to channel
reciprocity. The opportunistic coordinate interleaving would thus not degrade the
reliability of legitimate transmission. In practice, the legitimate node pair can only
have two noisy estimates of the common channel due to their independent estima-
tion errors. Hence, the performance of legitimate transmission with noisy channel
estimates needs to be evaluated.
Referring to the analysis in Section 5.2, the noisy channel estimate of the common
channel at the legitimate receiver follows a complex Gaussian distribution CN
(
0, σ2
HˆR
)
,
where σ2
HˆR
= σ2H+σ
2
R. Therefore, the channel gain λR (k) =
∣∣∣HˆR (k)∣∣∣2 is exponentially
distributed with parameter 1/σ2
HˆR
. In order to derive the interleaving pattern initi-
ated at the transmitter, the receiver compares its observed subcarrier channel gains
with a threshold ΛR. Similar to the analysis in (5.12), we can obtain the threshold
used at the intended receiver, ΛR, as
ΛR = −σ2HˆR ln
1
2
. (5.16)
The reliability of legitimate transmission is degraded when the transmitter and
legitimate receiver generate mismatched coordinate interleaving patterns. The prob-
ability of disagreement between the transmitter and legitimate receiver on whether
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one subcarrier in the set M is interleaved, pL(k), can be calculated as
pL(k) = P (λR (k) > ΛR|λT (k) ≤ ΛT ) + P (λR (k) ≤ ΛR|λT (k) > ΛT ) (5.17)
=
1
2
P (λR (k) > ΛR, λT (k) ≤ ΛT ) + 1
2
P (λR (k) ≤ ΛR, λT (k) > ΛT ).
Challenges here are to derive P (λR (k) > ΛR, λT (k) ≤ ΛT ) and P (λR (k) ≤ ΛR,
λT (k) > ΛT ). Considering that HˆT (k) and HˆR(k) are two Gaussian variables condi-
tioned on the common channel H(k), we can take HˆR(k) as a noisy version of HˆT (k),
that is
HˆR(k) = HˆT (k) + ∆HTR(k), k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, (5.18)
where
∆HTR(k) = ∆HR(k)−∆HT (k) (5.19)
identifies the composed channel estimation error of the transmitter/receiver and re-
ceiver/transmitter transmission link. It follows a zero-mean complex Gaussian distri-
bution with a variance of σ2TR = σ
2
T +σ
2
R. Consequently, HˆR(k) can be approximated
as a complex Gaussian random variable with a mean of HˆT (k) and a variance of σ
2
TR.
The channel gain λR (k) is thus noncentral Chi-square distributed with 2 degree of
freedom, with a PDF
fR (λR(k)) =
1
σ2TR
e−(λT (k)+λR(k))/σ
2
TRI0
(√
λR (k)λT (k)
2σ2TR
)
, (5.20)
and a CDF
FR (λR(k)) = 1−Q1
(√
2λT (k)
σTR
,
√
2λR(k)
σTR
)
, (5.21)
where IA(x) represents the Bessel function of Ath order as
IA(x) =
∞∑
k=0
(x/2)A+2k
k!Γ (A+ k + 1)
, (5.22)
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and Qc (a, b) denotes the Marcum Q-function, that is
Qc (a, b) =
∫ ∞
b
x
(x
a
)c−1
e−
x2+a2
2 Ic−1 (ax) dx. (5.23)
The disagreement probability pL(k) for the kth subcarrier can then be derived as
pL(k) =
1
2
∫ ΛT
−∞
fT (λT (k))
{∫ +∞
ΛR
fR (λR(k)) dλR (k)
}
dλT (k)
+
1
2
∫ +∞
ΛT
fT (λT (k))
{∫ ΛR
−∞
fR (λR(k)) dλR (k)
}
dλT (k)
=
1
2
∫ ΛT
−∞
fT (λT (k)) [1− FR (ΛR)] dλT (k)
+
1
2
∫ +∞
ΛT
fT (λT (k))FR (ΛR) dλT (k) . (5.24)
Unfortunately, the integral of the Marcum Q-function in (5.24) cannot be worked out,
and thus pL(k) cannot be evaluated in a closed form. However, it can be concluded
from (5.24) that pL(k) would be a variable independent of the subcarrier index k after
the definite integral, since the boundaries of the integral interval are uncorrelated to
k. Therefore, the index k can be removed from pL(k). In this study, numerical results
will be provided to evaluate this disagreement probability pL.
When M subcarriers are involved in the channel gain based coordinate interleaving
which are independent of one another, the interleaving pattern mismatch probability
for an OFDM signal at the legitimate receiver, PL, would be
PL = 1− (1− pL)M . (5.25)
Then, we can have the SER of legitimate transmission in the proposed anti-eavesdropping
OFDM system using channel gain based coordinate interleaving, that is
PS,L = 1− (1− PL) (1− PS) . (5.26)
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5.4 Proposed Secure OFDM System Using Chan-
nel Phase based Coordinate Interleaving
Channel phase is another typical CSI parameter in wireless communications.
OFDM eavesdropping prevention technique that exploits channel phase based co-
ordinate interleaving is investigated in this section.
5.4.1 Subcarrier Channel Phase based Coordinate Interleav-
ing
In the channel phase based security scheme, the transmitter compares the instan-
taneous channel phases of OFDM subcarriers involved in the security design with a
properly selected threshold to determine whether the real and imaginary parts of the
symbols at those subcarriers are interleaved. As the noisy channel estimate HˆT fol-
lows a zero-mean complex Gaussian distribution CN
(
0, σ2
HˆT
)
, the estimated phases
of the N subcarriers in an OFDM signal,
{
θˆT (0), θˆT (1), · · · , θˆT (N − 1)
}
, are i.i.d.
variables uniformly distributed over [0, 2pi). Similar to the subcarrier channel gain
based scheme, the pattern of the channel phase based coordinate interleaving at the
kth subcarrier can be mathematically expressed as θˆT (k) > Λ′T , interleavingθˆT (k) ≤ Λ′T , un-interleaving , k ∈M, (5.27)
where Λ′T denotes the threshold used by the transmitter in the channel phase based
scheme. In order to maximize the difficulty of eavesdropping, an OFDM subcarrier in
the setM should have equal probability of being and not being coordinate interleaved.
Considering that θˆT (k) follows a uniform distribution over [0, 2pi), the threshold Λ
′
T
can be selected as
Λ′T = pi. (5.28)
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5.4.2 Performance of Eavesdropping Prevention
As addressed previously, the eavesdropper at a third location experiences a mul-
tipath channel independent of the common channel. The subcarrier channel phase
estimate at the eavesdropper θˆE is uncorrelated to that observed at the transmitter,
i.e. θˆT. Hence, the eavesdropper can only make a random guess of the coordinate in-
terleaving pattern initiated by the transmitter. Again, as a binary hypothesis problem
where both possible outcomes have the same occurrence probability, the probability
that the eavesdropper makes a correct decision of whether the modulated symbol at
a subcarrier is coordinate interleaved would be
p′E(k) =
1
2
, k ∈M. (5.29)
In the situation that M subcarriers are included in the opportunistic coordinate
interleaving for the security enhancement, the probability that the eavesdropper ob-
tains a mismatched interleaving pattern for an OFDM signal can be calculated as
P ′E = 1−
1
2M
. (5.30)
Consequently, the SER of eavesdropping in the subcarrier channel phase based sub-
carrier coordinate interleaving scheme, P ′S,E, can be given by
P ′S,E = 1− (1− P ′E) (1− PS) . (5.31)
5.4.3 Performance of Legitimate Transmission
Since the observation of the common channel at the legitimate receiver, i.e. HˆR,
follows a zero-mean complex Gaussian distribution CN
(
0, σ2
HˆR
)
, the corresponding
subcarrier channel phases
{
θˆR(0), θˆR(1), · · · , θˆR(N − 1)
}
are also i.i.d. variables uni-
formly distributed over [0, 2pi). Therefore, the threshold used to derive the channel
phase based coordinate interleaving pattern at the legitimate receiver, Λ′R, should
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also be pi, i.e. Λ′R = pi. The probability of disagreement between the two nodes of
the common channel on whether the kth subcarrier is coordinate interleaved in the
channel phase based scheme, p′L(k), can then be calculated as
p′L(k) = P
(
θˆR (k) > Λ
′
R|θˆT (k) ≤ Λ′T
)
+ P
(
θˆR (k) ≤ Λ′R|θˆT (k) > Λ′T
)
=
1
2
P
(
θˆR (k) > pi, θˆT (k) ≤ pi
)
+
1
2
P
(
θˆR (k) ≤ pi, θˆT (k) > pi
)
. (5.32)
The subcarrier channel phase estimates at the transmitter and legitimate receiver,
i.e. θˆT and θˆR, respectively, are conditioned on the exact phase of the common channel
θ. As a result, we can treat θˆR(k) as a noisy version of θˆT (k) for all N subcarriers of
an OFDM signal. Mathematically, it can be expressed as
θˆR(k) = θˆT (k) + ∆θ(k), k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, (5.33)
where ∆θ(k) is the phase estimation error between the estimates θˆR(k) and θˆT (k).
As illustrated in Fig. 5.2, ∆θ(k) can be derived from the noisy channel estimate as
∆θ(k) = tan−1

∣∣∣∆HTR(k)∣∣∣ sin [∆θTR(k)− θˆT (k)]∣∣∣HˆT (k)∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∆HTR(k)∣∣∣ cos [∆θTR(k)− θˆT (k)]
 . (5.34)
For the trigonometric function tanx, it can be approximated to x when x is small.
Therefore, during a high SNR range that typically leads to a small estimation error,
∆θ(k) can be approximated as
∆θ(k) ≈
∣∣∣∆HTR(k)∣∣∣ sin [∆θTR(k)− θˆT (k)]∣∣∣HˆT (k)∣∣∣ . (5.35)
Referring to the statistics study in [112], the numerator of (5.35) follows a zero-
mean Gaussian distribution with variance σ2TR/2. Meanwhile, the denominator
∣∣∣HˆT (k)∣∣∣
is a Rayleigh distributed variable with a parameter
√
σ2
HˆT
/2. Based on the results
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Figure 5.2: Derivation of the phase estimation error from the noisy channel estimates.
in [113] for the probability distribution of the ratio between a zero-mean Gaussian
variable and a Rayleigh variable, the PDF and CDF of ∆θ(k), i.e. fθ (∆θ(k)) and
Fθ (∆θ(k)), respectively, can be derived as
fθ (∆θ(k)) =
σ2TRσHˆT
2
(
σ2
HˆT
∆θ(k)2 + σ2TR
)3/2 (5.36)
and
Fθ (∆θ(k)) =
1
2
+
σHˆT∆θ(k)
2
√
σ2
HˆT
∆θ(k)2 + σ2TR
. (5.37)
The probability of disagreement between the transmitter and legitimate receiver
on whether the kth subcarrier is coordinate interleaved in the channel phase based
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security scheme, p′L(k), can then be calculated as
p′L(k) = P (θˆR (k) > Λ
′
R|θˆT (k) ≤ Λ′T ) + P (θˆ′R (k) ≤ Λ′R|θˆT (k) > Λ′T )
=
1
2
∫ pi
0
[∫ 2pi−θˆT (k)
pi−θˆT (k)
fθ (∆θ(k)) d∆θ(k)
]
1
2pi
dθˆT (k)
+
1
2
∫ 2pi
pi
[∫ pi−θˆT (k)
−θˆT (k)
fθ (∆θ(k)) d∆θ(k)
]
1
2pi
dθˆT (k)
=
1
2
∫ pi
0

σHˆT
[
2pi − θˆT (k)
]
2
√
σ2
HˆT
[
2pi − θˆT (k)
]2
+ σ2TR
−
σHˆT
[
pi − θˆT (k)
]
2
√
σ2
HˆT
[
pi − θˆT (k)
]2
+ σ2TR

1
2pi
dθˆT (k)
+
1
2
∫ 2pi
pi

σHˆT
[
pi − θˆT (k)
]
2
√
σ2
HˆT
[
pi − θˆT (k)
]2
+ σ2TR
+
σHˆT θˆT (k)
2
√
σ2
HˆT
[
θˆT (k)
]2
+ σ2TR

1
2pi
dθˆT (k).
(5.38)
Let t = pi − θˆT (k), t′ = 2pi − θˆT (k), and t′′ = θˆT (k), we can rewrite (5.38) as
p′L(k) =
1
4pi
∫ 2pi
pi
σHˆT t
′
2
√
σ2
HˆT
t′2 + σ2TR
dt′ − 1
4pi
∫ pi
0
σHˆT t
2
√
σ2
HˆT
t2 + σ2TR
dt
+
1
4pi
∫ 0
−pi
σHˆT t
2
√
σ2
HˆT
t2 + σ2TR
dt+
1
4pi
∫ 2pi
pi
σHˆT t
′′
2
√
σ2
HˆT
t′′2 + σ2TR
dt′′
=
1
2pi
√
σ2
HˆT
4pi2 + σ2TR −
√
σ2
HˆT
pi2 + σ2TR
2σHˆT
+
1
4pi
σTR −
√
σ2
HˆT
pi2 + σ2TR
2σHˆT
−
√
σ2
HˆT
pi2 + σ2TR − σTR
2σHˆT

=
√
σ2
HˆT
4pi2 + σ2TR −
√
σ2
HˆT
pi2 + σ2TR
4piσHˆT
+
σTR −
√
σ2
HˆT
pi2 + σ2TR
4piσHˆT
=
√
σ2
HˆT
4pi2 + σ2TR + σTR − 2
√
σ2
HˆT
pi2 + σ2TR
4piσHˆT
. (5.39)
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In the case that M subcarriers are involved in the channel phase based subcarrier
coordinate interleaving, the interleaving pattern mismatch probability between the
transmitter and legitimate receiver for an OFDM signal can be given by
P ′L = 1− (1− p′L)M . (5.40)
Similarly, we can have the SER of the legitimate transmission in the proposed anti-
eavesdropping OFDM system using channel phased based coordinate interleaving as
P ′S,L = 1− (1− P ′L) (1− PS) . (5.41)
5.5 System Optimization with the Trade-off be-
tween Eavesdropping Resilience and Transmis-
sion Reliability
One superior anti-eavesdropping communication system should effectively pre-
vent eavesdropping and concurrently maintain reliable legitimate transmission. As
the eavesdropping prevention operation may degrade the legitimate transmission, a
trade-off between the resilience against eavesdropping and the reliability of legitimate
transmission needs to be realized. It can be concluded from the performance analysis
of the proposed anti-eavesdropping system, including both channel gain and channel
phase based schemes, the resilience of the proposed system against eavesdropping is
decided by the number of subcarriers involved in the opportunistic coordinate inter-
leaving in each OFDM signal. Meanwhile, the reliability of legitimate transmission
depends on estimation errors in the channel estimates, as well as the number of sub-
carriers involved in the security design. Therefore, the proposed anti-eavesdropping
OFDM system can be optimized by choosing a proper size of subcarrier set involved
in the security design, and mitigating channel estimation errors to a tolerable level.
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5.5.1 Proposed Evaluation Criterion for Anti-Eavesdropping
Communication Systems
An anti-eavesdropping communication system should effectively defend against
eavesdropping attacks and also minimize the impairment from the performed se-
curity processing to the legitimate transmission. Therefore, the evaluation of an
anti-eavesdropping communication system must take into account its performances of
eavesdropping prevention and legitimate transmission simultaneously. Unfortunately,
no evaluation criterion can be found in the literature for assessing anti-eavesdropping
communication systems in such a proper way.
To that end, a novel evaluation criterion for anti-eavesdropping communication
systems, named probability of confidential transmission, is proposed in this study. It
is defined as the probability that the transmitted data is correctly received by the
legitimate receiver but not intercepted by the eavesdropper. Mathematically, we can
express the probability of confidential transmission as
Π = P
(
EL,C , EE,D
)
, (5.42)
where EL,C denotes the event that the transmitted data is correctly received by the
legitimate receiver, and EE,D indicates the event that eavesdropping is successfully
prevented by the anti-eavesdropping communication system.
In the proposed anti-eavesdropping OFDM system, the performances of legitimate
transmission and eavesdropping prevention are associated with two independent wire-
less channels. The two events EL,C and EE,D can be modelled as two independent
variables. Consequently, the probability of confidential transmission in the channel
gain based subcarrier coordinate interleaving scheme can be calculated as
Πg = P
(
EL,C
)
P
(
EE,D
)
=
(
1− PS,L
)
PS,E, (5.43)
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and the probability of confidential transmission in the channel phase based security
scheme can be given by
Πp =
(
1− P ′S,L
)
P ′S,E. (5.44)
5.5.2 Selection of the Size of Subcarrier Set Involved in the
Opportunistic Coordinate Interleaving
It has been proved in (5.14) and (5.30) that the probability an eavesdropper mak-
ing an incorrect guess of the interleaving pattern in an OFDM signal, for both the
channel gain and phase based schemes, equals to (1−1/2M). This probability reflects
the resilience of the system against eavesdropping, and can be used to guide the se-
lection of number of subcarriers involved in the opportunistic coordinate interleaving
in each OFDM signal. Given a requirement of such probability Ξ, the size of the
subcarrier set, M , can be decided as
M =
⌈
log2
(
1
1− Ξ
)⌉
, (5.45)
where d·e denotes the ceiling function. It can be found from (5.45) that a strong
eavesdropping prevention capability can be achieved by just involving a few subcar-
riers of each OFDM signal in the security design. For instance, when M = 10, PE
and P ′E have already been larger than 0.999, which would lead to a SER that almost
equals to 100% at the eavesdropper.
From the perspective of legitimate transmission, the interleaving pattern mismatch
probability at the intended receiver reduces along with the decrease of M , as demon-
strated in (5.25) and (5.40). Consequently, we need to keep M as low as possible in
order to maintain a reliable legitimate transmission. As an anti-eavesdropping com-
munication system, it first needs to guarantee an acceptable resilience against eaves-
dropping, and then endeavors to enhance the reliability of legitimate transmission.
Thus, the number of subcarriers involved in the opportunistic coordinate interleaving
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of the proposed anti-eavesdropping OFDM system can be decided by (5.45), based
on minimum requirements of PE and P
′
E.
5.5.3 Channel Estimation Error Mitigation Technique
In addition to restricting the number of subcarriers involved in the opportunistic
coordinate interleaving in each OFDM signal, the reliability of legitimate transmission
can be further improved through mitigating the channel estimation errors. Consid-
ering that errors in the channel estimates are i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian variables,
one candidate solution is to average multiple channel estimates that have an identical
true value. In a slow time-varying wireless channel, the channel impulse response
can be invariant over several signal periods. For instance, in the IEEE 802.11g sys-
tem, the channel coherence time is approximately 53 ms according to the typical
pedestrian walking speed 1 m/s, while the period of an OFDM signal is 4 us. As a
result, the channel fading can ideally be considered as invariant over more than 10000
successive OFDM signals. The averaging based channel estimation error mitigation
technique is thus exercisable in practice. Assuming that Ω estimates are averaged to
provide a more accurate channel estimate, the variance of the estimation error after
the averaging processing can be reduced by 1/Ω.
5.6 Simulation Results
Simulations are carried out following the specifications of IEEE 802.11g standard.
Each OFDM signal is generated through a 64-point IFFT, and has a cyclic prefix of
length 16. 4-QAM is adopted as the modulation scheme for all subcarriers. Unless
stated otherwise, the transmitted OFDM signals are propagated through a Rayleigh
fading channel with exponential power delay profile of 50 ns RMS delay. Moreover,
training symbols with unit energy at each subcarrier are transmitted and exploited
for the channel estimation, while least-square (LS) channel estimation technique is
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adopted at all nodes in the network. In order to achieve a fair comparison, the statis-
tical models of the common channel and eavesdropping channel, as well as the noise
power levels at all nodes, are set to be the same. In addition, perfect synchronization
is assumed to be achieved at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper.
The probability of confidential transmission in the conventional OFDM system is
provided as a benchmark reference in the simulations. Since the conventional OFDM
system has a physical layer that is transparent to eavesdroppers, its eavesdropping
prevention performance can be characterized by the SER under the eavesdropping
channel. As a result, the probability of confidential transmission in the conventional
OFDM system, Πc, can be given by
Πc = (1− PS)PS. (5.46)
5.6.1 Performance of the Channel Gain based Security Scheme
5.6.1.1 Interleaving Pattern Mismatch Probabilities in the Channel Gain
based Scheme
First of all, the interleaving pattern mismatch probability between the transmitter
and eavesdropper is evaluated, where the transmitter derives the coordinate inter-
leaving pattern from the channel gain of the common channel and the eavesdropper
estimates the interleaving pattern from the channel gain of the eavesdropping chan-
nel. Simulation results are presented in Fig. 5.3. In the left subfigure, we change the
number of subcarriers involved in the opportunistic coordinate interleaving in each
OFDM signal, but fix the amount of channel estimates averaged for the estimation
error mitigation to 30. The mismatch probability PE decreases when the size of the
subcarrier set reduces. However, the variation is ignorable and the mismatch proba-
bility is always close to 100%. In the right subfigure, we fix the number of subcarriers
involved in the coordinate interleaving to 32 and study the impact of the number
of averaged channel estimates on PE. Since the interleaving pattern mismatch be-
94
tween the transmitter and eavesdropper is dominated by the independence between
the common channel and eavesdropping channel, the estimation errors almost have
no impact on PE that is always close to 100% in the simulations.
The mismatch probability between the coordinate interleaving pattern at the
transmitter and that at the legitimate receiver is simulated and plotted in Fig. 5.4.
As shown in the figure, when the number of averaged channel estimates is fixed to 30,
the mismatch probability PL significantly reduces with the decrease of the number
of subcarriers involved in the opportunistic coordinate interleaving. Moreover, when
more channel estimates are averaged to mitigate the estimation errors, the transmitter
and legitimate receiver are more likely to derive an identical coordinate interleaving
pattern.
5.6.1.2 Probability of Confidential Transmission in the Channel Gain
based Scheme
The performance of the proposed channel gain based anti-eavesdropping OFDM
system, in terms of the probability of confidential transmission Πg, is depicted in
Fig. 5.5. As a benchmark reference, the probability of confidential transmission of
the conventional OFDM system is also provided in the evaluation. In the simulation,
we set Ω = 30 and vary the size of the subcarrier set from 16 to 64. Compared
with the conventional OFDM, the proposed anti-eavesdropping OFDM system has
a little worse performance in the low SNR range when the resilience against eaves-
dropping and the reliability of legitimate transmission are simultaneously evaluated.
The reason for this phenomenon is that the legitimate transmission in the proposed
system is not so reliable as that in the conventional OFDM system during the low
SNR range, caused by the interleaving pattern mismatch between the transmitter and
legitimate receiver. However, when the SNR is larger than 15 dB, which is the typical
SNR condition in wireless communications, the proposed system has a probability of
confidential transmission much higher than that of the conventional OFDM system.
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Figure 5.3: Interleaving pattern mismatch probability at the eavesdropper in the
channel gain based scheme.
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Figure 5.4: Interleaving pattern mismatch probability at the legitimate receiver in
the channel gain based scheme.
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Figure 5.5: Comparison of confidential transmission probabilities between the channel
gain based anti-eavesdropping system and the conventional OFDM when Ω = 30.
Moreover, during the low SNR range, a smaller number of subcarriers involved in the
security design would lead to a better performance of the proposed anti-eavesdropping
system. Nevertheless, the impact of M on Πg turns to be indistinct during the high
SNR range. In addition, there is an interesting finding that the conventional OFDM
system reaches a peak performance when SNR is around 14 dB. After that, its
probability of confidential transmission decreases with the increase of SNR since the
conventional OFDM system is easier to be intercepted in a better channel condition.
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Figure 5.6: Probability of confidential transmission in the channel gain based scheme
under different channel models when Ω = 30.
5.6.1.3 Probability of Confidential Transmission in the Channel Gain
based Scheme under Different Channel Models
The probability of confidential transmission in the channel gain based security
scheme under different wireless channel models is also evaluated in the study. An-
other Rayleigh fading channel with an uniform PDP of 800 ns delay spread, which
introduces a more hostile multipath environment, is considered in the simulation.
As presented in Fig. 5.6, a more hostile multipath environment would degrade the
confidential transmission probability of the proposed anti-eavesdropping OFDM sys-
tem, where the performance loss mainly comes from the degradation of the legitimate
transmission.
99
5.6.2 Performance of the Channel Phase based Security Scheme
5.6.2.1 Interleaving Pattern Mismatch Probabilities in the Channel Phase
based Scheme
The eavesdropper’s interleaving pattern mismatch probability in the channel phase
based security scheme is provided in Fig. 5.7, where the transmitter and eavesdropper
derive the coordinate interleaving patterns from subcarrier channel phases of the
common channel and eavesdropping channel, respectively. It can be found that the
mismatch probability P ′E is always close to 100%, no matter how many subcarriers are
involved in the opportunistic coordinate interleaving and how many channel estimates
are averaged to mitigate the estimation errors.
Figure 5.8 plots the interleaving pattern mismatch probability at the legitimate
receiver in the channel phase based security scheme, denoted by P ′L. Similar to the
mismatch probability PL in the channel gain based scheme, P
′
L can be reduced by
involving less subcarriers in the opportunistic coordinate interleaving and averaging
more channel estimates to mitigate the channel estimation errors.
5.6.2.2 Probability of Confidential Transmission in the Channel Phase
based Scheme
The probability of confidential transmission in the proposed channel phase based
anti-eavesdropping OFDM system, Πp, is evaluated in Fig. 5.9. The channel phase
based scheme has a confidential transmission probability similar to that of the con-
ventional OFDM when the SNR is lower than 12 dB. With the increase of SNR, the
proposed system can achieve an obviously higher probability of confidential trans-
mission. In addition, no significant impact of M on the probability of confidential
transmission can be found in the proposed channel phase based scheme.
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Figure 5.7: Interleaving pattern mismatch probability at the eavesdropper in the
channel phase based scheme.
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Figure 5.8: Interleaving pattern mismatch probability at the legitimate receiver in
the channel phase based scheme.
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Figure 5.9: Comparison of confidential transmission probabilities between the channel
phase based anti-eavesdropping system and the conventional OFDM when Ω = 30.
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Figure 5.10: Probability of confidential transmission in the channel phase based
scheme under different channel models when Ω = 30.
5.6.2.3 Probability of Confidential Transmission in the Channel Phase
based Scheme under Different Channel Models
The Rayleigh fading channel with an uniform PDP of 800 ns delay spread is also
considered for evaluating the probability of confidential transmission in the channel
phase based security scheme. Similar to the results in the channel gain based coor-
dinate interleaving, the channel phase based anti-eavesdropping system has a worse
performance in the more hostile Rayleigh fading channel, as shown in Fig. 5.10.
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5.6.3 Performance Comparison between the Channel Gain
and Channel Phase based Schemes
A comprehensive comparison between the proposed channel gain and channel
phase based coordinate interleaving schemes is conducted in this subsection, using
the previously presented simulation results. From the perspective of the interleaving
pattern mismatch probability, the channel gain and channel phase based schemes can
both achieve quite high mismatch probabilities between the transmitter and eaves-
dropper. However, regarding to the interleaving pattern mismatch probability be-
tween the transmitter and legitimate receiver, the channel phase based scheme has
a lower mismatch probability under the same channel condition. The main reason
for this phenomenon is that channel gains are more sensitive to the noise and inter-
ference, compared to channel phases [88]. When we simultaneously evaluate their
eavesdropping resilience and transmission reliability, as shown in Figs. 5.5, 5.6, 5.9
and 5.10, the channel phase based scheme performs slightly better than the channel
gain based scheme, particularly in a low SNR range.
Merely considering the probability of confidential transmission, the proposed chan-
nel phase based scheme would be slightly better than the channel gain based security
design. However, when more factors, such as the computational complexity and
hardware limitations in the implementation, are taken into account, the channel gain
based scheme may be preferred since it is easier to perform and can also effectively
defend against eavesdropping. Overall, both the channel gain and channel phase
based dynamic coordinate interleaving can effectively prevent eavesdropping and, at
the same time, provide a reliable legitimate transmission. The selection between the
proposed channel gain and channel phase based security schemes would depend on the
operating environment, the available power and hardware, as well as the acceptable
computational complexity.
105
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, an eavesdropping prevention strategy in OFDM systems through
dynamic subcarrier coordinate interleaving is proposed, by taking advantage of the
reciprocal, location-dependent and time-varying nature of wireless channels. Symbol
coordinates of the subcarriers in each OFDM signal are interleaved in an oppor-
tunistic manner depending on the reciprocal channel state information between the
transmitter and legitimate receiver. Two coordinate interleaving schemes are in-
vestigated, which employ the subcarrier channel gain and phase in determining the
interleaving pattern, respectively. More specifically, the transmitter performs coor-
dinate interleaving at subcarriers with channel gains (or channel phases) larger than
a predefined threshold. Since wireless channels associated with each pair of users
at separate locations exhibit independent propagation characteristics, the frequently
updated selection of subcarriers undergoing coordinate interleaving is only shared be-
tween legitimate users based on channel reciprocity. Without a matched subcarrier
coordinate de-interleaving pattern, erroneous information recovery is carried out at
the eavesdropper so that eavesdropping is prevented. In order to simultaneously eval-
uate the eavesdropping resilience and transmission reliability of anti-eavesdropping
communication systems, a novel evaluation criterion, named probability of confiden-
tial transmission, is also proposed in this study. Theoretical analysis and simulation
results are provided to validate the proposed anti-eavesdropping OFDM system.
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Chapter 6
Eavesdropping-Resilient OFDM
Using Dynamic Subcarrier
Interleaving
The built-in security of wireless OFDM communication systems against eaves-
dropping can be remarkably improved through the proposed dynamic coordinate in-
terleaving strategy in Chapter 5. One noteworthy prerequisite of that strategy is that
data symbols transmitted at OFDM subcarriers must be in a complex-number struc-
ture. It is true that most modulation schemes adopted in modern wireless OFDM
networks produce complex data symbols, such as QPSK and QAM. However, we can-
not neglect the possible utilization of modulation schemes that modulate data bits
into a real-number structure, like BPSK. Eavesdropping prevention techniques with-
out the restriction of symbol modulation schemes utilized in OFDM systems thus
need to be investigated.
This chapter proposes a novel and effective eavesdropping-resilient OFDM system
through dynamic subcarrier interleaving, without any restriction of the adopted sym-
bol modulation scheme. The built-in security of the proposed secure OFDM system
is enhanced by exploiting the channel reciprocity and uncorrelation feature exhibited
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among spatially separate wireless channels in rich multipath environments. The trans-
mitter employs its dynamic and reciprocal channel state information to the intended
receiver in designing the subcarrier interleaving pattern. More specifically, subcar-
riers are interleaved according to the sorted order of their channel gains. In order
to mitigate the impairment of imperfect channel reciprocity, only partial subcarriers
of each OFDM symbol are included in the interleaving. A subcarrier selection algo-
rithm is also investigated to realize a trade-off between the eavesdropping resilience
and legitimate transmission reliability. Because of channel reciprocity, identical CSI
information is shared between legitimate parties, so that the subcarrier interleaving
scheme initiated by the transmitter can be figured out at the legitimate receiver lo-
cally without any feedback from the transmitter. In contrast, due to the fact that
spatially separate wireless channels are independent of each other, an eavesdropper
at a third location cannot derive the identical subcarrier interleaving pattern used
at the transmitter. Consequently, mismatched information recovery occurs at the
eavesdropper, thus preventing malicious eavesdropping. The proposed secure OFDM
system is validated through both theoretical analysis and simulations. From simula-
tion results, eavesdropping on the proposed system suffers a SER close to 100% while
the legitimation transmission has a SER matching to that of conventional OFDM
systems.
6.1 Introduction
OFDM has been widely employed in modern high-speed wireless communication
networks. Unfortunately, the conventional OFDM signal is vulnerable to malicious
eavesdropping and intervention, due to its distinct time and frequency characteristics
[13]. Traditional upper-layer security mechanisms cannot completely address the
security threats in wireless OFDM systems, because of the transparence of their
physical layer transmission parameters, It is therefore of significant importance to
enhance the security of OFDM systems at the physical layer.
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Physical layer security, which targets the communication security at the physi-
cal layer, is emerging as an effective complement to the traditional security strate-
gies in securing wireless transmissions [13]. Extensive research efforts have been
devoted to improve the physical layer security of OFDM systems against eavesdrop-
ping recently [13, 98–104]. Generally, the existing security enhancement techniques
for wireless OFDM systems are conditioned on the knowledge of eavesdropping chan-
nel, additional resource, significant modifications to off-the-shelf systems, or high
operational complexity. Simple but effective security approaches for OFDM at the
physical layer have yet to be investigated. Chapter 5 of this dissertation proposes a
simple and effective anti-eavesdropping OFDM system based on dynamic coordinate
interleaving, which can prevent eavesdropping and concurrently maintain a reliable
legitimate transmission. However, such anti-eavesdropping OFDM system would ask
for a symbol modulation scheme that modulates data bits into a complex-number
structure. In light of the possible employment of modulation schemes generating real
data symbols in OFDM systems, eavesdropping prevention techniques without any
restriction of symbol modulation schemes also need to be investigated for wireless
OFDM communication networks.
An effective and simple eavesdropping-resilient OFDM system is proposed in this
chapter by exploiting the dynamic subcarrier interleaving, inspired by the channel
reciprocity between legitimate user terminals and the uncorrelated behavior of spa-
tially separate wireless channels in rich multipath environments. Although subcarrier
interleaving has been introduced into OFDM systems to improve the transmission
reliability [114–118], the transmission security in OFDM systems has been largely ig-
nored. In this contribution, the CSI between the transmitter and legitimate receiver
are utilized to defend against eavesdropping. To be specific, partial subcarriers of each
OFDM signal are selected and then interleaved according to the sorted order of their
channel gains. A subcarrier selection algorithm is investigated to combat the imper-
fect channel reciprocity between legitimate users, so as to realize a trade-off between
the eavesdropping resilience and legitimate transmission reliability. Based on channel
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reciprocity, the frequently renewed subcarrier selection and interleaving scheme can
be shared between legitimate terminals without involving the exchange of secret infor-
mation. Due to the channel spatial decorrelation, the subcarrier interleaving pattern
is not available to eavesdroppers that experience independent channels, so that the
information recovery for eavesdropping is interrupted. The proposed system is vali-
dated through analytical and simulation results. Compared to conventional OFDM
systems, our approach is much more resilient to eavesdropping. Differing from prior
works, the proposed scheme can avoid additional resource consumption, has limited
computational complexity, only needs minor modifications of existing systems, and is
free from the restriction of modulation schemes adopted in the OFDM systems.
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 introduces the
system model and relevant background about the multipath channel in OFDM sys-
tems. The proposed eavesdropping-resilient OFDM system is described in Section
6.3, followed by a performance evaluation in Section 6.4. The interleaved subcarrier
selection algorithm is investigated in Section 6.5. Simulation results are provided in
Section 6.6. Finally, the conclusions are drawn in Section 6.7.
Notations Throughout the chapter, bold letters are used to identify a vector, i.e.
X = {X(1), X(2), · · · , X(N − 1)}. Complex Gaussian random variable X with mean
m, variance σ2, and with independent and identically distributed real and imaginary
components is denoted as X ∼ CN (m,σ2).
6.2 Problem Formulation and Preliminaries
6.2.1 System Model
The wireless communication system model considered in this chapter is presented
in Fig. 6.1. A source node communicates with a legitimate receiver using OFDM, in
the presence of a passive and silent eavesdropper in a richly scattered radio environ-
ment. The eavesdropper can overhear all the communications between the legitimate
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Figure 6.1: Wireless communication scenario consisting of two legitimate terminals
and an eavesdropper.
users but it is not interested in disrupting the legitimate transmission. The forward
and reverse channels between legitimate users occupy the same frequency band and
remain constant over several time slots. In addition, the underlying noise and inter-
ference in both the common channel and the eavesdropping channel can be modeled
as additive white Gaussian noise.
Generally, a third party who is at a distance larger than half a wavelength from
the intended receiver, experiences fading conditions that are uncorrelated to those
between the original legitimate communicating terminals [26]. In most practical sce-
narios, the eavesdropper has to be sufficiently separated from the legitimate terminals
to avoid being detected, that is, with a distance more than half a wavelength. There-
fore, the common channel and the eavesdropping channel are modeled as independent
of each other throughout this chapter.
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6.2.2 Multipath Channel in OFDM Systems
Considering an OFDM system with N subcarriers, the received signal at the
output of fast Fourier transform can be described as
R (k) = H (k)S (k) +W (k) , k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, (6.1)
where S (k) and R (k) represent the data transmitted and received at the kth subcar-
rier, respectively, W (k) indicates a complex AWGN with variance of σ2k, and H (k) is
the frequency domain channel response at the kth subcarrier, which can be represented
as
H (k) =
1√
N
L−1∑
n=0
h (n) e−j2pi
kn
N , (6.2)
where h (n) denotes the time domain channel response associated with the nth channel
tap. In Rayleigh fading, {h(0), h(1), · · · , h(L− 1)} can be considered as independent
and identically distributed zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables. Therefore,
H (k), which is characterized by the L time domain channel taps, can be modeled
as CN (0, σ2H) due to central limit theorem. Assuming that the subcarrier interval is
larger than the coherence bandwidth of the wireless channel, all the subcarriers, i.e.
H(k), k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, experience independent and identically distributed fading.
Since OFDM subcarriers, as well as the channel responses acting on the subcarriers,
are independent of each other, all subcarriers of an OFDM signal can be treated
independently.
6.2.3 Principle Behind the Proposed Design
The randomness of wireless multipath channels is exploited to enhance the trans-
mission security at the physical layer in the design. A dynamic subcarrier interleav-
ing scheme is proposed for securing OFDM systems against eavesdropping, by taking
advantage of the reciprocity, spatial decorrelation and time variation of wireless chan-
nels.
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Channel reciprocity indicates that the wireless channel behaves in an identical
manner irrespective of in which direction it is observed. Therefore, both the trans-
mitter and the legitimate receiver would theoretically have an identical estimate of
the common channel H(k) and then derive the same CSI-based interleaving pattern.
In practice, all nodes in a network can only obtain a noisy version of the channels due
to estimation errors at channel estimators, induced by interference, noise, as well as
hardware limitations [119]. Thus, the frequency domain channel responses observed
at the legitimate nodes during a channel coherence time take the form as
HˆT (k) = H(k) + ∆HT (k), k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, (6.3)
and
HˆR(k) = H(k) + ∆HR(k), k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, (6.4)
where HˆT (k) and HˆR(k) denote the estimates of the common channel H(k) at the
transmitter and the legitimate receiver, respectively. ∆HT (k) and ∆HR(k) are the
corresponding estimation errors, which can be modeled as zero-mean Gaussian ran-
dom variables. Following the assumption that H(k), k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1 are i.i.d.,
∆HT/R(k) for k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1 should also be statistically independent but may
not be identically distributed. In order to facilitate the analysis, ∆HT/R(k), k =
0, 1, · · · , N − 1 are assumed to be i.i.d. in the following discussion, so that
∆HT/R(k) ∼ CN
(
0, σ2T/R
)
, (6.5)
where σ2T/R is the variance of the estimation errors. Since H(k) and ∆HT/R(k) are
independent, HˆT/R (k) also follows a complex Gaussian distribution with zero mean
and variance of σ2
HˆT/R
= σ2H + σ
2
T/R. Therefore, the estimates of the common channel
at the transmitter and intended receiver may not be perfectly reciprocal in practice,
but they are correlated at least.
Channel spatial decorrelation denotes the fact that wireless channels associated
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with different endpoints at separate locations typically exhibit uncorrelated propa-
gation characteristics [10]. As a result, for an eavesdropper at a third location, the
eavesdropping channel HE(k) would be uncorrelated to the common channel H(k).
It is thus hard for the eavesdropper to track the subcarrier interleaving scheme in-
volved in the legitimate transmission and to recover the information in transmission.
Eavesdropping can then be prevented. Considering that estimation errors exist in the
channel estimate, the noisy channel observations at the eavesdropper, HˆE(k), can be
expressed as
HˆE(k) = HE(k) + ∆HE(k), k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1. (6.6)
Similarly, the channel estimation error ∆HE(k) follows a complex Gaussian distri-
bution CN (0, σ2E) and HˆE(k), k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1 can be modeled as i.i.d. complex
Gaussian variables. Since ∆HE(k) is independent of ∆HT (k) and ∆HR(k), the chan-
nel estimate at the eavesdropper, HˆE(k), should also be independent of the estimates
HˆT (k) and HˆR(k) obtained at legitimate terminals.
In addition, wireless channels are time-varying and thus introduce continual influx
of randomness. Consequently, the CSI-based subcarrier interleaving scheme would be
renewed frequently, which further strengthens the security.
6.3 Proposed Secure OFDM System with Dynamic
Subcarrier Interleaving
The proposed eavesdropping-resilient OFDM system with dynamic subcarrier in-
terleaving is illustrated in Fig. 6.2. At the transmitter, M out of the N subcarriers
of an OFDM signal are selected and interleaved after the symbol modulation. Ac-
cordingly, subcarrier deinterleaving is carried out at the receiver between equalization
and the symbol demodulation processes. The selection of M subcarriers and the in-
terleaving permutation are determined by the real-time CSI between the transmitter
and the legitimate receiver. The other processing steps of the proposed system are
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Figure 6.2: Block diagram of the proposed eavesdropping-resilient OFDM system
using dynamic subcarrier interleaving.
identical to those of a conventional OFDM system.
6.3.1 Interleaved Subcarrier Selection
In practical systems, the transmitter can estimate the CSI of the common channel
via handshaking signals or feedback such as acknowledgement (ACK) packet from the
intended receiver, while the receiver can obtain the temporal channel estimation from
training signals or inserted pilots. Their observations are ideally identical but only
correlated in practice, because of the asymmetric observations caused by the noise,
interference and hardware limitations, as shown in (6.3) and (6.4). Although the radio
channel is reciprocal, estimates of the radio channel are not perfectly reciprocal [120].
In order to mitigate the impairment of imperfect channel reciprocity between legit-
imate users, a combination of M subcarriers that can provide an interleaving pattern
robust to estimation deviations under the current channel condition is selected for
the interleaving at the transmitter, where M ≤ N . A trade-off between the resilience
to eavesdropping and the reliability of legitimate transmission is realized in the pro-
posed subcarrier selection algorithm. A detailed discussion of the subcarrier selection
algorithm will be presented in Section 6.5, after analyzing how the proposed inter-
leaving scheme acts on the performances of eavesdropping prevention and legitimate
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transmission in Section 6.4. A side information indicator I is adopted to indicate the
M selected subcarriers as follows
I(k) =
 1, selected0, otherwise , k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1. (6.7)
If the transmitter claims that the kth subcarrier is included in the interleaving, we
have I(k) = 1; otherwise, I(k) = 0.
6.3.2 Subcarrier Interleaving
Following the subcarrier selection, the M collected subcarriers are interleaved
according to the descending order of their channel gains observed at the transmitter.
The order of the M subcarriers can be expressed as
∣∣∣HˆT (0)k∣∣∣2 ≥ · · · ≥ ∣∣∣HˆT (ι)k∣∣∣2 ≥ · · · ≥ ∣∣∣HˆT (M − 1)k∣∣∣2 . (6.8)
Without further indication, indices k and ι will be included in the subcarrier specifi-
cation, where k denotes the exact position of the subcarrier among the N subcarriers
and ι represents the descending order of the subcarrier sorted according to the channel
gains of the M selected subcarriers.
6.3.3 Sharing of the Side Information I
Essentially, no signalling for the subcarrier selection indicator I and the subcarrier
interleaving permutation between the legitimate parties is expected in the proposed
system. Owing to channel reciprocity, the legitimate receiver should be able to figure
out the interleaving permutation as well as the indicator I based on its own channel
estimate HˆR, and then de-interleave the M interleaved subcarriers accordingly. Al-
ternatively, the side information indicator I can also be sent out along with the data
by the transmitter. The “I hiding” scheme can avoid a leak of any side information
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to eavesdroppers but may reduce the reliability of the legitimate transmission since
a mismatched I derivation may occur due to the asymmetric CSI observations. In
contrast, the “I sharing” scheme can improve the transmission reliability between le-
gitimate participants, but faces a potential threat that an eavesdropper may intercept
I that is transmitted in radio channels.
It will be proved in Section 6.4 that the subcarrier interleaving permutation dom-
inates the eavesdropping prevention capability, rather than the side information I.
Even if an eavesdropper has by “chance” intercepted the subcarrier selection indica-
tor, eavesdropping is still difficult due to the rapid spatial decorrelation and temporal
variation of radio channels. Therefore, in the proposed secure OFDM system, the
transmitter is allowed to send the subcarrier selection indicator I to the intended
receiver to improve the legitimate transmission reliability.
6.4 Performance Evaluation
In this section, the performance of eavesdropping prevention achieved by the CSI-
based dynamic subcarrier interleaving, as well as the reliability of legitimate transmis-
sion under noisy channel observations, is investigated. The probabilities of deriving
an identical interleaving permutation and demodulated symbol error rates at both
the eavesdropper and legitimate receiver are evaluated in the performance analysis.
6.4.1 Performance of Eavesdropping Prevention
In the proposed OFDM system, M out of the N subcarriers of each OFDM signal
are selected and interleaved. Two scenarios have to be taken into consideration in
the evaluation: eavesdroppers with, and without, the side information I.
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6.4.1.1 Probability of Identical Interleaving Permutation at the Eaves-
dropper’s End
The radio channels decorrelate rapidly in space, particularly in typical wireless
scenarios with rich scattering conditions. Under the assumption that the common
channel H and the eavesdropping channel HE are independent, the estimated fre-
quency domain channel responses at the transmitter and the eavesdropper, HˆT and
HˆE respectively, as well as their channel gains
∣∣∣HˆT∣∣∣2 and ∣∣∣HˆE∣∣∣2, should be statisti-
cally independent. Furthermore, the orders of the channel gains among the total N
subcarriers or any subset of the N subcarriers are also statistically independent. Con-
sequently, an eavesdropper has no more information than a random guess about the
interleaving scheme. Throughout this chapter, it is assumed that the eavesdropper
attempts to derive the subcarrier interleaving scheme based on its own channel state
estimate of the eavesdropping channel. Note that the interleaving pattern developed
from the channel gain order of an uncorrelated channel can also be taken as a random
guess of the interleaving scheme employed at the transmitter.
Under the scenario that the subcarrier selection indicator I is available to the
eavesdropper, the eavesdropper only needs to guess the subcarrier interleaving per-
mutation. For the M selected subcarriers, there are in total M ! potential permuta-
tions. Therefore, the probability that an eavesdropper derives an interleaving pattern
identical to that developed by the transmitter, PEM , is
PEM =
1
M !
. (6.9)
In the situation where the eavesdropper has no information about I, in addition to
determining the interleaving permutation, the eavesdropper has also to guess which
M out of the N subcarriers are interleaved for each OFDM signal with a success
probability 1/
(
N
M
)
. In this case, the probability to derive the interleaving pattern
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utilized by the transmitter, PENM , is
PENM =
1(
N
M
) 1
M !
=
(N −M)!
N !
. (6.10)
Although PENM is smaller than PEM when M 6= N , it can be observed that
PEM can already reach a negligible value even though M is small. For instance, when
M = 8, PEM can be as low as 2.5×10−5. As a result, an interception of the subcarrier
selection indicator I at the eavesdropper will not menace the eavesdropping prevention
capability of the proposed system, owing to the security achievement obtained from
the interleaving permutation. Therefore, the indicator I can be sent out by the
transmitter to improve the reliability of legitimate transmissions in the proposed
OFDM system, as introduced in Section 6.3.
6.4.1.2 Symbol Error Rate at the Eavesdropper
Let PS denote the SER of the conventional OFDM system using a certain modula-
tion scheme in a Rayleigh fading channel. The SER of eavesdropping under the same
channel condition when legitimate users adopt the proposed eavesdropping-resilient
OFDM system, PS,E, can be evaluated as
PS,E = 1− PEM/NM (1− PS) . (6.11)
6.4.2 Performance of Legitimate Transmission
6.4.2.1 Probability of Identical Interleaving Permutation at the Legiti-
mate Receiver
Ideally, the legitimate receiver could derive the same subcarrier selection indicator
I and interleaving permutation as that used at the transmitter due to channel reci-
procity. As a result, the performance of legitimate transmission should be identical
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to that of the conventional OFDM system. In practice, however, channel reciprocity
is susceptible to the noise, interference and hardware limitations, which would lead
to an estimation deviation at the channel estimator. The performance of legitimate
transmission thus needs to be evaluated under a more practical assumption: imperfect
channel reciprocity. Since the instantaneous subcarrier selection indicator I is sent
to the intended receiver by the transmitter, instead of being purely developed by the
receiver in the proposed system, we suppose that no errors are made about I at the
legitimate receiver in the following analysis. In other words, it is assumed that the
imperfect channel reciprocity can only cause a misunderstanding of the interleaving
permutation at the legitimate receiver.
In order to study the probability that the transmitter and the legitimate receiver
derive an identical interleaving permutation based on their CSI observations of the
common channel, we first investigate the correlation between their observed frequency
domain channel responses. Substituting (6.3) into (6.4), the channel estimate at the
legitimate receiver can be rewritten as
HˆR(k) = HˆT (k)−∆HT (k) + ∆HR(k) (6.12)
= HˆT (k) + ∆HTR(k), k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1,
where ∆HTR(k) = −∆HT (k) + ∆HR(k) is the composed channel estimation error
of the transmitter/receiver and receiver/transmitter transmission links. Since the
two terminals of a communication link generally experience independent interference
and noise, the estimation errors at the transmitter and the receiver, i.e. ∆HT (k)
and ∆HR(k) respectively, can be taken as independent. Consequently, the composed
channel estimation error ∆HTR(k) can be modeled as a zero mean complex Gaussian
variable as
∆HTR(k) ∼ CN
(
0, σ2T + σ
2
R
)
. (6.13)
In the proposed eavesdropping-resilient OFDM system, the legitimate receiver
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seeks to derive the interleaving pattern that is dynamically designed based on the
estimate HˆT at the transmitter. As shown in (6.12), the observation HˆR at the
legitimate receiver can be considered as a noisy version of HˆT. Therefore, HˆR can be
modeled as a complex Gaussian random variable with the mean of HˆT and a variance
equal to σ2TR = σ
2
T + σ
2
R. The channel gain λˆRk =
∣∣∣HˆR(k)∣∣∣2 is then noncentral Chi-
square distributed with 2 degree of freedom, with a probability density function
fRk
(
λˆRk
)
=
1
σ2TR
e
−
( |HˆT (k)|2+λˆRk
σ2
TR
)
I0

√
λˆRk
∣∣∣HˆT (k)∣∣∣2
2σ2TR
 , (6.14)
and a cumulative distribution function
FRk
(
λˆRk
)
= 1−Q1
√2
∣∣∣HˆT (k)∣∣∣
σTR
,
√
2λˆRk
σTR
 , (6.15)
where Iθ(x) represents the θth order Bessel function as
Iθ(x) =
∞∑
k=0
(x/2)θ+2k
k!Γ (θ + k + 1)
, (6.16)
and Qθ (a, b) denotes the Marcum Q-function, that is
Qθ (a, b) =
∫ ∞
b
x
(x
a
)θ−1
e−
x2+a2
2 Iθ−1 (ax) dx. (6.17)
Let ΦT denote the event that
∣∣∣HˆT (0)k∣∣∣2 ≥ · · · ≥ ∣∣∣HˆT (ι)k∣∣∣2 ≥ · · · ≥ ∣∣∣HˆT (M − 1)k∣∣∣2
and ΦR denote the event that
∣∣∣HˆR(0)k∣∣∣2 ≥ · · · ≥ ∣∣∣HˆR(ι)k∣∣∣2 ≥ · · · ≥ ∣∣∣HˆR(M − 1)k∣∣∣2.
The probability that the legitimate receiver derives the same interleaving permutation
based on the channel estimate HˆR, PL, can be described as
PL = P (ΦR|ΦT ) = P (ΦR ∩ ΦT )
P (ΦT )
. (6.18)
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The M subcarrier channel gains of the common channel observed at the trans-
mitter, λˆTk for k = 0, 1, · · · ,M − 1, are independent and identically distributed
exponential random variables with parameter σ2
HˆT
. Referring to the order statistics
theory [121], P (ΦT ) can be calculated as
P (ΦT ) =
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
λˆT0
∫ +∞
λˆT1
· · ·
∫ +∞
λˆT (M−2)
f
(
λˆT0, · · · , λˆT (M−1)
)
dλˆT0dλˆT1 · · · dλˆT (M−1), (6.19)
where f
(
λˆT0, · · · , λˆT (M−1)
)
is the joint PDF of the M subcarrier channel gains ob-
served at the transmitter. Since HˆT (k) follows a complex Gaussian distribution
CN
(
0, σ2
HˆT
)
, the channel gain of an estimated subcarrier channel, λˆTk =
∣∣∣HˆT (k)∣∣∣2, is
exponentially distributed, with a PDF f
(
λˆTk
)
= 1
σ2
HˆT
e
−λˆTk/σ2HˆT and a CDF F
(
λˆTk
)
=
1− e−λˆTk/σ
2
HˆT . Meanwhile, considering that all the subcarriers are independently dis-
tributed, we have
f
(
λˆT0, · · · , λˆT (M−1)
)
=
M−1∏
ι=0
f
(
λˆTι
)
(6.20)
=
(
1
σ2
HˆT
)M
e
−∑M−1ι=0 λˆTι/σ2HˆT .
Then, P (ΦT ) in (6.19) can be integrated as follows:
P (ΦT ) =
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
λˆT0
∫ +∞
λˆT1
· · ·
∫ +∞
λˆT (M−2)
f
(
λˆT0, · · · , λˆT (M−1)
)
dλˆT0dλˆT1 · · · dλˆT (M−1)
=
∫ +∞
−∞
f(λˆT0)dλˆT0
∫ +∞
λˆT0
f(λˆT1)dλˆT1 · · ·
· · ·
∫ +∞
λˆT (M−2)
f(λˆT (M−1))dλˆT (M−1)
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=∫ +∞
−∞
f(λˆT (M−1))dλˆT (M−1)
∫ λˆT (M−1)
−∞
f(λˆT (M−2))dλˆT (M−2) · · ·
· · ·
∫ λˆT2
−∞
f(λˆT1)dλˆT1
∫ λˆT1
−∞
f(λˆT0)dλˆT0
=
∫ +∞
−∞
f(λˆT (M−1))dλˆT (M−1)
∫ λˆT (M−1)
−∞
f(λˆT (M−2))dλˆT (M−2) · · ·
· · ·
∫ λˆT3
−∞
f(λˆT2)dλˆT2
∫ λˆT2
−∞
f(λˆT1)F (λˆT1)dλˆT1
=
∫ +∞
−∞
f(λˆT (M−1))dλˆT (M−1)
∫ λˆT (M−1)
−∞
f(λˆT (M−2))dλˆT (M−2) · · ·
· · ·
∫ λˆT4
−∞
f(λˆT3)dλˆT3
∫ λˆT3
−∞
f(λˆT2)
1
2
F 2(λˆT2)dλˆT2
=
∫ +∞
−∞
f(λˆT (M−1))dλˆT (M−1)
∫ λˆT (M−1)
−∞
f(λˆT (M−2))dλˆT (M−2) · · ·
· · ·
∫ λˆT5
−∞
f(λˆT4)dλˆT4
∫ λˆT4
−∞
f(λˆT3)
1
3× 2F
3(λˆT3)dλˆT3. (6.21)
Following the pattern of this integral, we can finally obtain
P (ΦT ) =
∫ +∞
−∞
f(λˆT (M−1))
1
(M − 1)!F
M−1(λˆT (M−1))dλˆT (M−1)
=
∫ +∞
−∞
1
(M − 1)!F
M−1(λˆT (M−1))dF (λˆT (M−1))
=
1
M !
FM(λˆT (M−1))
∣∣∣+∞
−∞
=
1
M !
. (6.22)
Similarly, the probability P (ΦR ∩ ΦT ) can also be derived based on the order
statistics theory result as
P (ΦR ∩ ΦT ) =
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
λˆT0
· · ·
∫ +∞
λˆT (M−2)
f
(
λˆT0, · · · , λˆT (M−1)
)
{∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
λˆR0
· · ·
∫ +∞
λˆR(M−2)
f
(
λˆR0, · · · , λˆR(M−1)
)
dλˆR0dλˆR1 · · · dλˆR(M−1)
}
dλˆT0dλˆT1 · · · dλˆT (M−1), (6.23)
123
where f
(
λˆR0, · · · , λˆR(M−1)
)
denotes the joint PDF for the M subcarrier channel gains
observed at the legitimate receiver. Because the channel gains of the subcarriers are
independent, this joint PDF can be expressed as
f
(
λˆR0, · · · , λˆR(M−1)
)
=
M−1∏
ι=0
fRι
(
λˆRι
)
. (6.24)
Therefore, (6.23) can be rewritten as
P (ΦR ∩ ΦT ) =
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
λˆT0
· · ·
∫ +∞
λˆT (M−2)
f
(
λˆT0
)
· · · f
(
λˆT (M−1)
)
{∫ +∞
−∞
fR0(λˆR0)dλˆR0
∫ +∞
λˆR0
fR1(λˆR1)dλˆR1 · · ·
· · ·
∫ +∞
λˆR(M−2)
fR(M−1)(λˆR(M−1))dλˆR(M−1)
}
dλˆT0dλˆT1 · · · dλˆT (M−1). (6.25)
Unfortunately, the integration of (6.25) cannot be worked out analytically, and
thus the probability of deriving an identical interleaving permutation at the legitimate
user, PL, cannot be expressed in a closed form. Therefore, in this study, the prob-
ability PL will be evaluated and compared with PEM and PENM through computer
simulations.
6.4.2.2 Symbol Error Rate at the Legitimate Receiver
Similar to the SER analysis for the eavesdropper, the SER at the legitimate re-
ceiver of the proposed OFDM system can be described as
PS,L = 1− PL (1− PS) . (6.26)
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6.5 Interleaved Subcarrier Selection Algorithm
It can be concluded from the performance evaluation that the selection of inter-
leaved subcarriers impacts both eavesdropping prevention and legitimate transmis-
sion in the presence of imperfect channel reciprocity. A combination of M subcarriers,
which can make the interleaving pattern unrecognizable to eavesdroppers while being
robust to the deviation of channel estimations between the legitimate participants,
needs to be collected. In the selection of the M interleaved subcarriers, a trade-off be-
tween the eavesdropping resilience and the legitimate transmission reliability can be
realized by answering two questions: 1) How many subcarriers have to be interleaved?
2) Which M out of the N subcarriers should be selected?
6.5.1 Size M of the Set of Interleaved Subcarriers
Referring to the analysis in Section 6.4, the probability that an eavesdropper
successfully derives the actual interleaving permutation used by the transmitter is
uniquely determined by the size, M , of the set of selected and interleaved subcarri-
ers, as shown in (6.9) and (6.10). A system which can successfully defend against
eavesdropping when the side information I has been intercepted by eavesdroppers,
should also work well when I is not available to eavesdroppers. Therefore, the mini-
mum requirement of M , Mmin, can be determined from PEM . Given the constraint of
PEM in preventing eavesdropping, Ω, Mmin can be decided by conducting the inverse
factorial of 1/Ω. Mathematically, the derivation of Mmin can be represented as
Mmin =
⌈
FIF
(
1
Ω
)⌉
, (6.27)
where FIF (·) denotes the inverse factorial function and d·e is the ceiling function. As
a result, we have (1/Mmin!) ≤ Ω. For instance, for Ω constraints [0.0001, 0.001, 0.01],
Mmin would be [8, 7, 5], respectively.
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6.5.2 Location of the M Subcarriers
The minimum amount of interleaved subcarriers is determined according to a given
requirement of eavesdropping prevention. Meanwhile, the location of the M subcarri-
ers needs to be selected to mitigate the impairment of imperfect channel reciprocity on
the derivation of the subcarrier interleaving permutation at the intended receiver. In
the proposed subcarrier interleaving scheme, the selected subcarriers are interleaved
according to the sorted order of their channel gains. Subcarriers having large channel
gain intervals between them can thus provide an interleaving permutation insensitive
to distortions caused by interference, noise, etc.
Assume that subcarrier i and subcarrier j observed at the transmitter have channel
gains
∣∣∣HˆT (i)∣∣∣2 and ∣∣∣HˆT (j)∣∣∣2, respectively, where ∣∣∣HˆT (i)∣∣∣2 ≥ ∣∣∣HˆT (j)∣∣∣2. The order
mismatch probability of these two subcarriers at the legitimate receiver, using the
noisy channel estimates, can be expressed as
Pe = P
{∣∣∣HˆR(i)∣∣∣2 < ∣∣∣HˆR(j)∣∣∣2}
= P
{∣∣∣HˆR(i)∣∣∣2 − ∣∣∣HˆR(j)∣∣∣2 < 0} . (6.28)
Based on the statistic theory result about the difference of two independent noncentral
Chi-Square random variables with 2 degree of freedom [122], the order mismatch
probability Pe can be calculated as
Pe = Q1
√2
∣∣∣HˆT (j)∣∣∣
σTR
,
√
2
∣∣∣HˆT (i)∣∣∣
σTR
 (6.29)
−1
2
e
[
−|HˆT (i)|
2
+|HˆT (j)|2
σ2
TR
]
I0
2
∣∣∣HˆT (i)∣∣∣ ∣∣∣HˆT (j)∣∣∣
σ2TR
 ,
where Q1(·, ·) is the first-order Marcum Q-function, I0(·) represents the 0th-order
Bessel function. Let D denote the observed channel gain interval between subcarriers
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i and j at the transmitter, i.e.
∣∣∣HˆT (i)∣∣∣2 = ∣∣∣HˆT (j)∣∣∣2 + D, equation (6.29) can be
rewritten as
Pe = Q1

√
2
√∣∣∣HˆT (i)∣∣∣2 −D
σTR
,
√
2
∣∣∣HˆT (i)∣∣∣
σTR
 (6.30)
−1
2
e
[
− 2|HˆT (i)|
2−D
σ2
TR
]
I0
2
∣∣∣HˆT (i)∣∣∣√∣∣∣HˆT (i)∣∣∣2 −D
σ2TR
 .
Obviously, the order mismatch probability Pe is determined by the channel gain∣∣∣HˆT (i)∣∣∣2, the channel gain difference D, as well as the noise power σ2TR.
Given a limitation for the order mismatch probability of two adjacent interleaved
subcarriers, denoted by Λ , the required channel gain interval between two adjacent
interleaved subcarriers under a certain channel condition can be determined from the
inversion of (6.30), which can then be utilized as a criterion to choose the interleaved
subcarriers. Unfortunately, D cannot be evaluated in a closed form from (6.30), and
thus numerical techniques, or an approximation, has to be used. In this study, a
look-up table for D under different channel conditions with various order mismatch
probabilities Pe, is generated by simulations. Part of the look-up table for Pe = 0.01
is shown in Table 6.1.
6.5.3 Summary of the Interleaved Subcarrier Selection Al-
gorithm
In the proposed eavesdropping-resilient OFDM system, interleaved subcarriers are
selected based on the constraints of PEM and Pe, i.e. Ω and Λ, respectively. Ω de-
termines the minimum number of interleaved subcarriers, while Λ determines which
subcarriers can be interleaved. It is noteworthy that when we select the location of
the interleaved subcarriers using Λ, the size of the set of qualified subcarriers, M ,
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may be either larger or smaller than Mmin, depending on the channel conditions. As
an eavesdropping-resilient system, it should ensure the capability to defend against
eavesdropping first, and then endeavour to mitigate the side-effect on the legitimate
transmission. Therefore, the subcarrier selection should give top priority to the Mmin
requirement. In the situation where M < Mmin, the requirement of Pe can be relaxed
to include more subcarriers in the interleaving. When M > Mmin, all the M subcar-
riers can be selected and interleaved to further improve the eavesdropping prevention
capability.
The proposed subcarrier selection algorithm can be summarized as follows:
1. The minimum number of subcarriers that need to be interleaved is decided by
Ω;
2. All the N subcarriers of an OFDM signal are descendingly ordered according
to their channel gains observed at the transmitter;
3. The subcarrier having the largest channel gain is selected first;
4. With the channel gain of the previously selected subcarrier, the estimated noise
power and the Pe ≤ Λ requirement, the channel gain distance between the
previously selected subcarrier and the next subcarrier, D, can be updated by
referring to the look-up table such as Table 6.1;
5. The subcarrier, which has a channel gain at least D smaller than that of the
previously selected subcarrier and at the same time is closest to the previously
selected subcarrier among all the qualified subcarriers, is selected;
6. Steps 4 and 5 are repeated until reaching the end of the order for the N sub-
carriers. Then M out of the N subcarriers have been selected out;
7. If M ≥Mmin, the subcarrier selection is completed; otherwise, one has to relax
the requirement of Pe, and then repeat steps 4 and 5 until M ≥ Mmin can be
achieved.
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6.6 Simulation Results
Simulations are carried out to validate the proposed eavesdropping-resilient OFDM
system following the specifications of the IEEE 802.11g system. The OFDM signal
is generated using 64-point IFFT with a cyclic prefix of length 16. The modulation
scheme 4-QAM is adopted for all the subcarriers and the sampling frequency is 20
MHz. For the interleaved subcarrier selection, parameter Ω is set to 0.01, leading to
Mmin = 5. Meanwhile, parameter Λ is set to 0.01 and 0.001, respectively. Unless
stated otherwise, the subcarrier selection indicator I is assumed to be known by the
legitimate receiver as well as by the eavesdropper. In addition, a Rayleigh fading
channel is considered in the simulations. Training symbols with unit energy at each
subcarrier are sent out and exploited for the channel estimation, while least-square
channel estimation technique is employed at all the nodes in the network. Conse-
quently, the channel estimates can be expressed as
Hˆ(k) =
Y (k)
X(k)
= H(k) +
W (k)
X(k)
= H(k) +W ′(k), k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, (6.31)
where W ′(k) and W (k) have the same statistical properties.
In order to make a fair comparison, it is assumed that the common channel and
the eavesdropping channel follow an identical statistical model, and the noise level at
all the nodes is the same as well. Perfect synchronization is also assumed at both the
legitimate receiver and eavesdropper’s end.
6.6.1 Security and Reliability of the CSI-based Subcarrier
Interleaving Scheme
As the interleaving permutation mismatch probabilities at both the legitimate re-
ceiver and the eavesdropper, directly determine the security against eavesdropping
and the reliability of legitimate transmission in the proposed system, they are evalu-
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ated in this subsection. A Rayleigh fading channel with uniform power delay profile,
with a delay spread as long as the CP length, i.e. 800 ns, for the 802.11g system,
is used in the simulations. As shown in Fig. 6.3, the interleaving permutation mis-
match probabilities at the eavesdropper are always close to 100% in the simulated
channel conditions, whether Pe = 0.01 or Pe = 0.001. Accordingly, the information
recovery by eavesdropping is severely disrupted, which makes the transmitted data
unrecognizable to eavesdroppers. In contrast, the interleaving permutation mismatch
probabilities at the legitimate user is negligible when the SNR is larger than 24 dB.
In other words, the legitimate transmission of the proposed system would be as good
as the conventional OFDM system in a high SNR range. Please note that the in-
terleaving permutation mismatch between legitimate users is mainly caused by the
channel estimation errors. Thus, a channel estimation technique inducing smaller
estimation errors can further improve the reliability of the legitimate transmission.
6.6.2 Performance of the Proposed Secure OFDM System
In this subsection, SERs at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are
compared under different channel environments to validate the security of the pro-
posed OFDM system against eavesdropping. Meanwhile, the SER of the conventional
OFDM system is also provided as a bench-mark reference to evaluate the reliability
of legitimate transmissions in the proposed system.
Figure 6.4 presents the SERs of the proposed and the conventional OFDM systems
under a Rayleigh fading channel with uniform PDP of 800 ns delay spread. It can be
observed from this figure that the eavesdropper always has a SER close to 100% when
it strives to intercept signals transmitted from the proposed eavesdropping-resilient
OFDM system. In contrast, the performance of the legitimate transmission can be
as good as that of the conventional OFDM system in that simulated rich multipath
environment.
A simultaneous evaluation of the eavesdropping resilience and transmission relia-
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Figure 6.3: Interleaving permutation mismatch probabilities at the legitimate receiver
and eavesdropper under a Rayleigh fading channel with uniform PDP of 800 ns delay.
132
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
SNR (dB)
SE
R
 
 
Legitimate User, P
e
=0.01
Eavesdropper, P
e
=0.01
Legitimate User, P
e
=0.001
Eavesdropper, P
e
=0.001
Conventional OFDM
Figure 6.4: SERs at the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper under a Rayleigh fading
channel with uniform PDP of 800 ns delay.
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Figure 6.5: Comparison of confidential transmission probabilities between the pro-
posed and conventional OFDM systems under a Rayleigh fading channel with uniform
PDP of 800 ns delay.
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Figure 6.6: SERs at the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper under a Rayleigh fading
channel with exponential PDP of 50 ns RMS delay.
bility of this eavesdropping-resilient OFDM system, in terms of our proposed evalu-
ation criterion for anti-eavesdropping communication systems in Chapter 5, i.e. the
probability of confidential transmission, is also performed. The novel evaluation cri-
terion is defined as the probability that the transmitted data is correctly received
by the legitimate receiver but not intercepted by the eavesdropper. In the proposed
eavesdropping-resilient OFDM system, the probability of confidential transmission
can be calculated as
Π =
(
1− PS,L
)
PS,E. (6.32)
As depicted in Fig. 6.5, the proposed OFDM system outperforms the conventional
OFDM system, particularly in the high SNR range.
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The SER vs. SNR performance of the proposed secure OFDM system under a
different channel condition is depicted in Fig. 6.6, where a Rayleigh fading channel
with exponential PDP of 50 ns RMS delay spread is considered. This represents a
multipath channel with much less scattering in comparison with the one used before.
As illustrated in this figure, the eavesdropper still suffers from a very high SER though
the SER is a bit less than that observed in Fig. 6.4. Comparing the performance of the
legitimate transmission with that of the conventional OFDM under the same channel
condition, legitimate users of the proposed OFDM system would now experience a
performance loss. However, the performance degradation becomes less significant
when the SER is less than 0.1. In addition, by using a smaller value of Pe in the
selection of the interleaved subcarriers, the legitimate receiver can obtain a lower
SER, such that the SER gap between the proposed system and the conventional
OFDM system can be reduced.
Comparing the performance results in Fig. 6.4 and Fig. 6.6, which are under
different Rayleigh fading conditions, the performance degradation of the proposed
eavesdropping-resilient OFDM system can be explained as follows: the reciprocity
and spatial variation properties of time-varying wireless channels, which are exploited
as the principle behind the proposed system, are more effective and reliable in rich
multipath environments. Therefore, a rich scattering multipath environment is highly
favorable to the proposed secure OFDM system.
6.6.3 Impact of the Side Information I on Eavesdropping
Prevention
As discussed in Section 6.3, the subcarrier selection indicator I may, or may not, be
available to the eavesdropper, depending on whether it is sent out by the transmitter.
The impact of the side information I on the eavesdropping prevention is also studied
in the simulations. SERs of eavesdroppers with and without the side information I
are compared in Fig. 6.7 and Fig. 6.8 for Rayleigh fading channels with uniform PDP
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of 800 ns delay spread and exponential PDP of 50 ns RMS delay spread, respectively.
In the simulations, the eavesdropper estimates the subcarrier selection based on its
own channel observations and the information of Ω and Λ, when the side information
I is not available. It is noteworthy that this operation can be taken as a random
guess of the indicator I since the common channel and the eavesdropping channel are
uncorrelated.
In both simulated communication environments, the eavesdropper experiences a
higher SER when the subcarrier selection indicator I is not available, compared to
the case where I has been intercepted. However, as shown in the figures, the SERs
of eavesdropping are all considerably high, even when eavesdroppers can intercept,
by chance, the indicator I. This is because the eavesdropping prevention capability
is dominated by the interleaving permutation but not the side information I as such.
The eavesdropper at a separate location observes an uncorrelated channel such that
it is hard for the eavesdropper to derive an identical interleaving permutation, even
though it knows exactly which subcarriers have been interleaved. As a result, infor-
mation recovery for eavesdropping is severely affected, thus leading to high SERs. In
addition, it can be observed from both Fig. 6.7 and Fig. 6.8 that there is a fluctua-
tion in the eavesdropper’s SNR values over the whole SNR range. The reason for this
phenomenon is that the amount of interleaved subcarriers, M , varies in the subcar-
rier selection according to the channel conditions, and this parameter would directly
affect the SER of eavesdropping as shown in (6.11). Moreover, the fluctuations of
SERs are minor, particularly when the subcarrier selection indicator I has not been
intercepted by the eavesdropper.
6.7 Summary
In this chapter, an eavesdropping-resilient OFDM system without any restriction
of the utilized symbol modulation scheme is achieved through dynamic subcarrier
interleaving. Exploiting the CSI between the transmitter and legitimate receiver,
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Figure 6.7: SER comparison for eavesdroppers with and without the subcarrier se-
lection indicator under a Rayleigh fading channel with uniform PDP of 800 ns delay.
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Figure 6.8: SER comparison for eavesdroppers with and without the subcarrier selec-
tion indicator under a Rayleigh fading channel with exponential PDP of 50 ns RMS
delay.
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partial subcarriers of each OFDM signal are selected and then interleaved according
to the sorted order of their channel gains. Since wireless channels associated with each
pair of users at separate locations exhibit independent fading processes, the frequently
renewed subcarrier interleaving scheme can only be shared between legitimate nodes
based on channel reciprocity. As a result, mismatched information recovery is carried
out at the eavesdropper without an identical subcarrier interleaving pattern, so that
eavesdropping is prevented. In order to mitigate the impairment from imperfect
channel reciprocity between legitimate parties, the interleaved subcarriers are selected
to achieve a trade-off between the eavesdropping resilience and legitimate transmission
reliability. Theoretical analysis and computer simulation results have been provided
to validate the proposed eavesdropping-resilient OFDM system. It is observed from
the simulation results that eavesdropping on the proposed system suffers from SER
values close to 100% while the legitimation transmission has a SER performance
similar to that of conventional OFDM systems.
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Chapter 7
Secure OFDM Systems with
Embedded Confidential Signaling
Two nodes of a communication link would theoretically experience and observe
the same channel fading due to channel reciprocity. Security design based on the
randomness of the common channel can therefore be shared between legitimate ter-
minals. In practical implementations, as channel estimates are generally distorted by
noise, interference and hardware limitations, estimates at the two nodes of a wireless
channel are not perfectly reciprocal though the channel is reciprocal inherently. The
reliability of legitimate transmission will thus be impaired once misunderstanding of
the channel based security design occurs at the legitimate receiver. Hence, solutions
to mitigate the impact of imperfect channel reciprocity on the channel based security
strategies need to be investigated, such as the inherent robustness improvement of
the security algorithm and the transmission of insensitive side information relevant
to the security design.
Techniques to enhance the inherent robustness of security designs to imperfect
channel reciprocity have been studied in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. In this chapter,
an efficient side information transmission mechanism between the transmitter and
legitimate receiver is provided, in order to assist the security design understanding at
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the intended receiver and then strengthen the reliability of legitimate transmission.
OFDM with precoded cyclic prefix (PCP-OFDM), which was originally proposed for
the adaptive transmission in cognitive radio, is extended and specifically tailored for
the confidential transmission of side information between legitimate users. In this
design, the side information relevant to the security design is conveyed by a specially
tailored PCP, and concurrently transmitted with the data-carrying OFDM symbol.
A set of orthogonal sequences, which is only known by legitimate users, is one-to-one
mapped to all the potential side information. An orthogonal sequence is chosen in the
transmission of each OFDM symbol corresponding to the present security design. The
PCP symbol is then generated by passing the selected orthogonal sequence through
an OFDM modulator, so as to maintain the same time and frequency characteristics
as the data-carrying OFDM symbol. With the inherent orthogonality among all
the candidate PCPs, the information conveyed by the PCP symbol can be reliably
detected through cross correlations between the received PCP and elements in the
local PCP library of the receiver. The local candidate PCP that leads to the maximum
correlation peak will be taken as the PCP sent out by the transmitter, and then used
to assist the understanding of the adopted security design. Theoretical analysis and
simulation results are provided to validate the proposed design.
7.1 Introduction
In secure wireless OFDM systems where transmitted OFDM signals are con-
structed according to the real-time status of the common channel, no signaling be-
tween the transmitter and legitimate receiver is needed ideally due to channel reci-
procity. Practically, all the nodes in a network can only observe a noisy version of
their undergoing channels because of estimation errors caused by the noise, interfer-
ence and hardware limitations. Although the radio channel is reciprocal, estimates
of the radio channel are not perfectly reciprocal. As a result, the real-time security
design initiated at the transmitter and that locally derived at the legitimate receiver,
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which are based on their individual estimates of the common channel, may not be
identical. Data demodulation error is then caused by the misunderstanding of the
security design. Consequently, the reliability of legitimate transmission is degraded.
As a superior secure communication system, it should effectively defend against
malicious attacks but also maintain reliable legitimate transmission. It has been
demonstrated in Chapter 6, the sharing of certain insensitive side information rele-
vant to the security design, such as the subcarrier selection indicator I in the proposed
eavesdropping-resilient OFDM system using dynamic subcarrier interleaving, can sig-
nificantly enhance the reliability of legitimate transmission. On the other hand, even
this type of side information happens to be intercepted by the eavesdropper during
the transmission, the damage to the system security is ignorable. Therefore, the
transmission of such side information between the transmitter and legitimate receiver
can be performed, particularly in a hostile communication environment.
There are several challenges in sharing the side information relevant to the channel
based security design in a wireless OFDM system:
• The transmission needs to be always available. Since the secure OFDM sys-
tem is designed according to the real-time wireless channel, the relevant side
information would be updated frequently, even symbol by symbol.
• The sharing of the side information should not interrupt or interfere the data
transmission. The data transmission in a secure OFDM system would have a
higher priority than the sharing of side information. As a result, we cannot
stop data transmission to send the side information. Also, the transmission of
the side information should minimize or even avoid the interference to the data
transmission.
• The transmission cannot occupy additional time and spectrum resources. The
time and spectrum resources are limited for wireless communications. The
sharing of side information needs to be completed within the time and spectrum
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resources allocated for the original data transmission in the OFDM system. No
additional resource is available and can be provided.
• The transmission should be reliable and confidential. The shared side infor-
mation is used to mitigate the impairment from the imperfect reciprocity of
channel estimates between the transmitter and legitimate receiver, and then
improve the reliability of legitimate transmission. Therefore, the transmission
of the side information itself should be reliable. Moreover, although the leakage
of such side information would only cause minor damage to the security of the
system, we still need to keep this transmitter-receiver interaction as confidential
as possible.
Several simultaneous communication strategies have been reported in the litera-
ture. In [123, 124], the inphase and quadrature branches of the signal constellation
are used to carry different data that need to be transmitted concurrently. By do-
ing this, the throughput of each data stream reduces compared to the scenario that
one data stream occupies both I and Q branches of the signal constellation. An-
other concurrent transmission strategy is to make the two data streams orthogonal
to each other and then mix them physically [125, 126], conditioned on a perfect or-
thogonality. Moreover, Zhao et al. proposed to enable simultaneous communications
by using the multiple-input and multiple-output technology, at the cost of additional
antennas [127].
In [18], a novel OFDM system with a precoded cyclic prefix, named PCP-OFDM,
was proposed for fast transmitter-receiver interaction in adaptive transmission. In
the original PCP-OFDM, the traditional cyclic prefix is replaced by two precoded
Kasami sequences that convey system parameters related to the current adaptation
scheme. Since the cyclic prefix is typically included in OFDM signals as a guard
interval to eliminate the inter-symbol interference, no additional time and spectrum
resources are required by the PCP signaling link. Moreover, the PCP caused ISI and
inter-carrier interference (ICI) to the data-carrying OFDM symbol in a multipath
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channel can be removed through a proposed interference cancellation algorithm. As
a result, a reliable data transmission comparable to the traditional OFDM system
can be achieved by the PCP-OFDM system.
This chapter extends the previous study on the PCP-OFDM system, and provides
an embedded confidential signaling link for the transmission of security design relevant
side information in secure OFDM systems. Technically, the side information relevant
to the security design is conveyed by a specially tailored PCP, and concurrently
transmitted with the data-carrying OFDM symbols. A set of orthogonal sequences,
which is only known by legitimate users, is one-to-one mapped to all the potential
information to be transmitted. An orthogonal sequence is chosen in the transmission
of each OFDM symbol corresponding to the present security design. The PCP symbol
is then generated by passing the selected orthogonal sequence through an OFDM
modulator, so as to maintain the same time and frequency characteristics as the data-
carrying OFDM symbol. With the inherent orthogonality among all the candidate
PCPs, the information transmitted through the PCP signaling link can be reliably
identified by cross correlations between the received PCP and elements in the local
PCP library at the receiver. The local candidate PCP that leads to the maximum
correlation peak will be taken as the PCP sent out by the transmitter, and then used
to assist the understanding of the adopted security design. It can be found that the
PCP enabled side information transmission mechanism does not interrupt the data
transmission and requires no additional time and frequency resources.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 introduces the trans-
mitter and receiver design in the PCP-OFDM system. The PCP generation and de-
tection for the embedded confidential signaling are addressed in Section 7.3, followed
by the performance analysis of the PCP detection and PCP-OFDM demodulation in
Section 7.4. Simulation results are provided in Section 7.5. At last, the chapter is
summarized in Section 7.6.
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7.2 Transmitter and Receiver Design for PCP-OFDM
System
The block diagram of the PCP-OFDM system is illustrated in Fig. 7.1. The trans-
mitter in Fig. 7.1(a) is basically the same as that in a traditional OFDM system,
except that the cyclic prefix is now replaced by a precoded sequence. More specif-
ically, the PCPs are generated from orthogonal sequences modulated by an OFDM
modulator, corresponding to the real-time security design. Generation and detection
of such PCPs will be discussed in Section 7.3. The PCPs are considered as known in
this section.
7.2.1 Transmitter Design for PCP-OFDM System
Each OFDM symbol in Fig. 7.1(a) is specified by an N -point time-domain vector
x obtained via an inverse fast Fourier transform of the complex data vector X of size
N . Without loss of generality, the data-carrying OFDM symbol in time domain can
be expressed in vector form as
x =
(
FN
)∗
X, (7.1)
where FN is the FFT transform matrix with its (n, k)th entry (exp{−j2pink/N}/√N).
Operator (·)∗ denotes the conjugate transpose.
Before the transmission of the data-carrying OFDM symbol in (7.1), PCP se-
quence with length of Ncp is inserted as its prefix. Generation and demodulation of
the PCP will be discussed in Section 7.3. Here we just need to take the PCP as a ran-
dom sequence with the same time and frequency characteristics as the data-carrying
OFDM symbol. With the purpose of a complete removal of ISI, the duration of PCP
is set to be longer than or at least equal to the delay spread of the multipath channel.
A generated PCP-OFDM signal after the PCP insertion can be written as
xpcp = [cp (0) , · · · , cp (Ncp − 1) , x (0) , · · · , x (N − 1) , ] , (7.2)
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where cp = [cp (0) , · · · , cp (Ncp − 1)] denotes the generated PCP symbol.
When there is no change in the system security design, the information needs to
be sent out through the PCP link is not renewed. Consequently, each data-carrying
OFDM symbol is preceded and succeeded by the same PCP. This is equivalent of
generating a new OFDM signal of N + 2Ncp samples with one PCP sequence as its
last Ncp samples and the other identical sequence as its cyclic prefix in the first Ncp
samples, as illustrated in Fig. 7.2. Hence, it creates a series of new OFDM signals
with cyclic structure similar to traditional OFDM signals protected by cyclic prefix.
In a more general scenario, the OFDM symbol is preceded and succeeded by two
different PCPs, due to the variation of the wireless channel and corresponding security
design. This also includes the scenario of zero vector as the second PCP, representing
the end of the transmission. Therefore, the following signal vector x′ can be used for
the interference analysis and PCP-OFDM signal demodulation, that is
x′ = [cp1 (0) , · · · , cp1 (Ncp − 1) , x (0) , · · · , x (N − 1) ,
cp2 (0) , · · · , cp2 (Ncp − 1)]T , (7.3)
where cp1 and cp2 denote the PCP sequences with identical bandwidth for preced-
ing and subsequent OFDM symbols, respectively. When there is no change in the
information to be transmitted in the PCP signaling link, we have,
cp1(n) = cp2(n), n = 0, 1, · · · , Ncp − 1. (7.4)
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Considering an L-tap static complex channel within one OFDM signal, h =
[h0, h1, · · · , hL−1]T , for the signal propagation and interference analysis, including
the worst case L = Ncp + 1, the received signal r corresponding to the transmitted
signal vector x′, with a size of (N + 2Ncp + L− 1)× 1, can be expressed as
r =

h0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
h1 h0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
hL−1 hL−2 · · · h0 0 · · · 0
0 hL−1 · · · h1 h0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · hL−1 hL−2 · · · h0
0 0 · · · 0 hL−1 · · · h1
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · hL−1

x′ + w′, (7.5)
where the size of the channel matrix in (7.5) is (N + 2Ncp + L − 1) × (N + 2Ncp),
and w′ is an AWGN vector with the same size as r. The received signal over one
OFDM symbol and two adjacent PCPs, r, is depicted in Fig. 7.3. As highlighted by
the shaded region in the figure, the transmitted signal appearing at the receiver is
spread by the multipath channel, resulting into ISI and ICI. The ISI from the adjacent
blocks and ICI within the current OFDM symbol have to be canceled for a successful
demodulation of the data-carrying symbol.
7.2.2 Receiver Design for PCP-OFDM System
The receiver of the PCP-OFDM system, with a frequency domain equalization and
time domain interference cancellation, is presented in Fig. 7.1(b). The transmitted
PCP is first identified. After that, the data-carrying OFDM symbol is demodulated,
following the ISI and ICI cancellation. The same as the observation period (OP)
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normally used in a traditional OFDM receiver for the data demodulation, only N
samples from the received signal are considered for demodulating the data-carrying
OFDM symbol in the proposed receiver. The exact location of OP and the channel
impulse response can be determined using the techniques in [128–130].
The PCP detection technique will be presented in Section 7.3. With the identified
PCP sequences and estimated channel impulse response, ISI from the preceding PCP
sequence due to the dispersive nature of multipath channel, can be computed and
subtracted from the received signal. Meanwhile, ICI, which exists because of the lack
of the cyclic structure in the PCP-OFDM signal when only N samples of the received
signal are used for the demodulation process, needs to be eliminated by rebuilding
the cyclic structure. To provide insights into the ISI and ICI within an PCP-OFDM
signal in a multipath channel, two N × N matrices are constructed to describe the
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impact from the channel. The first matrix
C =

h0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
h1 h0 · · · 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
hL−1 hL−2 · · · h0 0 · · · 0
0 hL−1 · · · h1 h0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · hL−1 hL−2 · · · h0

, (7.6)
represents the channel seen by the data-carrying OFDM symbol. The second matrix
CT =

0 · · · 0 hL−1 hL−2 · · · h1
0 · · · 0 0 hL−1 · · · h2
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · hL−1
0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0

, (7.7)
stands for the tail part of the channel impulse response that generates ISI in the
succeeding symbol. These two matrices have an interesting property that
C + CT = Ccycl, (7.8)
where Ccycl is the “ideal” channel matrix, i.e. the matrix that results in a cyclic
convolution between the transmitted signal and the channel [130]. Based on (7.5),
(7.6) and (7.7), we can express the received data-carrying OFDM symbol in the OP,
i.e. [r (Ncp) , r (Ncp + 1) , · · · , r (Ncp +N − 1)]T , as
r1 = Cx + CTRcp1 + w
′
N , (7.9)
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where Rcp1 is zero-padded signal vector of cp1, which can be expressed as
Rcp1 = [ 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
(N−L+1)
, cp1(P − L+ 1), · · · , cp1(P − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(L−1)
]T . (7.10)
w′N is the noise acting on the samples during the OP, i.e. w′N = [w′ (Ncp) ,
w′ (Ncp + 1) , · · · , w′ (Ncp +N − 1)]T .
In order to utilize a simple equalization and demodulation procedure like that in
the traditional OFDM system, the following ideal received signal vector ri has to be
constructed
ri = r1 −CTRcp1 + CTx. (7.11)
The signal structure depicted in (7.11) suggests that the first step of the proposed
hybrid domain receiver in demodulating x is to remove the ISI term by subtracting
CTRcp1 from the preceding PCP sequence. For any reasonable channel signal-to-noise
ratio of interest, the error from the estimated channel is small enough and hence we
will have reliable ISI cancellation.
After ISI removal, the next step is to remove the ICI term, or equivalently to
perform cyclic reconstruction for the received data-carrying OFDM symbol. Here we
employ an ICI cancellation approach in the time domain. Consider the propagation
of signal vector x′ in (7.3), as illustrated in Fig. 7.3. Let r2 of size N denote the
received signal vector lying out of the OP but containing part of the data-carrying
OFDM symbol due to the channel multipath distortion, that is
r2 = [ r (Ncp +N) , · · · , r (Ncp +N + L− 2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(L−1)
, 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
(N−L+1)
]T . (7.12)
r2 consists of signal components from both the data-carrying OFDM symbol and its
following PCP. When r1 is used for the demodulation of the PCP-OFDM signal, we
can find the remaining tail from the previous OFDM symbol in r2 is actually the signal
needed to reconstruct the signal cyclic structure. By subtracting the signal component
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of the second PCP from (7.12), the remaining tail from the previous data-carrying
OFDM symbol, which is used to eliminate ICI, can be obtained using [131]
CTx = r2 −CHRcp2 , (7.13)
where the N ×N matrix CH is
CH =

h0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
h1 h0 · · · 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
hL−2 hL−3 · · · h0 0 · · · 0
0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0

, (7.14)
and Rcp2 is the identified PCP following the data-carrying OFDM symbol, i.e
Rcp2 = [ cp2(0), · · · , cp2(L− 2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(L−1)
, 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
(N−L+1)
]T . (7.15)
Therefore, the ideal signal vector for the equalization and demodulation of the data-
carrying OFDM symbol can be derived as
ri = r1 −CTRcp1 + r2 −CHRcp2 . (7.16)
When the channel estimation is accurate, the ideal signal in the above equation turns
to be
ri = Ccycl
{(
FN
)∗
X
}
+ wN . (7.17)
As for an OFDM system with cyclic prefix, the circulant matrix Ccycl can be
diagonalized by N×N (I)FFT matrices [131]. For the equalization and demodulation
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purposes, applying an FFT matrix to the above equation leads to
FNri = F
N
{
Ccycl
{(
FN
)∗
X
}
+ wN
}
= DN(H˜N)X˜, (7.18)
where DN(H˜N) is N × N diagonal matrix with the estimated frequency domain
channel transfer function as its diagonal elements. As a result, the complete zero-
forcing demodulation process is
X˜ = D−1N (H˜N)
{
FNri
}
. (7.19)
7.3 PCP Design for the Secure OFDM Systems
In the secure OFDM systems using channel based security techniques, the side
information relevant to the security design can be shared between legitimate parties
to mitigate the impairment from imperfect channel reciprocity and then improve the
reliability of legitimate transmission. Usually, the side information does not contain
much content. However, the transmission of such information needs to be reliable and
confidential, without the requirement of additional time and spectrum resources and
interruption to the data transmission. In the proposed strategy, the side information
is conveyed by specially tailored PCPs, which are transmitted in a concurrent manner
with the data-carrying OFDM symbols.
7.3.1 PCP Generation
In order to achieve a secure and reliable transmission through the PCP link, the
side information to be transmitted is represented by a set of orthogonal sequences,
where each orthogonal sequence uniquely indicates a potential value of the side infor-
mation. Please note that the side information in a security design typically has limited
content. The used orthogonal sequences are kept privately, and are only available to
the legitimate users. In case the orthogonal sequences are cracked by adversaries,
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they will be renewed immediately.
Let Υ denotes the set of Ms orthogonal sequences indicating the potential in-
formation to be transmitted in the PCP, where each sequence has a length of Ncp
according to the length of the PCP. We have
Υ = [0, 1, · · · , Ms ] , (7.20)
where
1
Ncp
Ncp−1∑
n=0
i(n)
∗
v(n) =
 0, i 6= v1, i = v . (7.21)
It is noteworthy that the size of Ms is decided by the selected orthogonal sequences
and the sequence length Ncp. Since the design of orthogonal sequences is out of the
scope of this study, this dissertation does not focus on this issue. The development
of orthogonal sequences can be found in [132–134].
Generally, the orthogonal sequences are in a binary form, which would occupy
infinite bandwidth and have time and frequency characteristics distinct from the data-
carrying OFDM symbol. The time- and frequency-characteristic difference between
PCPs and data-carrying symbol can facilitate eavesdropping and traffic analysis at
adversaries, thus needs to be removed. For this reason, we would like to pass the
orthogonal sequence through an OFDM modulator. For an orthogonal sequence with
a length of Ncp, an OFDM modulator with Ncp-point IFFT is employed. Under
the assumption that i is selected to be transmitted according to the present side
information, the output of the Ncp-point IFFT, which is used as the PCP symbol,
can be expressed as
cp,i(n) =
√
1
Ncp
Ncp−1∑
k=0
i(k)e
j2pi kn
Ncp , n = 0, 1, · · · , Ncp − 1. (7.22)
It is noteworthy that the same sampling frequency is adopted for both PCPs and
data-carrying OFDM symbols to make they occupy the same bandwidth.
155
In the case that i is orthogonal to v, we can prove that cp,i(n) is also orthogonal
to cp,v(n) as follows:
1
Ncp
Ncp−1∑
n=0
cp,i(n)c
∗
p,v(n) =
1
Ncp
1
Ncp
Ncp−1∑
n=0
{
Ncp−1∑
ki=0
i(ki)e
j2pi
kin
Ncp
Ncp−1∑
kv=0
∗k(kv)e
−j2pi kvn
Ncp
}
=
1
N2cp
Ncp−1∑
ki=0
Ncp−1∑
kv=0
i(ki)
∗
v(kv)
Ncp−1∑
n=0
e
j2pi
(ki−kv)n
Ncp . (7.23)
If ki 6= kv, we can always have
Ncp−1∑
n=0
e
j2pi
(ki−kv)n
Ncp = 0. (7.24)
If ki = kv, equation (7.23) can be rewritten as
1
Ncp
Ncp−1∑
n=0
cp,i(n)c
∗
p,v(n) =
1
Ncp
Ncp−1∑
ki=0
i(ki)
∗
v(ki)
= 0. (7.25)
Therefore, the Fourier transform would not change the orthogonality of the sequences.
cp,i(n) is still orthogonal to cp,v(n).
Considering that both the real and imaginary parts of PCP symbols can convey
information, the information of 2 log2(Ms) bits can be transmitted by each generated
PCP symbol with a length of Ncp.
7.3.2 PCP Detection
The legitimate receiver, which has the information of all the candidate orthogonal
sequences, can locally generate all the possible PCP symbols that are orthogonal to
each other. Depending on the orthogonality, the transmitted PCP can be detected
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by correlating the received PCP with all the possible PCPs in the local library at the
receiver. Under a multipath channel h = [h0, h1, · · · , hL−1]T , the correlation peak
corresponding to the strongest path hk will be used for the PCP detection.
Assuming that perfect synchronization is achieved through training signals or
in-band pilot of the PCP-OFDM signal, the PCP detection process can be mathe-
matically expressed as
Cm =
Ncp−1∑
n=0
r(n)c∗p,m(n), m = 0, 1, · · · ,Ms − 1, (7.26)
where cp,m is the mth locally generated PCP symbol at the receiver. The candidate
PCP cp,m that leads to the maximum output in (7.26) will be taken as the PCP signal
sent out by the transmitter, and then used to assist the understanding of the current
security design. The correlation peak corresponding to the strongest path hk when
cp,m is transmitted can be given by
Cm,k = hkNcp + wc, (7.27)
where wc denotes the interference to the correlation result. Please note that signal
components from other multipath taps would act as interference to the correlation
peak, in addition to the AWGN. Consequently, the interference wc can be approxi-
mated as a zero-mean Gaussian noise with a variance
σ2wc ≈ Ncp
(
L−1∑
l=0,l 6=k
|hl|2
[
σ2P +
|l − k|
Ncp
(σ2s − σ2P )
]
+ σ2w
)
, (7.28)
where σ2P denotes the variance of the shifted autocorrelation of PCP symbol cp,m,
σ2s denotes the variance of correlation between the data-carrying OFDM symbol and
PCP sequence cp,m, and σ
2
w is the variance of the AWGN.
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7.4 Performance Analysis
7.4.1 Error Probability of PCP Detection
Under the assumption that cp,m is used for the current PCP-OFDM signal at
the transmitter, the correlation result of a correct PCP detection can be written as
(7.27). In contrast, when other local PCPs are correlated with the received PCP, we
can obtain a result as 0 +w′c. If hkNcp ≤ w′c−wc, an incorrect PCP detection occurs.
Therefore, the error probability of each test in the PCP detection can be derived as
Pe,m = P
{
hkNcp ≤ w′c − wc
}
= Q
 hkNcp√
σ2wc + σ
2
w′c
 , (7.29)
where
Q(a) =
∫ ∞
a
1√
2pi
e−
y2
2 dy. (7.30)
The overall error probability after Ms cross correlations can then be calculated as
Pe = 1− (1− Pe,m)Ms−1
= 1−
1−Q
 hkNcp√
σ2wc + σ
2
w′c
Ms−1 . (7.31)
It can be found from (7.31) that the error probability of PCP detection is independent
of the transmitted PCP symbols. In other words, all the potential PCPs that are
orthogonal to each other would have the same detection error rate.
7.4.2 Error Probability of PCP-OFDM Demodulation
In this evaluation, we concentrate on the demodulation errors of the data-carrying
OFDM symbol, caused by imperfect ISI and ICI cancellation with incorrect PCP
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detection. The errors induced by the misunderstanding of the security processing,
which primarily depend on the reliability of a specific security design, are not covered
in the analysis.
With the overall PCP detection error rate derived in (7.31), the data demodulation
performance of the PCP-OFDM system can be determined. Note that two PCPs need
to be decided for demodulating a data-carrying OFDM symbol. The detection errors
for cp1 and cp2 may result into different impacts on the data demodulation, as the
impairments from cp1 and cp2 are different. Assume Pe1 is the symbol error rate in
demodulating the data-carrying OFDM symbol when the two PCP detections are
correct, Pe2 is the SER when the detection of cp1 is incorrect but the detection of cp2
is correct, Pe3 is the SER under a correct cp1 detection but incorrect cp2 detection,
and Pe4 is the SER when both PCP detections are incorrect. The overall error rate
for the PCP-OFDM data demodulation, under the assumption that each of the Ms
orthogonal sequences has an equal probability to be transmitted, can be evaluated as
Pe,o =
1
Ms
Ms−1∑
m=0
[
(1− Pe)2 × Pe1 + (1− Pe)× Pe × Pe2 (7.32)
+(1− Pe)× Pe × Pe3 + P 2e Pe4
]
=
1−Q
 hkNcp√
σ2wc + σ
2
w′c
2(Ms−1) × Pe1
+

1−Q
 hkNcp√
σ2wc + σ
2
w′c
Ms−1
−
1−Q
 hkNcp√
σ2wc + σ
2
w′c
2(Ms−1)
×
(
Pe2 + Pe3
)
+
1−
1−Q
 hkNcp√
σ2wc + σ
2
w′c
Ms−1
2
× Pe4.
When the PCP detection error rate is low, the data demodulation performance of the
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PCP-OFDM system would be close to that of the traditional OFDM system.
7.5 Simulation Results
Computer simulations have been carried out to verify the proposed secure OFDM
system with embedded confidential signaling. PCP-OFDM signals are generated as
Fig. 7.1(a), where each data-carrying OFDM symbol has 64 subcarriers and the
length of the PCP is 16. Walsh codes with a size of 16 are adopted as the orthogonal
sequences to generate the PCP symbols. Sampling frequency for both the PCPs and
data-carrying OFDM symbols is set to 20 MHz. Moreover, Rayleigh fading channels
with exponential power delay profile of RMS delays 10 ns, 15 ns, 30 ns, 50 ns and
70 ns, are considered. Under the sampling frequency of 20 MHz, the lengths of the
corresponding Rayleigh fading channels are 3, 5, 8, 12, 16, respectively. In addition,
perfect synchronization and channel estimation are assumed in the simulations.
The error probabilities of the PCP detection under different Rayleigh fading chan-
nels are presented in Fig. 7.4. The error probability of PCP detection increases with
the increase of the channel delay spread. Please note that no channel equalization is
carried out for the PCP detection in the design, in order to reduce the operational
complexity. As the PCP symbol does not have a cyclic structure, equalization of the
PCP symbol has to seek help from the time domain iterative equalization techniques,
which would result into a huge computation burden. Without the channel equal-
ization, ISI from previous signals would disrupt the PCP detection. A longer delay
spread would cause a stronger ISI, and then degrade the detection performance more
severely. Fortunately, with the employment of orthogonal sequences, satisfactory
PCP detection performance can still be obtained without the channel equalization.
As shown in the figure, even when the delay spread is equal to the length of the PCP,
the detection error rate has already reduced to 0.1 when SNR is 10 dB. In addition,
it can be observed that the error probability curves turn to be flat during the high
SNR range. This is because that the PCP detection is mainly distorted by the ISI
160
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
SNR (dB)
Er
ro
r P
ro
ba
bi
lity
 
 
RMS Delay 10 ns
RMS Delay 15 ns
RMS Delay 30 ns
RMS Delay 50 ns
RMS Delay 70 ns
Figure 7.4: Error probability of the PCP enabled confidential signaling under different
channel conditions.
from multipath spread but not the noise when the SNR is high.
Since the ISI from multipath delay spread dominates the PCP detection perfor-
mance, particularly in the high SNR range, interference mitigate techniques can be
executed to improve the PCP detection reliability. Consider the duration of a PCP-
OFDM signal is usually much less than the channel coherence time. For example, in
an IEEE 802.11 network, the duration of an OFDM symbol is 4 us while the channel
coherence time is approximately 53 ms according to a pedestrian walking speed of
1 m/s. There is a big chance that a data-carrying OFDM symbol is accompanied
by two identical PCPs, since the channel based security design is not renewed so
frequently. As a result, the two PCPs can be averaged to mitigate the interference
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Figure 7.5: Error probability of the PCP enabled confidential signaling with interfer-
ence mitigation process.
and AWGN. Simulation results when two successively received PCPs are averaged
for the PCP detection are compared with the detection performance using only one
PCP in Fig. 7.5. Significant performance improvement of the PCP detection can be
observed when the interference mitigation process is operated.
The bit error rate (BER) and SER of data demodulation in the proposed secure
OFDM system with embedded confidential signaling are depicted in Fig. 7.6 and
Fig. 7.7, respectively. No interference mitigation process is carried out for the PCP
detection in these simulations. The BER and SER of the traditional CP-OFDM sys-
tem are provided as a benchmark in the study. As shown in the figures, the data
demodulation performance of the PCP-OFDM system is comparable to that of the
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Figure 7.6: BER of the secure OFDM system with embedded confidential signaling
under different channel conditions.
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Figure 7.7: SER of the secure OFDM system with embedded confidential signaling
under different channel conditions.
164
traditional CP-OFDM system, especially in a multipath channel with a short delay
spread. When ISI on the PCP symbol is strong because of a long multipath channel,
the performance of PCP-OFDM is worse than that of the CP-OFDM. The perfor-
mance loss of data demodulation comes from the imperfect ISI and ICI cancellation
for the data-carrying OFDM symbol, essentially due to the incorrect PCP detection.
7.6 Summary
An embedded confidential signaling strategy for secure OFDM systems is inves-
tigated in this chapter, in which the traditional cyclic prefix of an OFDM signal is
replaced by a specially designed orthogonal sequence, named PCP. The security de-
sign relevant side information is conveyed by the PCP, and concurrently transmitted
with the data-carrying OFDM symbol. Consequently, information sharing between
the transmitter and legitimate receiver is enabled by the PCP signaling link with-
out interrupting the data transmission and requiring additional time and spectrum
resources. In order to achieve a secure and reliable transmission through the PCP
link, a set of orthogonal sequences, which is only known by legitimate users, is one-to-
one mapped to the potential information to be transmitted. An orthogonal sequence
is chosen in the transmission of each OFDM symbol corresponding to the present
security design. The PCP symbol is then generated by passing the selected orthog-
onal sequence through an OFDM modulator, so as to maintain the same time and
frequency characteristics as the data-carrying OFDM symbol. With the inherent or-
thogonality among all the candidate PCPs, the transmitted side information can be
reliably detected through cross correlations between the received PCP and elements
in the local PCP library of the receiver. The local candidate PCP that leads to the
maximum correlation peak will be taken as the PCP sent out by the transmitter, and
then used to assist the derivation of the adopted security design. Theoretical anal-
ysis and simulation results have been provided to validate the proposed embedded
confidential signaling link in secure OFDM systems.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions & Future Work
8.1 Conclusions
Securing wireless communications is challenging due to the inherent broadcast na-
ture of radio propagation. Traditional security mechanisms that do not address the
security issues at the physical layer cannot completely protect wireless networks. To
that end, physical layer security is emerging as a complement to traditional strate-
gies for securing wireless communications. This dissertation has investigated physical
layer security to: 1) evaluate the security level of wireless environments for develop-
ing adaptive security strategies, 2) enhance the built-in security of wireless OFDM
communication systems against passive eavesdropping, and 3) provide an embedded
signaling link for reliably and confidentially transmitting the data and security design
relevant parameters simultaneously.
Chapter 2 provides fundamentals related to the wireless communication security,
including risks and threats in wireless communication systems, general security objec-
tives, and constraints of traditional upper-layer security approaches. The concept of
physical layer security in wireless communications along with a literature survey of ex-
isting techniques is also presented. Furthermore, OFDM technology is reviewed. The
security weaknesses of OFDM physical layer due to its distinct time and frequency
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characteristics are addressed.
Chapter 3 investigates a time domain pilot correlation based detection technique
for recognizing the existence of active users in a wireless network. The proposed tech-
nique is based on a cyclic correlation between the complex conjugate multiplication
of adjacent received signal segments and a local reference derived from the in-band
pilots. The noise effect on the detection reliability is mitigated by a time domain
segment averaging following the phase rotation locking processing. The robustness
of the proposed detection algorithm to timing offset is improved by the time domain
OFDM symbol length based segmentation and the cyclic correlation. The robustness
to frequency offset is enhanced by the complex conjugate multiplication and the use
of the correlation magnitude. Simulation results show that the detection performance
of the proposed technique is satisfactory under low SNR conditions, even though both
timing and frequency offsets exist.
Chapter 4 proposes a novel device RF-DNA based estimation technique for the
number of active users in a network. Since any node in a network may act as a
malicious attacker and be a potential threat, the number of active users in a network is
crucial for understanding the security level of the wireless operating environment. As
a typical device RF-DNA that has device-specific nature, transmitter I/Q imbalance
is explored in the design. I/Q imbalance of a transmitter is first estimated from its
transmitting signals, and then compared with the I/Q imbalance estimate of each
previously identified active user through a hypothesis testing, where the Euclidean
distance between the new and previous estimates is adopted as the test metric. If
all the distances are larger than a properly selected threshold, a new active user is
claimed. Finally, the number of active users is obtained by counting all the distinct
I/Q imbalances. Simulation results have been provided to validate the proposed
estimation technique.
Chapter 5 proposes a novel and effective anti-eavesdropping OFDM system through
dynamic coordinate interleaving, by exploiting the channel reciprocity and uncorre-
lation feature exhibited among spatially separate wireless channels. Two coordinate
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interleaving based security schemes are investigated, which employ the subcarrier
channel gain and phase in determining the interleaving pattern, respectively. Depend-
ing on the CSI associated with the transmitter and legitimate receiver, the symbol
coordinate at a subcarrier with channel gain or channel phase larger than a predefined
threshold is interleaved. Since wireless channels associated with each pair of users
at separate locations exhibit independent propagation characteristics, the frequently
renewed selection of subcarriers undergoing coordinate interleaving is only shared
by legitimate users based on channel reciprocity. Without a matched subcarrier co-
ordinate de-interleaving pattern, erroneous information recovery is performed at the
eavesdropper so that eavesdropping is prevented. Theoretical analysis and simulation
results have been provided to validate the effectiveness of the proposed secure OFDM
system against eavesdropping.
In Chapter 6, another novel eavesdropping-resilient OFDM system through dy-
namic subcarrier interleaving is investigated as an alternative solution to prevent
eavesdropping, by taking advantage of the reciprocal, location-dependent and time-
varying nature of wireless channels. A transmitter employs its instantaneous CSI to
an intended receiver in designing the subcarrier interleaving pattern, where partial
subcarriers of each OFDM signal are selected and interleaved according to the sorted
order of their channel gains. Since wireless channels associated with each pair of
users at separate locations exhibit independent frequency selectivity, the frequently
renewed subcarrier interleaving scheme is only shared between legitimate nodes based
on channel reciprocity. As a result, mismatched information recovery is carried out
at the eavesdropper without an identical subcarrier interleaving pattern, thus pre-
venting malicious eavesdropping. In order to mitigate the impairment from imperfect
channel reciprocity between legitimate parties, a subcarrier selection algorithm is also
investigated to realize a trade-off between the eavesdropping resilience and legitimate
transmission reliability. It is observed from simulation results that eavesdropping on
the proposed system suffers a SER close to 100% while the legitimate transmission
has a SER matching to that of conventional OFDM systems.
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Chapter 7 provides an embedded confidential signaling link for the transmission
of security design relevant side information in secure OFDM systems. Extending our
previous study on PCP-OFDM, the sharing of the security design relevant side infor-
mation between legitimate users is enabled by a specially tailored PCP sequence. To
be specific, a set of orthogonal sequences, which is only known by legitimate users,
is one-to-one mapped to the potential information to be transmitted. An orthogo-
nal sequence is chosen in the transmission of each OFDM symbol corresponding to
the present security design. The PCP sequence is then generated by passing the se-
lected orthogonal sequence through an OFDM modulator, in order to maintain the
same time and frequency characteristics as the concurrently transmitted data-carrying
OFDM symbol. With the inherent orthogonality among all the candidate PCPs, the
side information transmitted through the PCP signaling link can be reliably identified
through cross correlations between the received PCP and elements in the local PCP
library at the receiver, and then used to assist the derivation of the security design
initiated by the transmitter. The validity of the PCP enabled signaling link has been
demonstrated by theoretical analysis and simulation results.
8.2 Future Work
There are several topics related to the presented research worthwhile for further
study. Some of them are listed as follows:
• On the topic of security level assessment in wireless networks, the presented
scheme explores the number of active users as the evaluation metric. However,
other network relevant parameters that can also indicate the security status in
wireless environments can be exploited to increase the evaluation accuracy.
• In the proposed device RF-DNA based estimation technique for the number
of active users in a network, only one typical hardware impairment in wireless
devices—I/Q imbalance, is addressed. The proposed estimation technique can
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be further extended to other device RF-DNAs as well, such as frequency and
magnitude errors.
• Regarding the enhancement of the built-in security in wireless communication
systems, this dissertation concentrates on the security against passive attacks,
considering that passive attacks often cause fatal damage to a wireless commu-
nication system. It is thus necessary to extend the current work to a general
scenario consisting of both passive and active attacks.
• In the wireless channel based physical layer security approaches, the random-
ness of the wireless channel between the transmitter and legitimate receiver
is exploited for the security design. As a precondition, the identity of the le-
gitimate receiver must be accurately verified. Therefore, reliable and efficient
authentication techniques also need to be investigated.
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Appendices
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Appendix A
Timing and Frequency Offsets in
OFDM
A.1 Timing Offset
Timing offset, which comes from the effect of sampling time error at the receiver
side, is a serious problem in OFDM system. Since large timing offset can be eas-
ily corrected with OFDM frame synchronization, the timing offset addressed in the
appendix is the residue error after the frame synchronization. Assume X(k) is the
frequency domain data to be transmitted using the OFDM system. After the pro-
cessing of the OFDM transmitter introduced in Chapter 2, the corresponding time
domain OFDM signal x(t) is up-converted and transmitted over the wireless channel.
At the receiver side, the received signal is sampled with the analog-to-digital converter
(ADC) for demodulation and information recovery, where timing errors may exist and
thus degrade the receiver performance. The OFDM process chain with timing offset
is shown in Fig. A.1, where y(n) denotes the received time domain signal and Y (k)
stands for the output of the FFT.
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X(k) x(n) y(n) Y(k)
IFFT FFTTiming offset
Figure A.1: OFDM process chain with timing offset.
With IFFT, the time domain transmitted OFDM signal from X(k) is obtained as
x(n) =
N−1∑
k=0
X(k)ej2pi
kn
N , n = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1. (A.1)
Let ∆n denote the relative timing offset, which is the ratio of the timing offset to the
sampling interval. If the received signal is sampled with the timing error ∆n, y(n)
will be a time shifted version of x(n). Mathematically,
y(n) = x(n+ ∆n)
=
N−1∑
k=0
X(k)ej2pi
k(n+∆n)
N , n = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1. (A.2)
Since large timing offset is easy to be compensated, usually only the residual error
(fractional timing offset) exists in the following processing, and the orthogonality of
the OFDM signal will normally not be destroyed by the timing offset. In this case,
the recovered data after FFT at the receiver can be expressed as
Y (k) =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
[
N−1∑
l=0
X(l)ej2pi
l(n+∆n)
N
]
e−j2pi
kn
N
=
1
N
N−1∑
l=0
X(l)ej2pi
l∆n
N
[
N−1∑
n=0
ej2pi
(l−k)n
N
]
= X(k)ej2pi
k∆n
N , k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1. (A.3)
Equation (A.3) shows that the fractional timing offset causes a phase rotation of the
recovered signal, which is linearly proportional to the subcarrier index.
173
A.2 Frequency Offset
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Figure A.2: Illustration of frequency offset in OFDM signals.
Since there are local oscillator errors and Doppler frequency shifts in wireless
OFDM system, frequency offset always exists between the transmitter and receiver,
as illustrated in Fig. A.2. Similar to the analysis of timing offset, the OFDM process
chain with frequency offset is given as Fig. A.3.
X(k) x(n) y(n) Y(k)
IFFT FFTFreuqency offset ~ ~
Figure A.3: OFDM process chain with frequency offset.
In order to avoid potential confusion, the received signal with frequency offset is
represented by y˜(n) and the corresponding recovered data is denoted by Y˜ (k). Let
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∆k represent the relative frequency offset, which is defined as the ratio of the actual
frequency offset to the subcarrier spacing. The received signal with frequency offset
∆k can be written as
y˜(n) =
N−1∑
k=0
X(k)ej2pi
(k+∆k)n
N
=
N−1∑
k=0
X(k)ej2pi
kn
N ej2pi
∆kn
N
= x(n)ej2pi
∆kn
N , n = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1. (A.4)
As shown in (A.4), the effect of frequency offset on each time domain OFDM sample
x(n) is a phase shift of 2pi∆kn/N . The data symbol after the FFT can thus be given
by
Y˜ (k) =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
[
N−1∑
l=0
X(l)ej2pi
(l+∆k)n
N
]
e−j2pi
kn
N
=
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
[
N−1∑
l=0
X(l)ej2pi
(l−k+∆k)n
N
]
=
1
N
N−1∑
l=0
X(l)
[
N−1∑
n=0
ej2pi
(l−k+∆k)n
N
]
,
k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1. (A.5)
With the geometric series expansion, i.e.
N−1∑
n=0
an =
1− aN
1− a , equation (A.5) can be
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rewritten as
Y˜ (k) =
1
N
N−1∑
l=0
X(l)
1− ej2pi(l−k+∆k)
1− ej2pi l−k+∆kN
=
1
N
N−1∑
l=0
X(l)
ejpi(l−k+∆k)
(
e−jpi(l−k+∆k) − ejpi(l−k+∆k))
ejpi
l−k+∆k
N
(
e−jpi
l−k+∆k
N − ejpi l−k+∆kN
)
=
1
N
N−1∑
l=0
X(l)
ejpi(l−k+∆k)
ejpi
l−k+∆k
N
−2j sin(pi(l − k + ∆k))
−2j sin(pi l−k+∆k
N
)
=
1
N
N−1∑
l=0
X(l)ejpi(l−k+∆k)
N−1
N
sin(pi(l − k + ∆k))
sin(pi l−k+∆k
N
)
,
k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1. (A.6)
For a small x, sin(x) ≈ x. It can be used to simplify the above equation, especially
when N is very large. Thus,
Y˜ (k) ≈
N−1∑
l=0
X(l)ejpi(l−k+∆k)
N−1
N
sin(pi(l − k + ∆k))
pi(l − k + ∆k)
= X(k)ejpi(∆k)
N−1
N
sin(pi∆k)
pi∆k
+
N−1∑
l=0,l 6=k
X(l)ejpi(l−k+∆k)
N−1
N
sin(pi(l − k + ∆k))
pi(l − k + ∆k) ,
k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, (A.7)
where
N−1∑
l=0,l 6=k
X(l)ejpi(l−k+∆k)
N−1
N
sin(pi(l−k+∆k))
pi(l−k+∆k) is referred to as inter-carrier interference
caused by the sidelobes of other subcarriers due to frequency offset. It can be con-
cluded from (A.7) that a phase shift and an amplitude attenuation are introduced
by the frequency offset to the demodulated output. At the same time, the recovered
data is interfered by the signals from other subcarriers of the same OFDM symbol
due to the loss of the orthogonality.
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